852.00/6412: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 9—3:55 p.m.]
587. Department’s 385 September 8, 5 p.m.52 and Embassy’s 586, September 8, 7 p.m.53 I learn from the Foreign Office that delivery today of German and Italian refusals to attend the Nyon Conference may make necessary some modification of British and French plans. It was suggested that the first formal meeting may take place at Nyon and the subsequent work of the experts done at Geneva. British official opinion as well as public, reflected in the press of all shades of political opinion, is hardening. While the British Government may be compelled to meet in a practical way obstacles to realization of their objective, day by day as they arise, there has been no apparent change in their determination to bring about concerted action to deal with the menace in the Mediterranean. What effect the German and Italian suggestion that the matter now at issue should be referred to the Non-intervention Committee in London may have on developments, it is impossible now to say. The British are sending a strong delegation to the conference, composed [of] the Foreign Secretary, Vansittart and Lord Chatfield, First Lord of the Admiralty and chief of the Naval Staff, together with two naval experts.
Both Foreign Office and Admiralty officials are extremely reticent in discussing any details in connection with the Nyon meeting. I have, however, had the impression at the Foreign Office during the [Page 394] past week, although based on no special statement, that the weight of opinion inclines to the view that Italian submarines are responsible for recent attacks on shipping in the Mediterranean. This view is strengthening [strengthened by] information which the Naval Attaché received in confidence at the Admiralty this afternoon. Admiralty officials as well as those of the Foreign Office would not make any direct statement as to responsibility of Italy for submarine outrages but they mentioned to the Naval Attaché, as a matter of fact, that their naval radio interception service had obtained detailed information as to the amount and location of Italian naval radio activity in the Mediterranean which has convinced them that this radio activity is far greater than the normal movements of the Italian fleet would justify. It is also of interest that Admiralty officials stated their experts are convinced that a submarine torpedo was actually fired at the Havoc although they have no reliable evidence that the submarine had been damaged by depth charges from the Havoc.