852.00/6630: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 5—6 p.m.]
1394. This morning at the Foreign Office I was shown a copy of the note delivered by the British Ambassador and the French Chargé d’Affaires at Rome to the Italian Government on October 2nd.67 The note is courteous and conciliatory. It begins by expressing gratification at Italy’s participating in the Nyon arrangement for patrolling the Mediterranean and expresses the hope that this may lead to further helpful cooperation in dealing with the Spanish situation.
The note recalls the assurance given by Ciano to the British Ambassador that Italy would lend no further assistance in the Spanish struggle and the assurance given by Bova-Scoppa to Delbos at Geneva that Italy had no designs on any part of Spanish territory. The note refers to the interest of the British and French Governments in maintaining the policy of non-intervention and expresses the hope that in order to make this policy really effective it may be possible to make progress in the matter of withdrawing foreigners aiding both sides in Spain. While recognizing that this question of withdrawal of foreigners has been treated by the Non-intervention Committee in London, the view is expressed that at the present stage the chances of progress would be increased if there could be a “conversation” between the three powers dealing with the whole Spanish question. The note closes by stating that if substantial progress could be made in withdrawing foreigners from Spain then the question of granting limited belligerent rights could be taken up.
At one point in the note there is something of a veiled menace in the statement to the effect that, unless an advance can be realized in [Page 411] making non-intervention effective, public opinion in the two countries will hardly permit the maintenance of the present situation.
Rochat,68 who showed me the note, said that the French Chargé d’Affaires had reported that when it was first delivered to Ciano the latter’s attitude appeared to be unfavorable. Later, however, after Ciano had telephoned to Mussolini he spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and seemed to have a more favorable attitude. Rochat says that there is no indication of when the Italian reply may be expected or of what it may contain although the press reaction in Rome indicates that the Italian Government may suggest that the question of withdrawing foreigners should be treated in the Non-Intervention Committee.
I remarked that in the last few weeks there had seemed to be a stiffening of the Franco-British attitude vis-à-vis Italy in the Spanish and Mediterranean questions. Rochat said that this was true and that it could not be otherwise. He said that without in any way looking at things tragically a stage was now being reached in which before much longer some important decisions would have to be taken. The French Government knows for a fact that in Majorca and Minorca the Italians have taken firm possession and established submarine bases. This constant threat to French and British communications in the Mediterranean must be removed.
I asked whether he thought that Mussolini could possibly agree to withdrawing Italian troops from Spain. He said that he thought Mussolini could more easily agree to withdrawing Italian troops from Spain than the French and British could agree to let them stay there. He said that it was not a question of possible victory by Franco which disturbed the French: the French want the Spanish struggle to be fought out among the Spaniards alone and if Franco wins there is no reason why the French Government could not come to an arrangement with him under which French interests would be safeguarded. But if Italian forces continue to occupy the Balearics, that would be a situation which the French Government could not tolerate. At the moment the way was now open, with the proposal regarding the recognition of limited belligerent rights, so that Mussolini could agree to a withdrawal of forces without losing face. He said that the French and British Governments would not be over-exacting regarding the withdrawal of forces: if a start were made by taking Italian troops out of the Balearics that would be an indication of good faith.
I asked what the next step would be in case the Italians refused the proposal now made to them. He said that he could see nothing else but opening the frontier on the Pyrenees; public opinion here in France would demand it. I asked how the British Government stood [Page 412] on this question. He said that they were firmly with the French Government in the view that if Mussolini now refuses to make any concession in the matter of withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain there will be nothing left for the French to do except to open the frontier.
Copies London.