793.94/8882: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 21—6:40 a.m.]
305. 1. The following translation of an address given at Kuling by Chiang Kai-shek is published this morning by Central News Agency, Nanking, under yesterday’s date:
“When China is carrying out her cardinal policy of maintaining external peace and internal unity the Lukouchiao incident suddenly broke out, throwing the nation into a state of profound indignation and causing great concern to the whole world. The consequences of the incident threatened the very existance of China and the peace of East Asia. At this present juncture, in answer to many inquiries, I wish to state the following:
First, the Chinese race has always been peace loving. The internal policy of the National Government has always been directed towards maintaining internal unity and in our foreign relations, mutual respect and coexistence with other nations.
In February this year at the plenary session of the Central Executive Committee a manifesto was issued in which these points were clearly emphasized. For the last two years, as actual facts show, the National Government in its policy toward Japan has constantly sought to confine to all pending problems to proper recognized channels of diplomacy so that a just settlement could be reached. Our people should understand our own strength. For the past few years we have bent all our efforts towards patient endeavors and ensured peace in face of grave difficulties and grievous pain so that we may achieve national reconstruction. For this reason in my report on foreign affairs at the fifth plenary session, the year before last, I stated that while there is the slightest hope for peace we will not abandon it, so long as we have not reached the limit of endurance we will not talk lightly of sacrifice; and the subsequent explanation at [Page 217] the Central Executive session shows beyond the least doubt our anxiety to maintain peace. But although a weak country, if, unfortunately, we should have reached that least limit, then there is the only thing to do. This is to throw the last ounce of energy of our nation into a struggle for national existence. And when that is done, neither time nor circumstance will permit our stopping midway to seek peace. We should realize that to seek peace after war has once begun means that terms would be such that subjugation of our nation and complete annihilation of our race would be encountered. Let our people realize to the full extent the meaning of ‘limit of endurance’ and the extent of sacrifice thereby involved. For once that stage is reached we have to sacrifice and fight to the bitter end though with always the expectancy of eventual victory. Should we hesitate, however, and vainly hope for temporary safety we shall perish forever.
Second, there may be people who imagine that the Lukouchiao incident was a sudden and unpremeditated step. But already a month ago there were symptoms that an incident would ensue because of statements from the other side made both through their press directly and indirectly through diplomatic channels. Besides, before and after the incident we received news from various sources to the effect that the opposite side was aiming to expand the Tangku Agreement to enlarge the bogus East Hopei Government, drive out the 29th Army, force out General Sung Che Yuan and try to impose other similar demands. [From] the above, it can easily be seen that the Lukouchiao incident is not a sudden and accidental development. From this incident we must realize that the other side has a definite purpose towards us and that peace is not to be as easily secured.
According to our reports, the only way by which the Lukouchiao incident could have been avoided was to allow the foreign armies to come and go freely within our territory without limitation while our own army must abide by the imposed restrictions upon its movements or allow others to fire upon our soldiers and for us not to return fire. Any country in the world that has the least self-respect could not possibly accept such humiliation. The four northeastern provinces have already been lost to us for 6 years, following that there war [was] the Tangku Agreement and now the point of conflict at Lukouchiao has reached the very gates of Peiping. If we allow the bridge to be occupied by force then the result would be that our ancient capital of 500 years and the political, cultural and strategic center of our entire North would be lost. Peiping of today would then become a second Mukden, the Hopei and Chahar provinces would share the fate of the four northeastern provinces.
If Peiping could become a second Mukden what is there to prevent Nanking from becoming a second Peiping? The safety of Lukouchiao therefore is a problem involving the existence of the nation as a whole and whether it can be amicably settled comes within the comprehension of our term ‘limit of endurance’. If finally we reach the stage where it is impossible to avoid the inevitable, then we cannot do otherwise than to resist and to be prepared for the supreme sacrifice. This resistance is forced upon us. We are not seeking war. We are meeting attacks upon our existence. Our people must realize that today the Central Government is in the might [act?] of preparing measures to defend ourselves. A weak nation as we are, we cannot ensure the very, existence of our nation. It is impossible for us not to [Page 218] safeguard the heritage of our fathers, a duty which we must fulfill to the utmost. Let us realize, however, that once war has begun there is no looking backward. We must fight to the bitter end. If we allow one inch more of our territory to be lost then we would be guilty of committing an unpardonable offense against our race. What would be left to us other than to throw every resource of the nation into a struggle for the final victory?
Third, at this solemn moment, Japan will have to decide whether the Lukouchiao incident would result in a major war between China and Japan. Whether or not there is the least vestige of any hope for peace between China and Japan depends upon the action of the Japanese Army. Even at the very last second before we abandon all hope of peace we would still be hoping for peace, we would still be seeking a solution through proper diplomatic channels.
The following four points will clearly show what our stand on this issue is: first, any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of our nation; second, the status of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council is fixed by the Central Government and we should not allow any illegal alteration; third, we will not agree to the removal by outside pressure of those local officials appointed by the Central Government such as the Chairman of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council; and fourth, we will not allow any restriction being placed upon the position now held by the 29th Army.
These four points constitute the minimum conditions possible as a basis for negotiations for any nation no matter how weak it may be. If the opposite side will place itself in our position and have due regard for maintaining peace in the Far East and does not desire to force China and Japan into hostilities and to make them enemies forever, it shall realize that those conditions are the minimum that can be considered. To sum up, during the Lukouchiao incident the Central Government, ensuring the very existence of our nation, has taken a clear and unequivocal stand. But let us realize that we are a nation. We seek for peace but do not seek for peace at any cost. We do not want war but we may be forced to defend ourselves. During this grave crisis the Government may be counted upon to guide the nation with calmness and restraint, the people likewise must show sobriety and discipline. In discharging our obligations to our race let there be no distinction between North and South, age or youth but let all implicitly and with iron discipline follow the guidance of the Government.”
2. Sent to the Department, by mail to Peiping.