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The Counselor of Embassy in Spain (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

No. X–250

Sir: The local Association of Friends of the Soviet Union (Asociación de Amigos de la Unión Soviética) has been engaged for some time with preparations for the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. The period November 1–7 has been designated by it as the “Week of Homage to the U. S. S. R.”, during which numerous public ceremonies evidently will take place for the purpose of demonstrating Spain’s gratitude for the moral and material support it has received. Collections for these activities are now being made—the Government’s contribution thereto being 25,000 pesetas, that of each Member of the Cabinet, 250 pesetas, and that of the C. N. T., 5,000 pesetas. In the meanwhile, a “Golden Book” has been opened for signature, a delegation has been selected to go to Moscow with a gift of Spanish works of art and handicraft, and the Spanish premier, Señor Negrín, has addressed a somewhat effusive “Salutation to the Russian People” by radio, in the course of which, after praising the accomplishments of the Soviet Union “along the lines indicated by the genius of Lenin and followed by Stalin with singular clearsightedness”, he made the following remarks:

“The Soviet Union has followed its pacifist policy with respect to the Spanish question …87 Peace does not exist in Europe—not only because there is war in Spain but because the Soviet conception of ‘indivisible peace’ has been systematically blocked…87 The Soviet Union has clearly demonstrated its solidarity in Spain, asking nothing…87”.

[Page 437]

It is difficult to estimate the scope of Soviet influence in Spain—a topic about which unbiased information is virtually unobtainable. In so far as the structure of the Government is concerned, it is of course preponderantly Socialist and Republican, the two Cabinet posts held by Communists (Public Instruction and Agriculture) being of minor importance. The Cortes (a negligible factor at present) contained but 17 Communists in a nominal membership of 473 Deputies, although Communist proportional representation in that body has been increased by the war, as a result of which only 172 Deputies attended the last sessions. While the presence with Spanish forces of individual Russian officers and men has occasionally been reported, it appears to be certain that there are no organized Russian troops or volunteers in Spain. Indeed, the presence in Spain of any Russians at all is not apparent to the casual observer—but they are here and can from time to time be identified. They serve as advisers in some of the Government offices, and as instructors, operators, and pilots, in the aviation and tank corps. It is believed that they likewise serve with the navy and the anti-aircraft corps. No basis exists upon which to calculate the number of Russians in Spain—in the fighting forces and in advisory capacities—but it would appear to be safe to hazard the opinion that they may be counted by hundreds and almost certainly do not exceed two thousand. The Russian Embassy, the composition of which is not disclosed and which maintains no contact of which I am aware with the diplomatic corps, is commonly assumed (and I believe rightly) to exercise considerable influence in the councils of the Government, although there is no evidence upon which to base the assumption. It likewise is assumed to have been the channel through which arrangements were made for the acquisition by the Spanish Government of the abundant supplies of military equipment (airplanes, tanks, and munitions) received from Russia.

The agency through which Soviet influence in Spain probably is most effectively exercised, however, is the Communist Party—the “Partido Comunista de España”—an authentic “Section of the Communist International”, whose Statutes follow the prescribed pattern of the “struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”. This organization claimed last March to have 250,000 members, but since then, as the result of assiduous proselytizing, its membership probably has greatly increased. The strength of the Communist Party is believed to be disproportionate to its size—a fact probably attributable to excellent tactical guidance by its Russian and French counterparts as well as to its inherent militancy. It possesses one or more newspapers in Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia, probably is amply supplied with funds, and is well organized along the basic [Page 438] Communist system of the “cell” within all activities—including, it is not to be doubted, the entire Government. Vigorous and intelligent leadership has been shown in its opportune advocacy of the rights of the small farmer and tradesman, the need for a unified military command, a directed war industry, and the establishment of public order (see pages 4 to 6 of the accompanying Open Letter to the Socialist Party89). As these measures imply the negation of the policies and practices of other organizations, notably the C. N. T., and the F. A. I., which seized upon the outbreak of the civil war to institute a reign of terror and anarchy, a gradual shaping of opposing forces has taken place. The excesses of the Anarcho-Syndicalists, however, leading through the fall of Málaga to the Barcelona conflict last May (in which it is claimed 900 lives were lost) and the resultant reorganization of the Government, have favored the Communists and momentarily at least have debilitated their opponents. The present alignment of these opposing forces may be said to place the Communists and portions of the Socialist Party and the U. G. T. in one group, confronted by the C. N. T., the F. A. I., and the P. O. U. M. The Republicans and the remaining portions of the Socialist and U. G. T. organizations are presumed to lean definitely toward the first group—not because they favor the Communist Party but because they disapprove the activities of the other.

There are indications, however, that the successes of the Communist Party have led it to become overbold, and that its methods may result in the development of a general reaction against it. Among the vulnerable points of the Party in this respect are its importation into Spain of the Russian anti-Trotskyist move, exemplified here by the Communist Party’s war of extermination against the P. O. U. M. (Andrés Nin, the P. O. U. M. leader arrested a few months ago in Barcelona and imprisoned in Madrid, is said by the Government to have escaped. The P. O. U. M. claims that he was assassinated in jail); the alleged (the charge is frequently made) establishment of a Communist-controlled police organization—Cheka—separate from and independent of the Government police department; its persistent proselytizing in the Army (complained of at the last session of the Cortes, following which a Decree was issued forbidding such activities); and, finally, its seeming persecution of Senor Largo Caballero—whose loss of the Premiership (see the enclosed copy of an address delivered by the Communist Minister of Public Instruction, Jesús Hernández89) and subsequent misadventures can in large part be attributed to it. References in the U. G. T. and C. N. T. newspapers [Page 439] to the “overseas editorship” of the Communist press, by orators to the fact that “Spain is still a free country, and is not subject to the orders of Berlin, Rome, or Moscow” (a remark which brought forth a Governmental Order, deploring the comparison of the U. S. S. R. with nations invading Spain, and threatening with indefinite suppression any newspaper offending Russia), and that whereas in the past one had to count his beads or show a cross in order to get attention in a hospital he now must display the “Hammer and Sickle”, as well as statements made in private conversations, reflect the sentiment that is developing.

Respectfully yours,

Walter C. Thurston
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