700.0011 Pacific/18
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Atherton)17
I called on Sir Alexander Cadogan today and asked him what action the Imperial Conference had taken in regard to the question [Page 987] of a Far Eastern pact of non-aggression referred to in my 356 of June 8, 12 noon. He said that the Imperial Conference had passed no resolution on the matter, but had reached a confidential conclusion that “such a pact was a worthy objective to work towards over a period of time, but that the furtherance of the matter and all discussions in connection with it should be left in the hands of the British Government.” Sir Alexander Cadogan then went on to point out to me that the Japanese Ambassador was still insisting in his conversations with the Foreign Office that instructions would be shortly forthcoming from Tokyo to permit him to proceed with Anglo-Japanese conversations. (My 292 of May 18, 6 p.m.)18
Cadogan was very doubtful, however, whether Yoshida would be in a position to open these discussions at an early date, and felt that perhaps the best approach to the matter of a pact of non-aggression in the Pacific lay in the course of these very Anglo-Japanese discussions which Yoshida contemplated. In other words, that in any pact of non-aggression in the Pacific Japan was the most vital factor, and an indication of her attitude would be most helpful as to whether such a scheme were possible. It was thought more advisable, however, to raise such a question casually with the Japanese as a corollary to other discussions rather than make it a main isolated question. Cadogan went on to tell me that he had vaguely discussed the matter of this pact with the Chinese Ambassador as he had with me (see my telegram first above mentioned) and the Chinese Ambassador had stated the pact would only be of interest to China if the mainland were included, which would seem to bar out the idea of a mere extension of the present Four Power Treaty. Cadogan pointed out to the Chinese Ambassador his attitude would seem, for example, to involve the question of Manchukuo, and Cadogan inquired of the Chinese Ambassador whether, in taking up this position, the question of the future of Manchuria had been considered. The Chinese Ambassador undertook to obtain the further views of his Government in this connection.
Cadogan then stated that if Manchukuo was not included in the Pacific pact of non-aggression, then it might be claimed on her behalf at some future date, that any hostile acts of hers were not a violation of the pact. Furthermore, Cadogan went on, the question of North China was involved in the question of the mainland and in this also foreign interests as well as those of Japan and China were involved. Accordingly, Cadogan reiterated the importance he attached to some indication, however, informally arrived at, as to what the attitude of the Japanese Government would be to this proposed pact.
[Page 988]Cadogan then said he was equally interested in what the view of the United States would be. I said that in my first conversation with him about this subject (see my 292 of May 18, 6 p.m.) he had informed me that Mr. Lyons’ proposal in the Imperial Conference for such a pact had taken the British Government by surprise, and, indeed, it was generally assumed that Mr. Lyons had made his proposal more with the idea of making political capital in Australia. I did not know how far the views of my Government had crystallized since that conversation, but would raise this question with the Department of State and communicate with him again.
In a word, my conversation with Cadogan today impressed me with the fact that the British intended, in the first instance, for the purpose of complying with the conclusions of the Imperial Conference, to proceed with discussions as to the possibility of a pact of non-aggression in the Pacific, but due to the very nature of the allied questions that must be settled before such a pact could be achieved, such as Sino-Japanese questions over Manchuria, North China, etc., etc., it was impossible to anticipate any early progress.
It may also be noted that however reluctant the British may appear to be in going ahead with this question, it does offer a convenient method for raising those issues in the Far East which are awaiting settlement.