793.94/8814: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:50 p.m.]
293. An American-educated official having a very important post in the Chinese Government and close relations with General Chiang described the northern crisis briefly as follows:
The Japanese conquest of Manchuria, then of Jehol, and 2 years ago the forcing of the Ho-Umetsu Agreement show that the present Japanese attempt to consolidate their gains in Hopei is merely a step in a methodical program. If successful, the process will be repeated in successive advances without foreseeable limits. Consequently minor details of the occurrence and even the terms now being negotiated locally are inconsequential. The question the Chinese Government must decide is at what juncture to attempt to stem the Japanese advance. At the present stage Japan is immeasurably superior to China in military strength. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government is determined that there shall be no repetition of the Mukden incident when the mere presence of the Japanese Army magically transformed Chinese into Japanese territory.
- 2.
- The Chinese Government is without representatives in Tientsin, although some are going, and does not know what terms are being discussed by local military officers and it disavows the whole proceeding. Informant believes that at least a portion of the 29th Army especially the 37th Division at Peiping will fight rather than submit to such terms as evacuation to the south. Informant branded as propaganda to weaken the morale of the 29th Army the Tokyo press despatch published yesterday quoting a high Japanese Army officer as stating that the Chinese Government intends to utilize the Japanese to destroy the 29th Army. Informant thought the 29th Army must know that the Chinese Government will support it if fighting occurs. [Page 196] Informant said that the political unification of China has not been completed and his considered opinion is that the Government would be overthrown if it did not fight either to prevent actual alienation of Hopei or in support of the 29th Army in the event of hostilities. Although I indicated a desire to learn whether the Chinese Government had sent troops to the north or made other preparations for fighting the Japanese, informant refused comment. Having left General Chiang July 13 informant may not know the latter’s decision.
- 3.
- I thoroughly agree with Peiping’s July 17, 1 p.m.,32 that the future is obscure but my impression is that the Chinese Government may decide to defer armed resistance to a time of its own choosing unless its hands are forced as described above. I was informed by a former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 2 years ago that the Chinese Government would not attempt to retain by force of arms the area north of the Yellow River. The present interview was remarkable in that the informant did not question me about foreign mediation. In an interview some months ago he informed me Chinese leaders had learned that China could expect no effective assistance from other countries against Japan and that China must work out its own salvation.
Sent to the Department, Peiping, and Tokyo.
- Telegram No. 253, not printed.↩