Office of the Historian

793.94/8865: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, July 20, 1937—2 a.m.
[Received 6:40 a.m.]

302. Our 301, July 19, 7 p.m.

1.
The Chinese aide-mémoire was delivered by a subordinate official to the Japanese Counsellor of Embassy July 19, 3 p.m., and the latter regarded it as unsatisfactory because it did not deal specifically with the July 11 agreement. He asked whether it was intended as an answer to the Japanese aide-mémoire of July 17 and the bearer could not reply. According to the report the Counsellor asserted his conviction that the document would not be accepted by his Government as adequate and he would be willing to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs before midnight to receive further oral assurances and would hold the document in the meantime. On receiving this message the Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would be away all day but would see the Counsellor July 20, 8 a.m., which appointment the Counsellor accepted.
2.
At half past 10 the British Ambassador suggested that I call and told me he had seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs that afternoon and was informed of the gist of the aide-mémoire. He was favorably impressed thinking it dignified, reasonable and conciliatory but when he read the text as released he saw clearly it would not satisfy the Japanese. The Ambassador said incidentally the section outlining possible methods of settling the dispute embodied suggestions made by him informally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs some days ago. He said the Minister showed distinct signs of the strain he has been under in making a decision which we both agreed threatens to involve China either in internal dissension or war.
3.
Our conversation took place in the British Embassy chancery. Shortly after 11 the Japanese Counsellor called by appointment and discussed the situation with the Ambassador for more than one hour in his residence. The Ambassador subsequently told me that he pointed out to the Counsellor that the Minister for Foreign Affairs could not reasonably be expected to accept the July 11 agreement since he was aware neither of its contents nor implications. The Ambassador urged that the agreement be fully explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of [at?] the forthcoming interview and that the Counsellor take into consideration the difficulties confronting the Minister. He intimated that upon the effort of the Counsellor to straighten out this point which in itself was of trivial importance might hang the issue of peace or war. The Counsellor admitted the force of these arguments in part but insisted that the Japanese point of view must be considered.
4.
The Ambassador and I fear that the Japanese military will force events in the North and that the conversations in Nanking will be of no effect unless the Chinese Government surrenders unconditionally. He stated he has discussed the matter in a frank and common sense manner with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and a [the?] Japanese Counsellor at their desire separately several times hoping for a compromise. He has scrupulously avoided delivering messages and everything that might hint of mediation. He has also courteously kept me informed for the benefit of the American Ambassador and the Department.
5.
The Chinese Foreign Office at midnight issued an account of a conversation July 19, 1 p.m. between the Minister of War and the Japanese Military Attaché. The Military Attaché is reported as intimating that failure to withdraw “Central Government troops” from Hopei might result in bringing the crisis to its final stage. To this the Minister of War is reported as saying inter alia that the sending of troops as a precautionary measure had been necessitated by the large [Page 215] increase in the Japanese forces. He asserted China’s right to move troops in its own territory but intimated that withdrawal of additional forces by Japan from Hopei might lead China to consider similar action.

Sent to Peiping, Tokyo.

Peck