700.0011 Pacific/15
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 15.]
Sir: The statement made by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons of Australia at the opening meeting of the British Empire Conference in London on May 14, that Australia would welcome a non-aggression pact among the countries of the Pacific conceived in the spirit of the League of Nations Covenant, has been received with reticence and [Page 980] suspicion in Japan. In Japanese official circles only the Foreign Office spokesman has commented on the suggestion and then in a non-committal vein, while the press has been unreservedly critical of it. It is indicated that although Japan is not opposed to the idea in principle this country feels that the present is not the appropriate moment to consider such a pact. Besides, it is stated, Japan would be loathe to discuss certain issues of a controversial nature which would undoubtedly come up for discussion in any conference that might be held for the conclusion of a Pacific non-aggression treaty.
The idea of a non-aggression pact between two or more of the Powers bordering on the Pacific is not a new one, the question first having been raised over three years ago. For purposes of ready reference, instances known to the Embassy in which the matter has been proposed or publicly discussed, are briefly mentioned, as follows:
[Here follows summary of instances.]
There are several reasons why a Pacific non-aggression pact would not be feasible from Japan’s point of view. Soviet Russia would undoubtedly have to be included in any general non-aggression pact of the countries bordering on the Pacific and Japan has consistently fought shy of that country’s proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. The question of “Manchukuo” would have to be taken into consideration if efforts were made to conclude such a treaty, and it is well known in Japan that the United States and probably Great Britain do not intend to reverse the position taken by them with regard to the question of “Manchukuo”. Likewise, Japan’s relations with China would undoubtedly come up for discussion, and it is evident that Japan is opposed to round-table discussions of its relations with China. Furthermore, it is very likely that Japan would demand—probably without success—further access to world markets and a redistribution of economic resources.
There is enclosed a memorandum of a conversation4 which Mr. Andrews, Second Secretary of the Embassy, had with Colonel Longfield Lloyd, Australian Trade Commissioner, on May 27. The gist of Colonel Lloyd’s remarks was that in his opinion Prime Minister Lyons’s proposal was not only a friendly but also a generous gesture, and that the Japanese would be making a great mistake if they refused to give it due consideration. He also said that he had received the impression that the Lyons proposition, if made in the terms reported by the press, was a warning signal that Japan must either cooperate with Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand or else be prepared for the erection of economic barriers against Japan, certainly by Australia.
There is warrant for entertaining doubt whether pacts of non-aggression serve any useful purpose in the absence of collateral engagements [Page 981] among the concerned nations to limit instruments of aggression to levels calculated to avoid excitation of mutual suspicion. The so-called Locarno Pact5 is a case in point. That Pact offered a measure of security and was included among those factors making for stability in Europe only so long as Germany’s military establishments remained within limitations imposed upon that country; and without laboring the point it may be suggested that there is an intimate relationship between rearmament during the past few years by virtually all the principal nations of the world and the “realistic” attitude forced upon the League of Nations by Great Britain and France with regard to international disputes laid before the League for adjustment.
At the risk of stating the obvious, the primary problems which inhere in limiting armament, especially naval armament, rise in the final analysis out of differences in the basic foreign policies of the concerned nations. It is, for example, entirely illusory to discuss the principle of naval ratio between the United States and Japan on the basis of the extent of their respective coast lines and lines of communication, but on the other hand, when there exists—as there does between the United States and Great Britain—similarity of objective in the field of policy, and a resultant sense of security on the part of one nation against aggression by the other, technical problems of armament limitation lend themselves to solution. From this point of view, it would seem unwise to give consideration to the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression for the Pacific until the policies pursued by each of the nations in that area, especially in the Far East, shall be such as to offer reasonable expectation of there being concluded at the same time an agreement to limit naval armament.
When the time comes, if it ever does, for such a pact, it should include all of the interested countries and not be limited to a bi-lateral agreement, in my opinion. But I cannot feel that the time is ripe for any such measure. Machinery already exists to prevent aggression in the Pacific area as everywhere else, notably the Kellogg Pact, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the Nine and Four Power Treaties6 among other instruments. One power has partially wrecked that machinery and it would seem to me premature to write that act of sabotage up to profit and loss and now proceed to erect a new machine until we have more substantial evidence than now exists that there has been a permanent change of heart on the part of the wreckers. We ourselves would scrupulously abide by the terms of such an agreement but it would be a one-sided deal because events have amply proved that the other party would be likely to abide by it only so long as it [Page 982] suited that party’s convenience to do so. “Altered circumstances” have before now been adduced to explain and extenuate breaches of international contracts. Manchuria was suddenly declared the “life line” of Japan. Would it be so very far fetched to believe that some day in future the Philippines might similarly, through “altered circumstances”, be likewise declared another “life line”? Furthermore, it seems to me that the whole structure of international contracts in general and the peace machinery in particular are weakened by constantly planning to erect new machinery when the machinery already existing is ample, if respected. New peace machinery is, in my opinion, dangerous because it invites confidence and reliance. If you can’t find a rock to build your house on, but only sand, it’s much safer not to build a house at all.
In this connection I am favorably impressed with Lieutenant Smith-Hutton’s prize essay for 1937 on “Naval Limitations” published in the April issue of United States Naval Institute Proceedings. He sums up his sound, logical and common sense thesis as follows:
[Here follows extensive quotation urging security precautions until economic problems of less-favored but determined and aggressive nations are settled.]
Another excellent article on Japan entitled “Between Two Worlds Lies Japan” by Nathaniel Peffer appears in the New York Times Sunday supplement of April 25. Mr. Peffer diagnoses Japanese psychology and character with rare insight.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Signed October 16, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, p. 289.↩
- For text of the Four Power treaty signed between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan at Washington, December 13, 1921, see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 33.↩