740.00/196
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13.]
Sir:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The ever recurring questions discussed in diplomatic circles here are:
- (1)
- What would be the attitude of France if Germany and Italy were to actively go into Spain, and
- (2)
- What would be the attitude of France and England if Germany were to attempt a military coup against Czechoslovakia?
With reference to the first question, last evening here in Moscow the French Ambassador, Mr. Coulondre, who is an exceptionally able man, stated that if Germany and Italy were to go into Spain, with the result that the fascist front would be brought up to the border of the Pyrenees, it would definitely mean war, and that France would be compelled to fight. He was categorical and definite in that statement.
[Page 110]During the past few days the entire diplomatic corps here have been on the qui vive in connection with the withdrawal of Germany and Italy from the London conference, and the joint action of Italy and Germany in the making of an independent demonstration off of the Spanish coast in retaliation of the alleged firing of torpedos at the German warship Leipzig. Very little else has been discussed among the diplomats here for the last few days. It has entirely superseded discussions of the local Soviet situation.
The French Ambassador stated to me personally that while he was a “constitutional optimist” he had never felt so concerned over the possibilities of war in Europe as at the present time.
Another index of conditions may be found in the fact that the French Ambassador in Germany has described the German Government as the “great couching cat that is apparently sleepily at ease, but is really alert and ready to spring in any direction that would serve best its purpose and is vigilantly waiting and ready to spring at the first opportunity.”
With reference to the second question (supra):
At the outset it should be stated that there is very substantial opinion that the fears of a military aggression by Germany against Czechoslovakia are overdrawn, and that Germany, even if so disposed, would probably project its plans equally successfully through economic and political penetration, without resorting to war, particularly if it had some understanding with England.
With reference to the specific question, the most accurate answer is probably to be found in the opinion of Ambassador Bullitt, based on his conversations with the Chiefs of the Military, as well as the Political High Command of France. That answer is that France would unquestionably go to the military support of Czechoslovakia in the event of a military attack by Germany. This information was distinctly a surprise to me; as it is directly in contradiction to the prevailing general opinion that I have found everywhere, and presumably in well-informed circles. I would accept Ambassador Bullitt’s judgment.
In no quarters have I found the opinion that England or Belgium would “go in” in the event of such a contingency. It is generally agreed, however, that if such a contingency were to occur, and France were to be drawn in, there would be no doubt but that Belgium and England would be drawn in ultimately and inevitably.
The tension in the Spanish situation is relaxing. In well-informed diplomatic circles here, it is the distinct impression that neither Germany nor Italy presently desire that the Spanish situation should be permitted to involve Europe in a general war, and despite “these crises” which periodically develop, there is a distinct “will” on the part of the fascist nations not to go to the limit that will induce hostility [Page 111] of a general character. There is no question, however, but what the danger is becoming more imminent, with a recurrence of each of these so-called “crises”, that the situation might get out of hand.
Conditions here in the Soviet Union, as I have found them, will be the subject of a subsequent and independent despatch.
Respectfully yours,