793.94111/83: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State68
[Received 3:37 p.m.]
1489–1490. For the Acting Secretary.
2. Spain: Chautemps said that he had had some difficulty during the past 3 weeks in keeping Delbos and especially Massigli in hand. [Page 148] Massigli had invented the idea of a joint descent of the British and French fleets on Minorca and Eden personally had been inflamed by the idea. Chamberlain, however, had put a strong hand on Eden and he had calmed Massigli and Delbos.
Chautemps said that he had, however, proposed to the British that there should be a constant patrol of the waters around Minorca by the French and British fleets.
He had not yet received the British reply because the British desired first to have the assent of General Franco to this measure. The British were now attempting to obtain Franco’s assent arguing that he, Franco, might some day find it difficult to eject the Italians from the Balearic Islands if the Italians should have occupied all of them but would find it comparatively easy to get the Italians out if the British and French should hold Minorca.
I then asked Chautemps if the British were in close diplomatic contact with Franco. He said that they were in very close contact. The British definitely wanted Franco to win. About 2 weeks ago, the British Government had informed him that they would like to send a diplomatic representative at once to Franco’s headquarters. He had asked the British not to do this so long as the tension with Italy was so great, and had suggested that the British should send instead several men to Franco’s headquarters as commercial representatives, one of whom should be designated privately to Franco as the British diplomatic representative. The only question now was whether or not Franco would accept this arrangement. Up to the present moment he had objected to it.
I asked Chautemps if he intended to follow the British lead in this respect. He said that so far as he personally was concerned, he would like to send a diplomatic representative at once, but he had to remember that his Government depended on Socialist and Communist votes in the Chamber of Deputies.
I then asked Chautemps if he had any direct means of communication with Franco. He said that he had an excellent one. The French Consul General at San Sebastian was in daily communication by telephone with the chief of Franco’s political cabinet.
Chautemps went on to say that he had just received news that Gijon had fallen and that he feared dreadful butcheries there. He had sent some French ships to assist in removing refugees and had asked the British Government if they would not do the same; but the British had refused, saying that they would only do so if General Franco indicated his full approval.
I remarked that the whole tenor of his statements seemed to indicate that the British were convinced that Franco was certain to win. He said that that was the British conviction.
[Page 149]I asked him if he shared this conviction. He said that he did. He believed the fall of Gijon would release sufficient troops for Franco to make a great attack either on Madrid or more probably on Teruel. This attack might be successful enough to cause the Barcelona Government to collapse. Negrin69 had informed him a few days ago that he hoped to hold out through the winter by getting a few little factories in Barcelona working on munitions and by receiving abundant supplies from the Soviet Union.
In any case he, Chautemps, felt that the resistance on the Government side could not be prolonged beyond a few months.
I asked Chautemps how he interpreted Grandi’s70 acceptance of the British proposal in London. He said that he felt sure of its meaning which was that the Italians desired to spin out conversations and investigations because they were convinced that before those conversations and investigations could produce any concrete results Franco would have won. The only thing he could not understand was why Grandi had reversed his position within 24 hours. On this point he read from a telegram which he had just received from the French Ambassador in London which said in substance that no one in London had a reasonable explanation for Grandi’s about-face.
I asked Chautemps if there was still any possibility that the French Government might wish to reverse the outcome of the Spanish civil war by opening the frontier and sending large supplies to the Barcelona Government. He replied that he personally was entirely opposed to the opening of the French frontier. With the present tension in Europe, the French Government could not risk sending enormous war supplies to the Spanish Government. Furthermore, the opening of the French frontier would be the signal for greatly increased Italian activity in Spain and also shipments of German airships, munitions, men and officers. The Italians would sink Russian ships bringing supplies through the Mediterranean and the Germans would sink Russian ships bringing supplies through the Baltic. He felt certain, moreover, that there would be practically no Frenchmen who would desire to volunteer to fight in Spain on the side of the Government. He certainly could not mobilize the French Army for intervention in Spain and as a result the opening of the French frontier would be a large gesture which would have as its only result the condemnation of the French throughout the world for cooperation with Bolsheviks and the utter defeat of the side which the French were supporting. Incidentally, it would probably produce general European war.
Chautemps went on to say that he did not care in the least whether Franco won or not. The one thing which concerned him was to get [Page 150] the Italians out of the Balearic Islands. Recently both the Italians and Franco had given the French Government renewed assurances that the Italians would leave the Balearic Islands. The British were in favor of accepting those assurances at their face value. He himself would like to have at least a patrol of vessels around Minorca. Chautemps added that if the Italians should refuse to leave the Balearics after Franco’s victory France would have to attack the Balearics. The issue then would be clear and the entire French people would favor such an attack. He himself would reserve an ultimatum to the last possible moment.
The alteration of Chautemps’ attitude on the Spanish question since my departure from Paris only 3 weeks ago is striking and for the moment at least it appears that the French Government will follow the British lead and permit the establishment of a Franco Government in Spain.
3. Germany: We then had a general discussion of the problem of peace in the world. Chautemps expressed the opinion that no effective action could be taken in the Far East unless and until a genuine peace had been established on the continent of Europe so that England, France, Germany and Italy could cooperate as friends.
I asked Chautemps if he had made any progress at all in developing a rapprochement with Germany. He said that he had made no progress whatsoever. He was convinced that the vast majority of the people of Germany desired a reconciliation with France. He was less convinced that the high officials of the Nazi Party desired such a reconciliation but individually many leading Nazis had expressed the hope recently to François-Poncet French Ambassador in Berlin that such a reconciliation might be brought about. However on several occasions recently he had suggested to the German Ambassador here that the time might be ripe for serious discussions between France and Germany and the German Ambassador had replied invariably that he regretted that his Government felt that the time was not yet quite ripe.
- The four sections of this message were transmitted as telegrams Nos. 1488–1491. For section 1, dealing with Far Eastern matters, see vol. iii, p. 629. Section 4, on the domestic situation, is not printed.↩
- Juan Negrín, Spanish Minister for Finance.↩
- Count Dino Grandi, Italian Ambassador in the United Kingdom.↩