Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1937, General, Volume I

852.00/4828

The Portuguese Legation to the Department of State⁴³

Pro Memoria

The policy of the Portuguese Government during the recent European situation has been characterized by the frank exposé, from the very outset, of their views and objectives, portrayed repeatedly in diplomatic documents, oral addresses at international meetings, official statements and embodied, when necessary, in legislative measures.

2. In the Spanish crisis, Portugal necessarily holds a special position directly resulting from her geographical situation in the Peninsula, and from the facts, dangers and policies that, owing to such a situation, directly affect her. The outstanding and highly significant facts may be summarized as follows: our traditional policy of strict non-intervention in Spanish affairs; the Russian propaganda and openly proclaimed intention of the establishment of bolshevism in the Peninsula; the necessity of protecting ourselves against the danger of the establishment of a bolshevic regime in Spain; the principle, which is part of the program of the extremist forces of the popular front, of an Iberian federation of soviet socialist republics with the inclusion, by force, of Portugal; the support that, since the beginning of the conflict, the marxist forces received from responsible quarters in other countries; the outrages against life, liberty, property and churches that preceded the Spanish uprising; the predictions of the Portuguese Government, communicated to other Governments, as to the course that events would follow.

3. From the developments of the crisis other relevant facts and events must be borne in mind: Portugal gave her adhesion to the agreement of non-intervention in spite of her conviction that the agreement was illusory and did not correspond to the real purposes of several Governments; on giving her adhesion, Portugal made from the outset certain reservations, namely, regarding the enlistment of volunteers and the operation of subscriptions [conscriptions?], but such reservations have been systematically ignored or forgotten; our participation in the London Committee, the efficiency of which we did not hesitate to doubt and to say so, was prompted by the assurances that it was an essential condition for the carrying out of the non-intervention agreement; the definition we asked for as to the limitations of the Committee’s competence and the rules of procedure, having been assured that no resolution would be imposed unless accepted by the respective delegates; the slanderous campaign started in Red Spain against Portugal and the Portuguese Government; the invasion of Portuguese territory by armed Spanish militia that kidnapped from Portuguese estates Spanish refugees who were taken back across the border and shot, no explanation or excuse having been forthcoming from the Madrid Government for these outrages; the safe return on a Portuguese liner, at the expense of the Portuguese Government, to the Spanish port indicated by the Madrid Government, of all the red refugees that had been driven into Portugal; the liner was received at Tarragona with hostility and after the refugees had been landed an attempt was made to raid her, forcing the escorting destroyer to clear for action and dress her guns; a mutiny was fomented on board the Portuguese men of war that had been stationed at Alicante in an attempt to make them join the ships of the red fleet; the severance of diplomatic relations with the Madrid Government as a result of all these and many other acts, yet we have not up to the present, recognized General Franco’s Government; accusations against Portugal presented by the Madrid Government to the London Committee which found them to be unjustified and groundless; successive attacks by Russia on Portugal, both in the Committee and the world press.

4. Regarding the question of volunteers, now given special prominence, Portugal declared that, in spite of the fact that we know that there are not more than a few dozen Portuguese volunteers in Spain, the Government is prepared to adopt severe measures on the lines of those that other countries may adopt, but the Portuguese Government is unable, as a question of principle and owing to the fact that public opinion would not allow it—and public opinion is, according to our Constitution, “a fundamental element of the policy and administration of the Country”—to accept the international supervision of her land frontiers as it would be too dangerous a precedent for a small country to accede to.

5. Such are the outstanding facts.

6. The Portuguese Government has always understood, felt and declared from the outset, that the problem in Spain is not merely an armed conflict between two parties, but the struggle of two civilizations or, more adequately, between civilization and barbarism.

7. The Portuguese Government has always been convinced that should the nationalist forces be vanquished by the forces supporting the Madrid Government, the latter would be dominated by communists and other extremist elements that in turn would be at the service and orders of foreign elements, that is to say of Russia, this has happened even though no such victory took place.

8. As regards mediation, we have expressed the views that to stop the struggle without victory on one side, to be followed by the formation of a strong and generous Government, would be to deliver Spain of her present evil but to prepare her to endure a much worse one in the near future.

9. The Portuguese Government understands that it is not only necessary but important to bear in mind not only the conditions of war in Spain but also the conditions of peace, that is to say not only the horrors of the fighting but also the horror of the crimes perpetrated when there still was no fighting and committed in places where there is no fighting even today. Such demeanor claims to represent a doctrine and a policy with the right to stand on the same level as the policies and doctrines as conceived by our western civilization.

10. Our foreign policy remains faithful to the old alliance with Great Britain which has for so long been its basis, but we can not subordinate such a policy, on points that are vital to us, to mere considerations of international policy to which other Governments may be compelled to take into consideration.

11. Our policy as regards Spain is, therefore, individual, and the result of our situation and not the outcome of agreements with other countries.

12. In the midst of this turmoil, rumors implying the existence of certain more or less secret agreements regarding our Colonies have been circulated and have been once more most emphatically denied, as no sort of agreements are entertained regarding either our Colonies or our dispositions in the Atlantic and the East. Such campaigns maliciously creep up every now and then and are prompted by concealed designs that unscrupulously take advantage of the slightest excuse and persist in ignoring our repeated denials.

13. Our Colonial policy is to welcome all initiatives that may be integrated into our national economy; we do not wish to entertain foreign and independent influences within the realms of our sovereignty, but welcome all and every one in a spirit of collaboration for the advancement of civilization.

14. All that may be said, and much that has been written contrary to the above, may be discarded as either malignantly inspired or ignorantly speculative.

Washington , February 18, 1937.

43. Received in the Department of State on February 23, 1937.