701.6252/29: Telegram (part air)
The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 28—9 a.m.]
204. It is my feeling that the recall of General Faupel as German Ambassador to the Franco Regime has been accorded undue importance in current diplomatic and press comment. It seems to us that any significance in the happening might lie chiefly in the choice of his successor. The whole matter has been handled at Berchtesgaden but while no name has yet been announced the understanding here is that he will be replaced by a career diplomat.
There seems to be no good reason to doubt the official German explanation that Faupel was recalled for reasons of health in particular, as this is substantiated by collateral evidence. It appears to be true, nevertheless, that he did not get along very well with the Spanish officials at Salamanca, that there were numerous evidences of friction and that, in general, his mission was not entirely successful. The Italians have a career diplomat as Ambassador. The situation at Salamanca is understood to be rife with political intrigue and a striving for a predominant political influence and Germany may well think that a career diplomat is better suited to serve her current purposes in Spain.
It may be suggested, however, that the replacement of a military officer by a diplomat is in line with German policy, in sharp contrast to that of Mussolini, of playing in defiance of her military activities in Spain, the military title of Faupel being a somewhat embarrassing symbol of her military efforts.
In general, Germany’s policy appears to remain that of according limited but definite military assistance but at the same time maintaining complete official silence on that score and continuing the tacit fiction of “volunteers”. While this fits in with an opportunist policy of making no public move pending decisive developments in Spain, and again in contrast to Italy facilitating such face saving as may become necessary, there is no local evidence of Germany’s “withdrawal” from Spain which has from time to time been mooted.
Although no exact estimate is possible the Military Attaché believes that there are roughly some 12,000 German officers and men in Spain. These are understood to be, with the exception of a number of anti-aircraft batteries and aviators, entirely engaged in training and in other behind the line activities. This would mean that no material change has occurred in recent months. Shipments of munitions continue at about the same high level and it is thought that to an extent these are being paid for by shipments of grain.
[Page 379]Respecting the immediate military situation, the Military Attaché tells me that German Army circles seem much more satisfied with the progress made than they have been for some time. This satisfaction is based on the success in the Santander campaign which was accomplished largely by German trained all Spanish “navarre” divisions and is thus regarded as a German achievement and a vindication of German policy and methods.
On the purely German side the military authorities here see an extremely important advantage in the employment of Spain as an ordnance testing ground under combat conditions of all their equipment. Meanwhile their casualties are stated to be not over two or three hundred for the period to date. A financial loss would, of course, be sustained to the extent Germany is not receiving or may not receive payment for the equipment furnished.
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