It is hoped the Department will have no objection to the scope of
these reports being extended to include Soviet relations with China
as well as those with Japan and “Manchukuo.” All of these questions
are so intimately bound up with one another that it is difficult to
separate them. In view of Soviet penetration into Sinkiang and Outer
Mongolia and the Soviet influence on the Chinese communist armies on
the one hand, and Japanese domination of Manchuria and penetration
into North China and Inner Mongolia on the other, Soviet-Chinese
relations affect Soviet-Japanese relations at almost every turn.
[Enclosure-Extract]
Memorandum Prepared by the Embassy in the
Soviet Union
There has been little change during the last few weeks in the
character of the Soviet attitude toward Japan or in the
relations between the two countries. Nothing has occurred to
diminish in any degree the disillusionment and bitterness
occasioned in Moscow by the conclusion of the German-Japanese
pact, and for the moment there are no immediate prospects of
improvement in relations between the two countries. Moscow’s
policy with regard to Japan and “Manchukuo” continues to be one
of firm restraint in matters of diplomacy, and of continued
preparation for war. The Soviet leaders have no desire to
provoke a conflict at the present time and appear to be
determined not to allow themselves to be provoked into a rash
action.
In accordance with this policy, the Moscow leaders, after the
publication of the German-Japanese pact, refused to proceed with
the signing of the new long-term fisheries convention which had
been negotiated before the German-Japanese agreement became
known. On the other hand, when the Japanese threatened to carry
on their fishing activities without any agreement at all and to
employ the Japanese Navy for the protection of their fishermen,
the Soviet Government refused to allow this threat to become a
question of prestige and prudently agreed to prolong the old
agreement for another year.
Meanwhile the situation along the borders of Outer Mongolia and
the Soviet Far Eastern provinces has again become delicate and
there
[Page 22]
has been a revival
of that extensive border friction which had shown a welcome
tendency to decline during the autumn of 1936. With the
suspension of through traffic (at the border point of
Pogranichnaya) between Harbin and Vladivostok, the entire border
between Japanese-controlled areas and the Soviet Union, from the
Pacific Ocean to Outer Mongolia, would seem to be closed to
international traffic, except at Manchuli and Khabarovsk.
Conditions along the rest of the border, if the reports from the
Soviet side may be believed, continue to resemble those of
suspended hostility between two belligerent countries, rather
than of normal peacetime frontier relations.
Relations between the Soviet Union and China are less susceptible
to ready description than are those between Moscow and Tokyo. As
has been indicated in previous reports, Moscow has deprecated
the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, but has continued to use its
influence in Nanking in favor of compromise with the Shensi
military leaders. For the time being, the chief concern of
Soviet diplomatists in regard to China is that a sufficiently
stiff opposition should be presented to Japan in China proper to
detract Japanese attention from the Manchurian border and to
make it impossible for the Kwantung Army to leave its southern
flank unguarded. Considerations for the well-being of China play
a very minor part—if any—in the determination of Soviet policy.
Moscow will continue to work for a general anti-Japanese front,
including the Chinese communists, and its attitude toward
Nanking will continue to be determined by the extent to which
the Kuomintang is ready to cooperate in the realization of this
aim.
There is no doubt that the Kremlin is doing whatever it can to
utilize the communist armies in China as a weapon for the
furtherance of its policy. Insofar as this is true, Moscow may
be said to share responsibility for the kidnapping of Chiang
Kai-shek and the subsequent events in Shensi. It may very well
be that the subsequent development of events in that province
turned out to be quite different than that which the Kremlin had
anticipated. But there seems to be no doubt that the Chinese
communists who were so closely connected with these events were
following what they considered to be good Comintern policy.
Their actions represented at best a misguided interpretation of
ideas which they had received from Sinkiang and points west.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
