890.00/47
Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis of a Conversation With the British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Cadogan)99
Sir Alexander Cadogan told me today at a luncheon at his home that Eden had suggested that he have a talk with me about the Far East, and that at any time that was convenient to me he would come to see me, or would be glad to have me go to the Foreign Office, if I preferred. I told him I was having a meeting with Mr. MacDonald1 in the House of Commons at 4:30 that afternoon with regard to sugar, and agreed to stop at the Foreign Office to see him between 5:30 and 6:00 o’clock.
Cadogan first told me that Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador, had for some time been urging them to consider some kind of an agreement to remove tension and misunderstanding in the Far East, and particularly, to promote the economic rehabilitation of China. He had intimated very definitely to Yoshida that until Japan takes a different attitude than heretofore about agreements and treaties which she enters into, and until there is more assurance that she is prepared to live up to her agreements and to cooperate for the promotion of peace and progress in the Far East, there is not much incentive to consider new agreements.
Yoshida had, however, insisted that the militarists are losing ground in Japan and that it would be very helpful towards getting Japan on the right track if something could be done to induce Japan to revise her policy in China, which had been a failure, and adopt a policy of cooperation which would soon justify itself.
Cadogan said that he and his associates in the Foreign Office do not feel that it is practicable to try to settle anything much with Japan so [Page 976] long as the militaristic group is in control, or until the Japanese Government recognizes the error of its ways and wants to cooperate. Nevertheless, there have been some recent indications of a change in attitude, even on the part of the present Government and, at Yoshida’s request, they had finally decided to say that they would be glad to consider any program or concrete suggestions which the Japanese Government might wish to make with regard to cooperation looking towards an improvement of the economic situation in China. He had told Yoshida, however, that Japan was in such bad odor with China that the British were fearful it might have a bad effect in China if they were to make an agreement with Japan, and that they would not consider any agreement that was not entirely acceptable to China and which did not have for its main purpose an improvement of conditions in China.
Cadogan said that while Yoshida has the best of intentions, he does not have very much influence and doubts if anything will develop now from this effort on the part of Yoshida to get his Government to make some definite proposals. He said the United States would, nevertheless, be kept fully informed of any developments and if the indications are that something worth while might be done he deemed it essential that the United States should be a party. His view was that if Great Britain and the United States should, in agreement with Japan and China, cooperate in efforts to develop China economically, it would increase trade all around and would help to insure peace and political stability in the Far East. I told Cadogan that until it was possible to get a clearer picture of what the objective and concrete proposals are, it would not be possible to express an opinion as to what might be the attitude of the United States.
I asked Cadogan if the Japanese were still talking about a non-aggression pact. He said they had mentioned that some time ago but that it was too impractical and too absurd to consider seriously. He said he thought there were too many non-aggression pacts already and that he could not think of anything more ridiculous than to enter into some new ones. He agreed that the Japanese idea of a non-aggression pact was to tie other peoples’ hands so as to give themselves a free hand.
Cadogan said they were still pressing Japan on the naval question2 with a view of at least getting them to agree to keep us informed as to their intentions, but that they had been unable to get anything definite as yet.
We then discussed the question of nonfortification in the Pacific, which the British had raised last summer, and I explained why it had seemed impractical to us. Cadogan gave the impression that he [Page 977] personally concurred in our view. I remarked that if anything were done in that respect it would have to be on a more comprehensive and practical basis.
I then told him that a suggestion had been made recently in Washington that an international agreement be negotiated to demilitarize or neutralize all of the islands and possessions in the Pacific, with the exception of Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Japan proper and Hawaii, but including Hongkong. I told him that while it would undoubtedly be desirable if the Pacific could be made a great peace area, I was not at all confident of the feasibility of such a plan, at least under present conditions, and asked him if he thought it was a matter which might be worth considering. He replied that his first reaction was that it was impractical but that he would talk it over with his associates and see if they thought it might have some possibilities. I told him this question had been raised only shortly before I left Washington and that I did not know what conclusions they had arrived at regarding the advisability or practicability of such an undertaking.
Cadogan said that at present he did not think it was practical to enter into any such serious agreement with Japan, because so long as Japan is dominated by the militaristic group, which has no regard for its committments and no desire for international cooperation, it is not possible to rely upon any agreement with Japan. Furthermore, the question which arises now in considering any agreement with Japan, is how to do so without putting a tacit stamp of approval on violations of treaties heretofore made by Japan. In substance, he said his idea was that so long as Japan adheres to her present policies it is not worth while trying to make any important agreements with her, and that as soon as they change that policy and adopt one of cooperation for peace, there will not be so much need for neutralization.
We then had a brief discussion about the Naval Treaty. I told him of my talk with the heads of the Admiralty. I mentioned the suggestion that we might approach Italy with regard to agreeing to adhere to the Treaty and said I was inclined to think that the time for any approach to Italy would be after the British signed up with Russia and Germany; and that even then it would seem that since the British have taken the initiative all along, it would be better for them to take this up with Italy. I told him, however, that we would naturally desire to help in any way possible.
Cadogan said he agreed with my view and, furthermore, he thought there was a possibility that Italy would shortly be willing actually to sign the Treaty.
We discussed the question of 14" versus 16" guns and he agreed that as a result of Japan’s action the 16" gun has become the legal [Page 978] gun and that the only way to avoid going to the 16" gun would be through a supplementary agreement on the part of all the naval powers, which would be desirable if possible.
Cadogan thought the British rearmament was having a good effect on Japan and that it would also have a further beneficial effect if we should accelerate our own naval building program.
We agreed to have a further talk before my departure.3
- Copy transmitted to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) by Mr. Davis from London, April 27; on May 4 Dr. Hornbeck informed the Secretary of State that “Mr. Davis’ memorandum might almost have been a memorandum of conversation between Davis and the undersigned.”↩
- James Ramsay MacDonald, British Lord President of the Council.↩
- See vol. i, pp. 618 ff.↩
- For a conversation which Mr. Davis also had with Ambassador Yoshida, see memorandum of April 23 by Mr. Davis, p. 74.↩