852.00/5238
The Ambassador in Spain (Bowers), Then in France, to the Secretary of State
[Received April 25.]
Sir:
I
I have the honor to report that the war in Spain has definitely entered upon a new phase with the advantage shifting to the Government. The army defending the Republic is no longer an undisciplined mob, broken up into numerous independent party or factional segments, indifferent to Government orders. The inexperienced peasants, workers and liberals who, crudely but effectively, prevented the speedy triumph of the rebels, have been converted into a real fighting force, working as a single army, and subject to one command. I am reliably informed that at Albacete raw recruits have been constantly trained and drilled by competent officers throughout the winter and that these are now ready to take the field. This national army no more resembles that which made a mess of things, clinging to their trenches, in the early stages of the war, than did the Union army of Bull Run resemble that which fought at Gettysburg.
In addition to this almost miraculous improvement in the fighting qualities of the men, the Government army, but recently embarrassed by inadequate mechanized facilities, has come into possession of sufficient arms, ammunition, tanks, planes, and heavy guns. The insurgents here insist that this change has been brought about by France, though there certainly is no evidence here to sustain the charge, and General Queipo de Llano in a radio speech within the week has praised France for the vigorous manner in which it is enforcing the nonintervention pact upon itself. It is not believed that much war material has come from Russia in two months and many believe that the greatest material aid coming to the legal Government comes from Mexico.
With this remarkable improvement in the timbre of the Government army, both in men and war material, there is a most remarkable improvement in Government morale. The Italian fiasco on the Guadalajara front, followed by an even more brilliant series of successes on the Cordoba front, has convinced the supporters of the Government of ultimate success.
At the same time there has been a distinct lowering of morale in Franco’s army due in large measure to the same causes. That there have been actual mutinies among his men both in Algeciras and in Tetuan cannot longer be doubted. The mutineers in both places were [Page 279] Spaniards, not Italians in Algeciras and Moors in Tetuan, as at first reported. There may be much significance in the fact that these mutinies and many desertions have resulted to a considerable extent from the rout of Guadalajara.
Three explanations are heard here:
One, that the mischief makers in Franco’s army are men never in sympathy with his cause but men forced into service in the territory he seized in the early stages of the war.
Another is that they are soldiers of fortune, without principles of any sort, who assumed in the beginning that this military rising would follow the lines of previous military rebellions in Spain, and are now convinced that Franco’s cause is lost.
And third, that many Spaniards now look upon the war as an international and not a civil war, and that the presence of Italian and German armies in Spain has converted the struggle into one for national independence.
After nine months one thing is conclusively proven—that the Spanish people, as a people, were not in sympathy with the rebellion, and are not now, and that without the aid of foreign armies on a large scale Franco cannot possibly prevail. My own observations have long convinced me that were the Italians, the Germans and the Moors removed the rebellion would speedily be suppressed. Many think this would be true if only the Italians and the Germans were withdrawn, since the cream of the trained fighting forces of the Moors who were brought over in the beginning has been exterminated. That is the opinion of every war correspondent with whom I have talked. The Moors now here are semi-savages from the hinterland, with little training.
The fact that in the most critical time, with fighting in the North, General Franco made a journey to Seville to address some dignitaries of the Moors taken there by Italian ships on their return from a religious pilgrimage is an indication that he has some fears as to the present attitude of his Moorish mercenaries.
I find some significance, too, in the fact that General Franco is becoming more and more intolerant toward war correspondents with his armies. He turned them all away when the attack on Malaga began. The men he then turned away had been with him for months and had written the most pronounced pro-Franco articles. No war correspondent with him could have been more satisfactory to him than Knickerbocker who was convinced of his early and inevitable victory when I saw him frequently five months ago. He returned to America three months ago and has now been ordered back. I have seen him twice in Saint-Jean-de-Luz at my home. He was waiting for a permit to cross the border and to rejoin the army. He has just been informed that he “cannot continue his journey to Spain”. I [Page 280] can only interpret this denial to mean that there must be something in the present situation that General Franco does not care to have blazoned to the world. I find Knickerbocker completely flabbergasted by the changed situation. He had never conceived it possible that an untrained army of peasants and workers and liberals could be converted into an army capable of holding its own with professional soldiers; but he may not have read the story of the French Revolution.
The reports I have received from our Consul General in Barcelona indicate that progress is being made even there in bringing order out of chaos in Catalonia. There are now some reasons to believe that a Catalan army actually may enter the field to fight wherever needed. The strength of the extreme syndicalists and the anarchists in Barcelona has made the position of the Companys Government most precarious for months. One thing convinces me that there must be a radical change in that quarter. I know Companys—know him to be a timid, trimming politician without much courage of any kind; and when he suddenly takes the bull by the horns and comes out openly with demands for the unification of all forces under the authority of the Government, I know there must have been a change in public opinion. He is not a man who would venture much.
