740.00/164: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4:50 p.m.]
584–588. In the course of a long conversation last night Delbos expressed to me his “despair” of inventing a working foreign policy which might preserve peace in Europe. He said that day and night he was occupied in thinking of how he could keep Central Europe from falling into the hands of Germany. He had been unable to invent any scheme which seemed to him likely to achieve success. Every time that he suggested to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia or Austria that they should together with France take a more decided attitude of opposition to Germany the reply was “we should be very glad to do so if England would join France in guaranteeing us against Germany. France is not strong enough to protect us alone especially in view of the new status of Belgium. We cannot therefore carry out an anti-German policy”.
He said that he had had another conversation with Sir Eric Phipps in addition to the one in which I had participated (see my telegrams 563 and 565).19 The conversation had been long and intimate. Phipps had made it entirely clear to him that Great Britain would not guarantee either Czechoslovakia or Austria to say nothing of Rumania. [Page 90] He did not despair of persuading Belgium to alter somewhat her attitude with regard to the passage of French troops. In fact he had decided to make a trip to Belgium in the very near future in order to talk with the King, Van Zeeland and Spaak on this subject. He said that he would probably go secretly and asked me not to mention the matter for the moment. He added that his visit might be made officially and publicly.
Delbos said that he had discussed with Sir Eric Great Britain’s attitude toward the entire European situation. He had derived the impression from his conversation with Sir Eric that the British would do nothing effective to support Van Zeeland’s inquiry and he believed that Van Zeeland’s efforts were doomed to failure. He had asked Sir Eric whether Great Britain was prepared as France was prepared to make concessions to Germany in the colonial field. Sir Eric had replied that France might do what she pleased but Great Britain would not give Germany one inch of the territory of the British Empire including mandated territory.
Delbos went on to say that Schmidt, the Austrian Foreign Minister, would reach Paris on May 19th and he, Delbos, would not know what to say to him. France alone could not possibly march to the support of Austria. Mussolini had made it clear to Schuschnigg that he would do nothing to keep Austria from falling into Germany’s hands. Mussolini furthermore had told Schuschnigg that he was entirely opposed to the project for rapprochement between Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It was he, Delbos, who had initiated this rapprochement and he hoped that Schuschnigg and Beneš would go ahead with it in spite of Mussolini’s disapproval. He still had some faint hopes that such a rapprochement might become the nucleus around which the other states of the Danubian basin could group themselves but he was by no means optimistic. He had tried to draw Poland into better relations with Czechoslovakia by the recent French loan to Poland but Poland was remaining as hostile to Czechoslovakia as ever.
Delbos went on to say that Schuschnigg had shown great courage in his conversation with Mussolini at Venice. He had said to Mussolini that he could not and would not detach Austria from Czechoslovakia, that they were both menaced equally by Germany, that if one should be swallowed the other would be shortly after, that they might be weak but that they should stand or fall together.
Delbos added that he believed Schuschnigg would hold out to the end against absorption by Germany because he knew that the Pope was doing everything possible not only to support Schuschnigg against the Nazis but to influence Schuschnigg to resist to the end. In view of Schuschnigg’s intense religious convictions he believed that this [Page 91] attitude of the Vatican would be decisive in preventing Schuschnigg from working out any reconciliation with the German Government.
(Incidentally Titulescu during his recent stay in Paris did everything he could to spread the belief that Beck had tried to persuade the Rumanian Government to take an anti-Czech stand. Titulescu exhibited to me and no doubt to a great many partial people in Paris what purported to be the originals and photostatic copies of many important documents of the Rumanian Government.
He succeeded in getting Delbos to make strong representations in both Bucharest and Warsaw. I have heard the entire story now at length from Titulescu, Delbos, and Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador in Paris. It would appear to be that Beck’s conversations in Rumania were directed almost entirely toward attempting to strengthen Rumania-Polish cooperation against the Soviet Union and that Beck made no attempt to turn Rumania against Czechoslovakia. Delbos said to me last night that Titulescu had seemed to him unbalanced and wild in his statements.
It is, however, true as I have pointed out before, (see my No. 536, April 26, 8 p.m.20) that the Poles feel that their best chance for safety in the immediate future lies in having Germany so occupied with driving toward the south through Czechoslovakia and Austria that Germany will cherish the maintenance of Polish independence since Poland will afford Germany a buffer against Soviet attacks during the period of German advance southward.)
Delbos once more stated emphatically that if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia, France immediately would declare war on Germany. He said that he realized fully that the line of the Rhine from Switzerland to Karlsruhe was so fortified as to be almost un-attackable. The only possible line of attack against Germany would be the 150 kilometers between Karlsruhe and Luxemburg. This front was so short that a small portion of the German Army could hold up the French Army leaving the major portion of the German Army to operate against the Czechs and Austrians. In his discussion of this question he was so gloomy that for the first time I caught a note of irresolution and I suspect that after Delbos has visited Belgium and found that it will be impossible under any conditions to obtain the approval of the Belgian Government for a march through Belgium against Germany the decision of the French Government to go to war on behalf of Czechoslovakia may weaken.
In conclusion Delbos said that it was clear that France was no longer strong enough to maintain the status quo in Central Europe against an opposition composed of Germany and Italy. France could take a strong position only if she should have the absolute support of [Page 92] England. Until England should be fully rearmed he feared that England would not take any strong position with regard to Central Europe. He was at his wits end to devise a method of meeting the problems which had now arisen.