852.00/6376
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 4.]
Sir:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It seems appropriate here to make a few observations on British policy regarding Spain after a year of civil war, as seen by the Embassy. There have been a number of indications of a growing feeling in official circles, particularly since the fall of Bilbao, that it is time for Great Britain to start trimming her sails for the possibility of a Franco victory, or at least Franco in control of the greater part of Spain—and geographically the most important part of Spain from Great Britain’s point of view. In all probability the British Government [Page 375] would still prefer a peace without victory (see Embassy’s despatch No. 2748 of January 4, 193736), or in any event a weak Spain, free from Italian and German influence. With the gradual extension of the Nationalist territory, however, the British Government seems to have given up hope of a more convenient outcome and begun exerting its subtle powers of propaganda towards gently preparing public opinion for the eventual recognition of Franco.
In other matters, unimportant in themselves but of possible interest as indications of policy, Franco has given the British Government something to think about. His cool attitude with regard to British interests in the Bilbao area, in contrast to the warm reception extended to Germany, must at least be a source of inconvenience. Judging from numerous questions in the House of Commons, Franco is making difficulties in connection with the return of British consuls to Nationalist territory. The Government has also been sharply questioned concerning the Spanish guns recently mounted near Gibraltar, and Mr. Churchill, who a year ago openly favored Valencia, bluntly stated in the House on July 19th that these guns near Gibraltar made formal relations with Salamanca necessary, whether Great Britain liked them or not. Even England’s ancient ally, Portugal, on breaking relations with Czecho-Slovakia, left Portuguese interests entrusted to the Italian Legation. On the other hand, Franco is doubtless badly in need of money and since Italy and Germany have none to spare, the British Government should be able to make a satisfactory deal with Nationalist Spain in return for financial support from the City. Furthermore, under ordinary circumstances Great Britain is Spain’s best customer.
In fine, though Great Britain dislikes the prospect of a dictatorship in Spain friendly to Germany and Italy, the British Government has to consider whether it is not time to start cultivating Franco’s friendship. British public opinion, and the Press, are of course influenced by their taste for the Left or the Right in Spanish politics. But it is unlikely that these feelings have any important influence on Great Britain’s policy, in Spain or anywhere else, which is simply aimed at serving strategic and other interests of Great Britain and the Empire regardless. Since a drawn contest seemed to give promise of simplifying Great Britain’s Mediterranean problems (or to some even a victory for Valencia) the Government has tempered its policy accordingly; now that it looks as if Franco may have come to stay, the Government is making the appropriate adjustments. By the same token, should by any chance the ultimate fortune of war favor Valencia, this process will be reversed again and we will doubtless hear more about the “legitimate Government in Spain” than we have of late.
[Page 376]I have no desire, in making these remarks, to minimize in any way what I believe has been, from the beginning of the Spanish conflict, the sincere and open desire on the part of the British, paramount among various considerations, to keep the fighting strictly confined to the Spanish peninsula with a view to preserving European peace.
Respectfully yours,
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