793.94/8781: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

203. Embassy’s 199, July 14, 5 p.m.

1.
The British Chargé d’Affaires decided, subsequent to our talk yesterday, that his instructions required him to see the Foreign Minister and he therefore called yesterday on Hirota. Dodds confined himself to repeating Eden’s observation to Japanese Ambassador in London knowing that present moment might not be an opportune one for opening the conversations in London looking towards an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations. Hirota asked Dodds if he had observed the absence of propaganda on the part of Japan. Dodds replied in the affirmative and said that he had so reported to his Government. (See last sentence, paragraph 3, Embassy’s 193, July 13, 6 p.m.13)
2.
Today Dodds received definite instructions directing the British diplomatic representatives in Tokyo and Nanking to counsel moderation on both sides. Dodds called on Horinouchi14 but contented himself [Page 179] by stating orally that “the British Government is using such influence as it may possess at Nanking to persuade the Chinese Government to take no action which might make the situation in North China most difficult. If in the course of any negotiations that may take place for a settlement the British Government could be of any assistance it will be glad to listen to any suggestions that the Japanese Government would care to make”.
[3?]
Dodds felt that he must take this action because the Chinese authorities in Nanking would in the meantime be assuring the Chinese Government that similar steps were being taken in Tokyo. He refrained, however, from “counseling moderation”. He had not yet received a reply to his telegram mentioned in paragraph 2, Embassy’s 199, July 14, 5 p.m.
4.
Dodds tells me that Horinouchi, after long consideration, thanked him warmly for this act of friendship, presumably referring to the counseling of moderation in Nanking. Horinouchi furthermore expressed optimism as to a peaceful outcome and gave Dodds explicit assurances that no Japanese troops had yet been moved from Japan Proper or Chosen and that no mobilization had taken place.
5.
In my conversation with Dodds today he gave me a somewhat different impression of Eden’s representations to Yoshida (paragraph 3, Embassy’s 199, July 14, 5 p.m.). Eden apparently told Yoshida that the present moment for opening the expected Anglo-Japanese negotiations would not be opportune if the situation in China were allowed to become worse. It is not clear that Eden referred to reenforcements.
6.
The French Ambassador has been told by his Government that he may make in Tokyo representations similar to those of his British and American colleagues. I am informed that he strongly disapproves of making representations of any kind and that he will for the present ignore the authorization given him. He is convinced that the Japanese did not premeditate or commence the incident and he believes that they are anxious to avoid war (see paragraph 4, Embassy’s 192, July 13, 5 p.m.15)
7.
As this telegram was about to be despatched, Department’s 115, July 14, 7 p.m.,16 was received and has just been decoded. I am sending it as drafted and without abridging it as it may be of interest to the Department to learn how events have unfolded here.

Repeated to Peiping.

Grew
  1. Not printed.
  2. Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.
  3. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 319.
  4. Not printed.