711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/56: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
Paris, October 9, 1937—11
a.m.
[Received October 9—9:23 a.m.]
[Received October 9—9:23 a.m.]
1419. Day before yesterday Chautemps referring to the President’s Chicago speech said that France would support any initiative tending [to] strengthen the solidarity of the peace-loving nations. In considering such a statement the following occurs to me:
- 1.
- Since the Rhineland reoccupation in March 193664 French foreign [Page 137] policy so far as its essential aspects are concerned has been very often dependent on British policy. France is in a position where she cannot afford to do anything which might affect in an important degree her relations with Germany or Italy without first having obtained the approval and support of the British Government. The cardinal point in French policy is to maintain intact the British guarantee of France’s frontiers.
- 2.
- While France has important material interests in the Far East these are secondary to the problem of French security in Europe. The French Government would be unable to commit itself to any offensive in the Far East which might weaken its defensive position in Europe to such an extent as to constitute an invitation to Germany and Italy to take aggressive action. (Probably the British are in the same position in this regard.)
- 3.
- My judgment is that the French Government would go along with the United States and Britain in a common policy regarding the Far East to the point where it became a matter of assuming serious responsibilities. They would then be happy to assist in developing a situation where the United States would become the spearpoint of any action to restrain Japanese aggression. At the same time they would endeavor to relate the policy pursued against aggression in the Far East to that to be pursued against aggression in Europe in such manner as to drag us into the latter action if at all possible.
Wilson