740.00/272
The Ambassador in Poland (Biddle) to the
Secretary of State
[Extracts]
No. 284
Warsaw, December 30, 1937.
[Received January
17, 1938.]
Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that
Mrs. Biddle and I spent the entire period of my recent 8 days leave of
absence in Paris, with the exception of travel time. Aside from the several
engagements which I had previously arranged with my former business
associates, who had come to Paris from London, for the purpose of
transacting business in connection with our private affairs, I was able to
devote the greater part of each day both to conferences with Ambassador
Bullitt and to the review of records in our Embassy. The Ambassador’s and my
exchange of information, happening as it did, immediately after M. Delbos’
visit to Warsaw, and during his continued voyage in Central Europe, proved
of particular value to me in the light of this Mission’s perspective. I was
thus enabled to acquire the reaction to the Delbos visits to Warsaw and
other capitals as reflected in Paris governmental and diplomatic circles.
Ambassador Bullitt in his numerous conversations with French Cabinet
Ministers and Chiefs of Missions accredited to Paris had acquired a very
useful fund of information, particularly from the Western European
standpoint, bearing on the Delbos tour.
Moreover Ambassador Bullitt’s report on his stopover in Berlin en route to
Paris from Warsaw proved of utmost interest to me, especially in the light
of its important direct and indirect bearing on the situation in this region
of Europe.
In brief, the opportunity afforded me, during my Paris visit, to exchange
information and reactions with Ambassador Bullitt on questions pertinent to
affairs in Eastern Europe, as well as on the broader issues bearing on
Europe as a whole, has, from my own viewpoint, proven exceedingly
enlightening and helpful. Moreover, I venture to hope that I may be afforded
similar useful opportunities from time to time, especially during this
“jittery” period throughout Europe.
The joint effort of Britain and France to bring about a general appeasement
and pacification settlement is so broad in scope that the various nations
whose support is desired will be either directly or indirectly interested in
all phases of the envisaged negotiations. Hence I believe that it would be
most helpful for the American Chiefs of Mission accredited to those
countries whose interests are at stake, to exchange information and
viewpoints from time to time for the purpose of assisting each other towards
the mutual development of
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the
broadest possible perspective in terms of the near and long-term
outlook.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aside from the conversations which the Ambassador and I had together with the
several French statesmen, which conversations he has undoubtedly already
reported, there was one discussion which I had with former Prime Minister
Flandin at dinner the night before my departure, the substance of which I
take occasion to forward in the attached memorandum and which, in effect, I
have already verbally communicated to Ambassador Bullitt. I was particularly
glad to have had the opportunity of talking with M. Flandin at M. Pietri’s
(former Minister of Marine) dinner because that same day Ambassador Bullitt
had received a report that M. Flandin, since his return from Berlin, had
been intimating in the couloirs of the Chambre des
Députés that the German officials with whom he had talked in Berlin had
intimated that “Poland was already in Germany’s pocket”. I naturally
therefore welcomed the opportunity of asking him what, if anything, the
Germans had said in relation to Poland during his Berlin talks. Without
hesitation, and I felt with due sincerity, he replied that little if
anything was mentioned about Poland during his conversations.
In connection with the report which Ambassador Bullitt had previously
received regarding M. Flandin’s remarks on Poland (if he had actually made
such remarks), I am inclined to put them down merely to personal, political
tactics: perhaps a double-edged thrust: (a) to throw
off on M. Delbos’ Warsaw visit, and (b) to
discountenance in French eyes Minister Beck, for whom M. Flandin evidently
bears no particular affection.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Poland (Biddle) of a Conversation With
the Former French Prime Minister (Flandin), in Paris, December 17,
1937
As regards the League, events had occurred during recent months which
warranted a change in viewpoint in respect to certain issues.
Both France and Britain had for long based their respective
forward-looking foreign policies on the League. They had both devoted
loyal efforts towards upholding the code of justice in international
relations.
As to whether the victorious “Allies”, who had effected a material
reduction in their armaments during the post-war period, had been “too
big” in their treatment of frequent Peace Treaty violations,
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might be left for history to
decide. The League had functioned satisfactorily and had served
frequently as a check against potential conflicts, while the material
forces of France and Britain had constituted the predominant factor in
Europe.
This bore out the regrettable realism that the “big stick” was an
essential support to insure the prevalence of the moral forces, for the
League’s authority had been threatened when military predominance
appeared temporarily to have shifted. It was, moreover, to the credit of
Prime Minister Chamberlain’s realism and courage, that he had realized
the League was not capable, for the moment, of assuring the security of
its members.
Both the British and the French, having proceeded for some time with a
sense of confidence in the League, had experienced an awakening, as a
result of which both countries had engaged in intensive rearmament.
Indeed they had become aware of the potential threats to their
respective colonial domains, if not their own frontiers.
Hitler had been almost religiously pursuing the principles set forth in
Mein Kampf. Between these principles and
those entailed in the Covenant there was a marked conflict. Moreover, in
terms of the future outlook, international differences might be expected
to be liquidated either by force of arms or by appeasement and peaceful
means. Meanwhile, the totalitarian nations had practically completed the
mobilization of the material and social forces within their respective
national boundaries. The Democracies had made a good start, and were now
well on their way.
As to whether in the course of their development, these highly charged
forces could be held in check, remained to be seen.
As to the respective attitudes of the two “axes”, the French and British
“left wings” looked for a collapse of the economic structures to bring
about the fall of the totalitarian régimes.
On the other hand, the totalitarian leaders looked for revolutionary
disturbances in France, and reckoned on a general weakness of the
parliamentarian democracies.
At the same time there were vigorous campaigns being waged by each axis
to alienate the adherents of the other. For example, Paris believed it
possible to wean Rome from the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, while London
still favorably regarded the possibility of breaking Berlin away. On the
other hand, Berlin continued to envisage the weaning of London from the
London–Paris alignment.
As regards the discussions which took place during Lord Halifax’s visit
to Berlin—they had apparently assumed the form of a search for a
compromise between the Führer’s doctrine of force and the doctrine of
unalterable Treaties.
The real issue now at stake was the modification of the Covenant, the
moderation of the exercise of laws governing international relations,
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and the rounding out of
the elements of potential force in terms of a “new deal” for Europe.
The same circles that were pressing France to stand pat in regard to the
Covenant, were willing to have France assume the role of policeman for
Europe.
As practice had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of collective guarantees
under the Covenant, France had found it difficult to pursue a strictly
ideological policy.
As far back as 1933, M. Flandin had perceived on the part of Poland and
the Scandinavian States, Norway and Denmark in particular, a tapering
off of wholehearted enthusiasm for the League, in terms of strict
adherence to and full support of the principles embodied in the
Covenant. He had subsequently come to recognize this as the “handwriting
on the wall”, pointing to a tendency to look to France and Britain to
shoulder the burden of policing Europe. In other words, as far back as
1933 he had gained the impression that both his country and Britain
might be expected to be “passed the buck” by their associates in the
League, in the event of a crisis.
France could not be expected to serve as Europe’s policeman, for this
role would hold unforeseen dangers and complications for her—besides,
the severe measures in the military and other fields necessary to
support such a role would only work an added hardship on the French
people. Indeed there was no justification for France’s adopting such a
role. Nor on the other hand, could France afford to risk isolation.
French support of Franco-British joint European interests might be
expected to be facilitated by a more precise definition of these
interests.
M. Flandin concluded by stating that neither peace nor French security
had netted effective and durable advantage, after 15 years of
idealism.
France now, however, was on the threshold of adopting a policy of facing
realities and of adjustment to current day circumstances.
