793.94/9723: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:10 p.m.]
1202 …
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2. Delbos gave me a long and highly entertaining account of Van Zeeland’s recent visit to him in the south of France.…
Delbos said that Van Zeeland’s purpose in coming to visit him was to discuss a possible visit with Hitler. (See my 1024, July 21, 9 p.m.42). Van Zeeland had said that he had finally drawn up a plan that he felt might interest Hitler. He would like to go to Berchtesgaden to discuss it with Hitler; but would desire first to visit France officially and would announce in advance to Hitler that he was coming as the representative not simply of Belgium but of France and England as well. It was agreed that if the Spanish situation should develop favorably Van Zeeland should visit Paris in the latter part of October and visit Hitler shortly afterward. He would not accept Hitler’s proposal for a guarantee to Belgium on all fours with the French and British guarantees of April last (See my 516, April 22, 9 p.m.43) until it should become evident that no new Locarno Pact could be agreed upon.
Delbos went on to say that he and Van Zeeland both hoped that it might be possible to work out a new Locarno Agreement during the next month and a half. The crucial question was that of Spain. If there should be some sort of settlement of the Spanish question he felt that it might be possible to establish a new Locarno Agreement. The basis of any satisfactory settlement must be the withdrawal of “volunteers”. He, Delbos, did not care in the least whether Franco should win or not. If Franco should win as now seemed probable [Page 118] because the parties which support the Valencia Government are fighting among themselves and morale in Madrid is growing low and Franco will soon have great reinforcements from the Santander front, France would be ready to come to terms with Franco at once and have most friendly relations with him provided he should ship out of Spain the Italian and German forces now there. Delbos went on to say that whereas Franco now needed intensely German and Italian military support the moment he should have won the war he would need equally urgently British and French financial support. He believed that Franco would then be ready to ship the Germans and Italians out of Spain in return for French and British money. The way would then be clear for a new Locarno Agreement and Van Zeeland’s visit to Hitler.
3. Delbos said that he was in disagreement with Chautemps’ policy of rapprochement with Italy. Before he had left for his vacation Chautemps had told him and Blum that he intended to attempt to come to terms with Italy. Both he (Delbos) and Blum loathed Mussolini intensely and believed that Chautemps’ attempts to reach reconciliation with Italy would be interpreted by Mussolini as a sign of weakness. They (Delbos and Blum) believed that Mussolini merely would be encouraged to further violence. Delbos said he was furious with Eden and Chamberlain for having inaugurated the rapprochement with Italy. He would see Eden at Geneva in the latter part of September and intended then to ask Eden as bluntly as possible why Great Britain without informing France had abandoned the policy on which he and Eden had agreed, to wit: that every effort should be made to reach reconciliation with Germany but that Italy should be treated with contempt and disdain as a relatively unimportant jackal.
Chautemps had always been known as a friend of Italy and after the British move he (Delbos) and Blum had not objected to Chautemps’ doing what he could to improve relations with Italy. They (Delbos and Blum) both remained completely skeptical, however, and believed that Chautemps’ friendliness with Italy would merely result in further outrages by Italy.
4. Delbos said that he was still intensely desirous of reaching some sort of agreement with Germany. François-Poncet, however, had been unable to begin work on any constructive program. Hitler reigned but did not rule. He remained at Berchtesgaden most of the time playing pinochle with his cook, his butler and his chauffeur while Goebbels sat in Berlin and directed Germany’s destinies. Goebbels today definitely was more powerful than Goering or anyone else.
Delbos concluded by saying that he felt a visit by Van Zeeland to Hitler was the only hope of improving relations between France and Germany.
[Page 119]5. Delbos referred to the desperate economic and financial situation of Poland and discussed the pitiable poverty of the Jews and the enormous unemployment among agricultural laborers which he asserted had led recently “to real peasant revolts”. …44
Delbos said that he believed Poland could do nothing except continue more or less on her present road with a continually decreasing standard of living and continually increasing misery. Beck was pursuing a policy which was entirely correct insofar as direct relations between France and Poland were concerned; but he was pursuing also a policy of violent hostility to Czechoslovakia which was the direct result of his close relationship to Germany. Incidentally the Polish Ambassador in Paris, Lukasiewicz who is Beck’s intimate said to me recently that Poland would look with approval on a German dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Beck consistently opposed every French policy designed to protect Czechoslovakia and central Europe from German attack. Poland was slowly sinking into a hopeless economic abyss. The President of Poland who had the powers of a dictator was afraid to use any of them. The Prime Minister was a cipher. General Smigly-Rydz desired to run the political life of the country without involving himself in politics and Colonel Beck was nourishing the idea that there could be war in Europe without Poland becoming involved and that Germany could swallow Czechoslovakia without Poland becoming the next morsel.
6. Delbos went on to discuss the position of Czechoslovakia and made the statement that not only would France go to war in case Germany should attack Czechoslovakia directly; but also would go to war in case Germany should provoke a revolt of German speaking inhabitants in Bohemia and would support such a revolt by shipments of munitions and “volunteers”.
I ventured to doubt that the people of France would march if Germany should maneuver such a revolt cleverly; but Delbos insisted and detailed his reasons for believing that even in case Germany should provoke the most clever revolt of the German speaking inhabitants of Bohemia the people of France would march in support of the Czechoslovak Government.
7. With regard to the internal situation Delbos said that at the Cabinet meeting yesterday afternoon agreement had been reached on the nationalization of the railroads. He said that the details of the scheme had not yet been worked out but it had been agreed that all railroads should be nationalized by the Government acquiring a majority of the stock in each road. I had the impression that Delbos had not paid much attention to the discussion of the railroad situation and that this information may not prove to be entirely accurate.