Office of the Historian

793.94/8863: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 20, 1937—5 p.m.
[Received July 20—9:50 a.m.]

213. My telegram No. 211, July 19, 6 p.m.

1.
The Chinese reply to the Japanese representations at Nanking was sensationally displayed in this morning’s issues of Japanese papers. [Page 222] The only editorial comment on the reply was that of the Nichi Nichi which contended that the reply left Japan no choice but “to cross the Rubicon”. Other editorial opinion was obviously written before the reply was received here and agreed that a serious state of affairs would arise if the Chinese reply were unsatisfactory.
2.
A statement issued to the papers late last night by the Foreign Office charges the Chinese Government with seeking to befog the issue, which the Japanese contend is only whether or not the Chinese Government will continue to obstruct implementation of local agreement reached by the Japanese on July 11 with the Hopei–Chahar authorities. The Japanese authorities in China are reported to have expressed strong dissatisfaction over the reply.
3.
At the War Office today for the first time pessimism was expressed to the Military Attaché over situation, this sentiment being created by the character of the Chinese response. We learn at the Foreign Office that the Chinese reply is regarded as not responsive to the Japanese representations so much so that the Japanese Counselor at Nanking arranged to have a further interview this morning with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain clarification of several of the points stressed by the Chinese note. Our informant at the Foreign Office stated that although final opinion with regard to the Chinese now [note?] would have to await reports of this morning’s interview that note was believed to be reflective of desire by the Chinese Government to avoid termination of discussions between the two Governments.
4.
The Foreign Office informant states that one development yesterday which may influence future developments adversely was the fact that the Ho–Umeza line was crossed by several Chinese contingents. The situation in North China, however, was holding out greater prospects of favorable settlement by reason of the fact that in further fulfillment of the reported July 11 agreement Chinese troops were being withdrawn from Peiping. If it were not for the fact that the 37th Division were getting out of hand it could be said that the situation in the Peiping area was developing satisfactorily.
5.
Other than military action the alternatives open to Japan seem to be to renew the discussions at Nanking or to allow matters to drift until there is introduced into the situation some factor which cannot now be foreseen. It will be apparent that no responsible expression of opinion with regard to the future attitude or action of the Japanese Government can be obtained at this moment.
6.
The foreign editor of an important Japanese paper stated today to a member of my staff that notwithstanding sensational treatment by Japanese press of the Chinese note editorial boards are privately of the opinion that the Chinese Government does not intend its reply [Page 223] to be construed as final rejection of Japanese representations. He regarded General Chiang’s proclamation issued last night as being intended principally for Chinese consumption and that while firm in tone it was so drafted as to be capable of interpretation by Japan as a conciliatory statement.
7.
In appraising the chances of war we should bear in mind the fact that the Chinese have offered the Japanese an armistice and have proposed settlement by diplomatic negotiation. It must be evident to the Japanese Government that its case before the world would be improved if it could accept the proposal. On the other hand such acceptance would be difficult to reconcile with its previous contention that the matter is a local issue.
8.
Another factor possibly enters the picture. It is reported today that Soviet forces have again attacked on the Manchurian frontier. The possibility of Soviet action in case of war can hardly be ignored in the calculations of the Japanese Government.

Repeated to Peiping.

Grew