Office of the Historian

693.002/400: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 27, 1937—9 p.m.
[Received November 27—10:45 a.m.]

575. My 573, November 27, 5 p.m.

1.
My British colleague has just informed me that it is upon instructions issued to them by General Matsui10 and not from the Japanese Foreign Office that Japanese civil officials at Shanghai refuse to discuss the customs question with British and other third party representatives. This fact probably explains why the Foreign Office professes to know very little of what is going on at Shanghai.
2.
Craigie has been instructed to make to the Foreign Minister formal written representations as soon as the French Ambassador and I are authorized to make “joint representations”. Craigie is to set forth in his note that:
(a)
The British Government takes the strongest possible exception to any Japanese effort to settle the customs question with the local Shanghai customs only because the customs revenues are as recognized by Japan an international interest. The British Government maintains that no proper arrangement can be reached without reference to other interested governments;
(b)
Hall-Patch has been appointed to conduct the negotiations with the Japanese but any arrangement reached would be subject to the approval of the various interested governments given through their representatives at Tokyo.
3.
Craigie is very much concerned and I share this feeling lest what happened at Tientsin may happen at Shanghai—the Japanese military may force an objectionable arrangement upon the local customs officials before something can be done to stop it. He feels that only the strongest possible pressure by the interested governments upon the Japanese Foreign Office would induce Hirota to intervene. I informed Craigie that I had recommended to my Government that every practicable means should be used to protect and preserve tangible American interests in China and that it seemed to [Page 887] me that the integrity of the customs and the disposition of its revenues is a definite American interest.
4.
It seems both to Craigie and myself that time is of the essence and that action should be taken most urgently.
5.
Please instruct as to action and the form of action deemed advisable. I recommended parallel not joint action and a formal signed note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Repeated to Shanghai.

Grew
  1. Gen. Iwane Matsui, Japanese Army Commander in Chief in Central China.↩