In this connection another very significant indication of change: in several places, mostly in the neighborhood of Valencia where the anarchists have gone on a rampage in defiance of the national Government, the authorities in Valencia have promptly sent troops and put them down by force. This would have been too dangerous a venture two months ago.
To sum up my conclusion from all this I would say that the military prospects have so changed that unless Italy or Germany or both run amuck and send in a very large army, with the consent of the rest of Europe, there is every justification for the optimism of the Government.
II
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It appears to be true that the insurgents have made no foreign loan. They have partly paid as they have gone by turning over to Germany and Italy the product of mines as payment for arms and ammunition. I am informed, reliably I think, that an attempt was made in London to negotiate a loan and that it failed. A recent decree calling on those of means to make sacrifices, to turn in all their gold under a heavy penalty, and to turn over the income from foreign securities and checks, payable in foreign money, bears out what I hear in this quarter about the insurgents being considerably concerned on the financial side.
[Page 281]III
There was some astonishment when the insurgents launched their desperate offensive against Bilbao at this juncture. Never in history has Bilbao been taken, largely because of her natural advantages for defence. During the last eight months the Basques have had ample opportunity for the construction of powerful defences, and I am informed by Bilbao business men who have come out and by Consul Chapman that the last two lines of defence seem almost impenetrable. Thus, when instead of attempting at once the wiping out of the humiliation of Guadalajara, the insurgents launched the attack on Bilbao, it came as a surprise.
Two reasons are advanced. There is no doubt but that General Franco has been paying Germany and Italy for their assistance by turning over to them the products of mines within the territory controlled by the insurgents. The Government victories on the Cordoba front have deprived the Italians of the mercury mines in that quarter. Incidentally Italians were engaged in large numbers on that front. It is understood here that Germany has complained to Franco that she has not been getting the minerals she expected and that she expected iron ore and was not receiving it. It is assumed that Franco replied that the iron mines of the Basque country were there to take and that an attempt would be made to take them with the assistance of the Germans. That Germans in unusual numbers are on the Basque front is indicated by the capture of several German officers.
Another reason given for the attempt on Bilbao has more to do with propaganda than anything else. The fixed policy, persistently pursued by the insurgents, is to create the impression, especially in Catholic countries, that the Franco forces are fighting for the Catholic church and against the persecutors of Catholics and the burners of churches and the killers of priests. They have been embarrassed by the notorious fact that the Basques are as ardently Catholic as are the people of Navarre and are as ardently supporting the Government as the people of Madrid. The fact reported generally, and positively known, that there has been no interference with worship in the Basque country, that priests and nuns walk the streets in their religious garb without meeting with discourtesy, has interfered considerably with the success of the religious part of insurgent propaganda. And when a dozen or fifteen Basque priests went to Ireland to combat the propaganda there the hate of the Carlists began to center on their fellow Catholics in the Basque country. The Carlists, who have a prominent part, along with Italians, in the Basque offensive, are fighting with the fanaticism of their hate.
When at Durango insurgent bombing planes, flying low, deliberately bombed the cathedral there, which is an ancient one of great artistic [Page 282] and historic importance, it was with full knowledge that the church was crowded with worshippers. The result was the wrecking of the church, the killing of the priest and two hundred Catholic worshippers, and the wounding of as many as six hundred.
If the insurgents can take control of the Basque country it will be possible for them to boast that all deeply religious sections are within their territory.
IV
Just at this juncture when to cover his own continued violations of the Non-intervention Pact that bears his signature, Mussolini has recently charged France with sending help to the Spanish Government, it is of some interest to note that General Queipo de Llano, one of the rebels’ triumvirate of generals, and their nightly voice over the radio, has just expressed appreciation of France’s rigid enforcement of her part of the pact. I heard this comment over the radio but I am indebted to the Diario de Navarra of April 6, 1937 for the speech in full.…
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It is positively established that German warships are in the waters of this section, beyond the territorial limits. A dependable English business man from Bilbao reports seeing the two German warships, Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer while on his way here. This open activity of the German navy is not confined to northern waters. The interference of the German cruiser, the Leipzig, with the Government flotilla en route to the shelling of Ceuta is well established, since the Government boats called the attention of a British ship to the action of the Leipzig and received an acknowledgment.
There can be no possible doubt of the active participation of the Italian and German navies with the rebels, and this notorious fact must be taken into consideration in passing judgment on the justification of the Spanish Government’s denunciation of the non-intervention control plan to give these hostile navies a monopoly on the guarding of the eastern coast, as intolerable and dishonest.
Respectfully yours,