711.00111 Lic. Hanover Sales Corp./52/22
The Secretary of State to the Spanish Ambassador (De los Rios)
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Spain and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his memorandum of November 19, 1937, which he handed [Page 602] to the Secretary of State, in regard to the purchase of a bullet-proof automobile intended for the use of the Prime Minister of Spain.
Mr. Hull invites Señor de los Ríos’ attention to his note of September 16, 1937, in which he stated that “military armored vehicles” are listed among the articles in Category I (6) of the enumeration of arms, ammunition, and implements of war contained in the President’s Proclamation of May 1, 1937, and that, as long as the President’s Proclamation of May 1, 1937, remained in effect, he would feel constrained to consider armored limousines intended for exportation to Spain as “military armored vehicles”, and to direct that licenses authorizing the exportation of such vehicles to Spain be not issued.
The Ambassador of Spain will realize that it is impossible to distinguish between military and non-military armored vehicles when these vehicles are intended for export to countries engaged in war or civil strife, and that, therefore, the Secretary of State is obliged to refuse permission for the export to such countries of armored vehicles of any sort.
In regard to Señor de los Ríos’ statement, in his memorandum of November 19, that the entire list of the articles enumerated in the President’s Proclamation of May 1, 1937, falls without exception within the first class of articles of contraband referred to by the Supreme Court of the United States in The Peterhoff, 5 Wallace 28, that is “articles manufactured and primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war”, the attention of the Ambassador is invited to the fact that the Proclamation of May 1, 1937, includes a considerable number of articles which could not conceivably be considered as falling within this definition. For example, paragraphs (1) and (4) of Category I of the Proclamation include a number of types of rifles, cartridges, and ammunition which are manufactured for and primarily and ordinarily used for sporting purposes only. Paragraph (1) of Category V includes all of those aircraft, civil and commercial, which are not designed, adapted, and intended for aerial combat and hence are definitely not manufactured or primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war. Paragraph (3) of Category V includes all types of aircraft engines, whether these engines are manufactured and used for commercial or military purposes. Paragraph (2) of Category VI includes a number of gases which have a commercial as well as a military use and which, indeed, in time of peace, are manufactured almost exclusively for commercial purposes. Paragraph (1) of Category VII covers propellant powders of all types and, in so doing, includes a number of powders which are in time of peace used exclusively for sporting purposes. Paragraph (2) of Category VII contains a number of high explosives which have a wide commercial use and which in time of peace are manufactured and utilized almost exclusively for industrial purposes. [Page 603] In view of these examples, it will be clear that the President’s Proclamation of May 1, 1937, does not apply exclusively to the articles referred to in the first class mentioned by the Supreme Court in the case of The Peterhoff but that, on the other hand, it includes a large number of articles which fall within the second class mentioned by the Court and among which an armored automobile might reasonably be considered to fall.
The Secretary of State regrets, therefore, that he must abide by the decision communicated to the Ambassador of Spain in his note of September 16, 1937, and refuse to issue a license authorizing the export of an armored vehicle of any kind to Spain at the present time.