852.00/6675: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

646. I was informed late this afternoon by high officials of the Foreign Office that the Cabinet today approved in general the French suggestions arising from the Italian refusal to attend a three-power discussion of intervention in Spain. Specific approval was given to meeting the Italian suggestion for returning the question to the Non-Intervention Committee. I understand the British idea is that in informing the Italian Government of this decision they will, without presenting an ultimatum, make it perfectly clear that there must be no delay and that if the matter is referred to the Non-intervention Committee there must be quick action. I was not told exactly what the French suggestions had been but was given to understand that the British have not agreed in every detail. There will be no question of British approval being given to opening of the Franco-Spanish frontier pending the results of the deliberations and action of the Non-intervention Committee. The situation as the Foreign Office pointed out is really back where it was in July when the British proposals reported in my 469, July 14, 1 p.m. and 520 July 31, 2 p.m. produced a deadlock in the Non-intervention Committee caused, so it was stated, primarily by the Russian stand against any recognition of the belligerency of Franco. This deadlock will continue unless the Russians modify their stand. The British are counting on the French to bring sufficient pressure to bear to obviate this difficulty.

I gather that the British consider the vanity of Mussolini and his fear of losing prestige a very material factor in the present situation. [Page 419] They are therefore anxious to avoid any move which might be wrongly construed by him and which he could possibly take as an affront. For that reason it was said they could not possibly give their approval to the opening of the Franco-Spanish frontier at least until every expedient had been exhausted by the forthcoming meeting of the Non-intervention Committee. If, after having considered the Italian point of view in referring the question back to the Nonintervention Committee, the result is complete failure, the British will have to determine a new policy with the French. They are, it seems, determined not to allow the proceedings of the Non-intervention Committee to be wrecked by dilatory tactics. They may not be able to prevent a complete breakdown on issues but it will be made clear to the Italians that a decision one way or the other must be quickly got at.

Johnson