741.65/402: Telegram
The Chargé in Germany (Mayer) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 12—10 a.m.]
195. In a conversation with the French Ambassador recently he analyzed the present Anglo-Italian conversations in the following manner.
First of all, the maneuver is in the classic Italian manner. Likewise it is the sort of maneuver both the Italians and Germans have [Page 116] to resort to on occasion because of their respective peculiar positions in Europe. Alone, either Germany or Italy, and especially the latter, is relatively isolated in European politics, whereas, associated they exercise a large influence. Certain important aims and interests of the two countries, however, are opposed with special reference to Central Europe. It is necessary, therefore, from time to time that each demonstrate a certain independence. Eventually this may well result in the one selling out the other. The situation has not gone so far at present, however, since the Berlin-Rome Axis is still extremely useful to both parties, particularly in regard to the ultimate relations with the British. As the above would imply it is too early to estimate the real scope or aims of the British or Italian policy in the present discussions. The Abyssinian matter should be, and doubtless will be, cleared up during the next Assembly when the whole move should become clearer. While the Four Power Pact so phrased is undesirable as causing offense and apprehension to Russia and certain smaller European states, the basic idea is sound and inevitable if there is to be a real peace. European cooperation, whether through a League of Nations or some similar idea, must be founded on and can only result after the agreement of the principal European countries.
The French Ambassador further stated his understanding that the Anglo-Italian discussions were initiated by Mussolini. Mussolini was apprehensive of the British, aware that his economic position is not good and is growing more difficult, and desirous of currying favor with the British at this time, especially when Mussolini believes Franco will win and Germany will demand of Italy as regards Austria and Central Europe the price which Germany stipulated for assistance in Spain.
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