852.00/5311
The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 4.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s despatch No. 321 of April 15, 193768 and previous despatches concerning the Spanish situation, I have the honor to inform the Department that with the inauguration of the international control scheme on midnight of April 19th there has been an appreciable change in tone of articles relating to developments in Spain as published in the Italian press, although it is still briefly reported that French and Russian violations of the non-intervention accord continued during March and April. For the past few days newspaper articles have been confined to reports of news from the Spanish front, indicating that the present objective of General Franco appears to be the capture of Bilbao before resuming his drive on Madrid. There has been no direct editorial comment since the Government spokesman’s article referred to in my telegram No. 164 of April 18, 11 a.m.68
On April 19th it was announced that eight Italian vessels would exercise surveillance in the zone allotted to Italian control extending from the French frontier to Cape Oropesa and the island of Minorca. These vessels under the command of Admiral Marenco are as follows: one flotilla leader, the Quarto (3000 tons) armed with 6–120 mm. guns; two destroyer mine layers, the Aquila and Falco (1400 tons); three destroyer mine layers, Mirabello, Nullo and Manin (1100 tons); and two armed merchant vessels, the Barletta and Adriato.
Although no confirmation can be obtained, it is rumored that General Goering, who passed through Rome en route to Naples on April 21st, will upon his return discuss with the Italian authorities the question of the withdrawal of Italian and German volunteers from Spain. The press, however, is silent in this respect but there is apparent in Rome a definite impression that the Italian Government is becoming increasingly anxious to liquidate its participation in the Spanish conflict and may seek an early occasion in the meetings of the International Committee to support any effective proposal for the withdrawal of volunteers. In this connection reference is made to my telegram No. 143, April 5, noon, reporting Count Ciano’s declaration that Italy would be glad to see all Italian contingents return home. The Embassy is informed that Mussolini would be prepared to accept such an arrangement if it could be accomplished without loss of Italian prestige. While it was formerly said that he was only awaiting a victory of the Franco forces before withdrawing, it may now be that the [Page 288] Italian Government would be prepared to agree to a scheme to be worked out by the London non-intervention committee without further consideration of military developments on Spanish soil.
On the other hand, the Embassy has been informed in confidence of a conversation which took place on April 16th with the representative of the Franco Government in Rome, of which the following represents a summary of Señor García Condé’s statements:
The Spanish Minister confirmed that between 58,000 and 60,000 Italian troops and 18,000 Germans had in all gone to Spain and estimated that the total number of men serving in Franco’s army was approximately 400,000, 65,000 of whom were raw recruits undergoing training. While additional foreign troops would be welcome, Franco now has sufficient man-power to draw from and very few soldiers are being brought from Africa. The great need, however, is for arms and ammunition and this need is being supplied by Italy. Garcia Conde admitting that both men and ammunition were still arriving in Spain from Italy, principally by way of Palma, then said “I have nothing to complain about; Mussolini and Ciano continue to do more than their share.” With reference to the method of shipment, he explained that it was often announced that the vessels are bound for Ethiopia but change their destination after leaving port, but that every recruit on board was however informed of his true destination and had been engaged for this service.
The Spanish representative continued that Mussolini, when he had decided upon the necessity of aiding Spain, had been firmly convinced that the war could not and would not last over six months at the utmost but, feeling certain of the peril to the Fascist regime in Italy should the Red government win in Spain, he had recently informed Garcia Conde that he would “see Franco through.”
After the Guadalajara disaster the Spanish Minister said he had had a long conversation with the Duce and Ciano, during which the various causes of the disaster were discussed, and among them the difficulties which had arisen in the high command between the Germans, Italians and Spanish. In consequence, the Duce gave instructions to the Italian leaders in Spain that Franco must be unquestionably supported by them in all military decisions. The recent rumor in the press of the possibility of supplanting Franco by another commander-in-chief was stated by Garcia Conde to be entirely false since Franco enjoys to a singular degree the confidence of all his Spanish soldiers and the Italians have never wavered in their support of him. He then said that Franco recognized his error in not employing all his available forces to encircle Madrid and cut the Valencia road, thus preventing supplies from reaching the capital along this, and had now decided not to push his attempts to take the capital further but first to do his utmost to capture Bilbao. Garcia Conde explained that the Italian intelligence service was performing excellent work in Spain as shown by the recent publication in Italian newspapers of French and Russian military shipments to Spain, thus creating justification for the dispatch of supplies from Italy.
Garcia Conde admitted that Russia has recently sent some 150 planes to Spain, which has meant that Franco has lost his earlier advantage of superiority in the air. There is no phase of the military [Page 289] situation which is of greater concern to Franco than this, and the Spanish representative continues to request further Italian planes and aviators.
With regard to the future of Franco’s government, it was said that he hoped, after taking Madrid and Bilbao, to make known to the world the form of democratic government he proposed to establish. He considers that America’s recognition will be very vital to him, particularly as he hopes that an American relief association may come to his country’s aid during the first months of reconstruction. In return for the American loan, Franco would prefer to grant American bankers concessions which “the hypocritical English” are certain to covet. In this connection, Garcia Conde said that Senor Cardenas had recently occasion to go to the United States on behalf of Franco. While Garcia Conde hoped that Madariaga might be willing to go, he said that neither Madariaga nor his particular group are willing to serve Franco at present, preferring to keep apart from the situation until victory for one side or the other seems more certain.
The question was raised as regards recognition by the Holy See of the Franco Government and Garcia Conde’s reply was that although Franco’s agents have done their utmost to obtain that recognition, Cardinal Pacelli continued to urge that such recognition would merely entail a further massacre of priests and prelates still in the territory under Bed jurisdiction.
Respectfully yours,