852.00/5599: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 1—4:15 p.m.]
332. My 328 of June 1, 4 p.m.1 The French Ambassador dined at the Embassy last night and I took occasion to ask his views upon the present situation. He said that he regarded it as very grave indeed and feared that it might be the incident of which all had been apprehensive, which would make it impossible longer to restrict the war within Spanish boundaries, although his Government and the British Government were doing everything possible, as heretofore, to bring about armistice.
I lunched with the Soviet Ambassador today and he criticized both the British and French Governments severely for not taking a definite and determined stand with both Germany and Italy, laying down the law, as he said, to them to clear out of Spain and stop all their activities there.
The Italian Ambassador is dining at the Embassy tonight and if I learn anything of interest from him, I shall send it over tomorrow.
This afternoon I saw Eden at the Foreign Office and told him of my Government’s concern over the situation and that I should like to know his views and what course he intended to pursue; also whether his Government intended to try to operate through what was left of the Non-Intervention Committee or would proceed directly with the Governments concerned. He said that he was greatly troubled over the situation and that he would like to read to me in full the message he had received yesterday from the British Ambassador in Berlin reporting his conversation with Neurath. The Ambassador said that Neurath had told him that he, Neurath, fortunately had been in Munich; that he saw Hitler at once and spent 6 hours with him trying as far as possible to calm him down as he was in a furious rage; that he had urged upon him the wisdom of not taking any precipitate action. However, his efforts had met with only a partial measure of success and he had entirely failed to prevent the bombardment of Almeria as Hitler was determined that some such act of reprisal must be made and made promptly; that Germany should withdraw for the time at least from the Non-intervention Committee and from any patrol activities. The British Ambassador’s interview was broken off by a summons from Hitler.
Eden then read me the notes of his interview with the German Chargé d’Affaires. (See my 323, May 31, 7 p.m.)
[Page 318]Eden told me that he had subsequently seen Ribbentrop who had merely reiterated the position taken by the Chargé d’Affaires but had assured Eden that apart from non-participation in the deliberations of the Non-Intervention Committee and in patrol work Germany would maintain the agreements made in connection with Spanish situation for the present. Eden said to me that it was fortunate that the Deutschland had gone into Gibraltar as it gave the British naval officers there an opportunity to examine the ship and that they had reported to him that the Germans who were killed and wounded were in the messroom which convinced him as it had convinced these British officers that the bombing was unprovoked. My own judgment coincides with this view. Eden said that he had stated to the Premiers of the Dominions and other representatives at the Imperial Conference only last Saturday that it looked as if the clouds were lifting. I mentioned to Eden it was an ominous coincidence that on several occasions when the situation seemed to be improving some untoward incident has occurred to upset the situation and increase its hazards and dangers. Eden replied that this was true and that it looked as if the Soviet Government wanted the British to pull its chestnuts out of the fire and would not be disturbed if Germany was at war with England and France leaving Russia with a comparatively free hand on the other side. He said he felt the situation although difficult and onerous was not yet hopeless and that his Government with the assistance of the French was doing everything possible to gain time and to bring about an appeasement in the present difficulties. He added that from his knowledge of the German temperament he was inclined to believe that it was quite possible Hitler and his regime might feel satisfied for the present at least with wreaking vengeance on Almeria because he did not think Germany was ready to precipitate a general war at this time; that as a matter of fact he anticipated more difficulty at the moment in dealing with the Italians than in dealing with the Germans. He especially asked me to say that if my Government had any suggestions as to the manner and method of dealing with this situation he would welcome them.
- Not printed.↩