Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, General, Volume I

711.00 Pres. Speech, Oct. 5, 1937/8: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Paris, October 6, 1937—9 p.m.
[Received October 6—8:15 p.m.]

1404. Delbos sent for me this afternoon. He said that he wanted to ask me to inform my Government that President Roosevelt’s speech⁵⁸ yesterday at Chicago had caused the utmost satisfaction to the French Government and people. He said that the speech was “magnificent” and that it was “an act” of the highest importance. He said that he of course understood perfectly that the speech did not mean that the United States was going to throw itself into the middle of European disputes but that even if the speech stood alone and was not followed up by any action it should prove of tremendous assistance to the cause of peace in Europe. He said that not only the subject matter of the speech but also the time of its delivery was most important: it had been delivered at a time when France and England were striving to the best of their abilities to deal with the blackmailing tactics of the dictators and to prevent them from creating a situation which might prove disastrous to the peace of the world. It had been delivered upon the eve of the preparation of the Italian reply to the Franco-British note⁵⁹ proposing conversations on the Spanish question and it could not fail to make a deep impression upon the two dictators.

I asked whether there was any indication of what the Italian reply would be. He said that there was none as yet but he feared Mussolini would follow his usual evasive tactics: that he would propose that the matter of withdrawing foreign troops from Spain should be dealt with by the London Non-intervention Committee. Delbos said that he did not attach any importance to the form in which conversations might be carried on with the Italians but that he did attach the greatest importance to having conversations with them: if the Italians objected to anything which looked like a conference of the three powers then he was willing that conversations should be carried on, but carried on actively through diplomatic channels. If the Italians insisted that the question of withdrawing foreign troops must be dealt with by the London Committee he said that he would agree ultimately to this but that first there must be direct conversations between the British, French, and Italians in order that they might if possible achieve something concrete which could be reported to the Committee; otherwise to have another full dress discussion in the Committee would merely mean that Maisky⁶⁰ would at once say something insulting to the Italians and any possibility of action would be blocked (this of course was exactly what Mussolini wanted).

I asked what would be done in case the Italian reply was negative. He said that he was not sure what would be done but that he was entirely sure that some definite and firm action would have to be taken: England and France had taken the initiative of making this proposal to Italy and they could not in the event of a negative reply by their inaction seem to say to the Italians “all right go ahead and dig yourselves in in the Balearics, cut off our communications in the Mediterranean, we will do nothing about it.” He said that in the event of a negative reply, of course the frontier on the Pyrenees could be opened. This was a step which might carry with it serious consequences. It might not be necessary at first to go as far as that; France could grant liberty of transit over French territory for munitions and supplies originating in other countries and intended for Spain. In talking with Bova-Scoppa⁶¹ at Geneva he had said to him that in prohibiting not only shipments from France but even shipments over French soil, France was doubly the accomplice of Italy in the latter’s war against the Valencia Government.

I asked whether the British Government would support the French Government in opening the frontier or in permitting transit of munitions across France for Spain. Delbos laughed and said that as always the British disliked to cross a bridge before they came to it: he was, however, in the closest touch with the British and the two Governments were “concerting” their action most carefully.

I asked Delbos whether he felt that Mussolini’s visit⁶² to Hitler had resulted in any closer working arrangement. He said that he felt that it had not: he was of the opinion that the interests of the two countries were too much opposed to make any close alliance possible and that neither Government trusted the other very far. This, however, would not prevent them from working together closely when it was to their advantage to do so as for instance in the “blackmail” they are pursuing at present against France and England with regard to the Spanish problem.

Speaking of the Far East Delbos said that he knew nothing of the report from Geneva in tonight’s papers that the French and British Governments expect to get in touch soon with the Government of the United States regarding a conference in London of the countries of the Nine-Power Pacific Pact:⁶³ he said that no such action was now under consideration so far as he knew. He said that when he was at Geneva there had been some discussion of calling a conference of the powers having interests in the Pacific but nothing definite had developed. Probably this story from Geneva was due to the recommendation made by the Advisory Committee to the Assembly that steps be taken to bring about consultation among the signatories of the Nine-Power Agreement.

At the close of our talk Delbos reverted to the President’s speech and again expressed the profound gratification which it had caused him.

Wilson

58. Department of State, Press Releases, October 9, 1937, p. 275.
59. See pp. 410 ff.
60. Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, and representative on the London Non-intervention Committee.
61. Renato Bova-Scoppa, Italian permanent delegate to the League of Nations.
62. September 25–29.
63. Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.