500.C001/1310
The Consul at Geneva (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 30.]
Sir: With reference to the Consulate’s telegram No. 373, December 10, 4 p.m. concerning the Italian withdrawal from the League, it is thought that the following observations may be of interest, especially as regards the broader international aspects of the situation created by the recent Italian action.
Most observers in Geneva are inclined to the view that Italy in formally severing relations with the League did so in understanding with Germany. It is said that during the past year, although Italy had completely withdrawn from any participation in League activities, Mussolini had refrained from formally leaving the League because of the fear that if he took this step a settlement might be arranged with Germany as a result of which Germany would rejoin the League, leaving Italy isolated. The present Italian action, however, was followed promptly by a German declaration that Germany would never return to the League.
The conclusion drawn here from this is that Italy’s fears of possible isolation in case she withdrew from the League were allayed by advanced assurances from Germany. This in turn is linked with the failure of Germany to obtain satisfaction during the Halifax conversations. It is not lost sight of that Italian action, although perhaps precipitated by German pressure, was doubtless facilitated by the situation in the Far East, and by at least the moral support of Japan as evidenced by the adhesion of Japan to the three-power anti-Communist pact. It is interesting to note in this connection that any “acute” situation in the Far East seems to be followed by an Italian [Page 203] or German diversion in Europe and tension in Europe seems to provoke a corresponding move of Japan in the Far East.
In this connection I was told by a responsible member of the League Secretariat that in conversations with Lord Halifax and with Delbos, German officials had adopted a very stiff attitude, insisting upon colonies and other advantages as a moral right but at the same time refusing to discuss any guarantees for a general European settlement such as a German return to the League or some general system of disarmament, an attitude which presented an almost insoluble impasse.
Since the return of Germany to the League within the framework of a general European settlement has been the cardinal objective of British policy, the German declaration following upon Italy’s withdrawal, if it is found that it must be accepted at its face value, would seem to indicate for Great Britain the necessity of effecting a profound change in the orientation of her policy. This declaration is considered as tantamount to an ultimatum that the British and French must negotiate directly with Germany to the entire exclusion of the League, and is at least indirectly a further step in efforts to exclude Russia from the councils of Europe.
It is feared in Geneva that the next step for the Berlin–Rome–Tokyo axis may be to bring pressure upon small Member States such as Austria, Hungary and perhaps Poland to persuade them to follow the Italian move with a view to setting up a group of states which would form an entente in open opposition to the remaining League states and to the whole ideology of the League. Should this be successful, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries and other small Member States might be placed in a position of being forced for their own security either to safeguard their neutral status not only as regards the punitive economic and military features of the Covenant of the League, but also to refuse to take any part in League action capable of arousing outside resentment and finally even withdrawing therefrom altogether, thus so seriously weakening the League that the whole structure would either collapse or become completely ineffective. In such a situation observers feel that there are actually only a few possible alternatives and that the choice of these alternatives by the great League powers such as Great Britain, France and perhaps even Russia will determine the future direction of European events.
Of these alternatives one would seem to be that the great League powers may be forced to adopt such a strong attitude with regard to the anti-League group and an increasing show of strength and determination toward world affairs generally that either a reasonable [Page 204] settlement can be gradually arrived at, or that there will be a war within the relatively near future. It is felt here that if a sufficiently firm attitude should be adopted by the great powers and by the small states still remaining faithful to the League, a reasonable European settlement would be probable and that war might be avoided.
It is recognized, however, that there is a danger that Italy, in dread of England, may attempt to precipitate a conflict before the completion of British rearmament in order to forestall a possible change in the international situation which would be less favorable to her in respect of support from Germany and Japan. An analogy is sometimes drawn between the present relation of Italy to Germany and the relation of Austria to Germany in 1914.
A second alternative would be to buy off Germany in the hope that once satisfied, Hitler would abandon his Italian allies, whom the average German after all regards with considerable distrust. The difficulty here would seem to be that up to the present Hitler has apparently shown no disposition to give anything toward a cooperative settlement, and it is felt that satisfaction to Germany in the absence of reciprocal guarantees would result only in the strengthening of the anti-League States with the probability that some of the present small Member States would be forced to join the Berlin–Rome–Tokyo axis.
A third alternative would seem to be that Great Britain and France would, in the hope of a turn in events, continue the present policy of drift and indecision coupled with a probable closer orientation of Great Britain and France to Russia together with efforts in various directions to hold together as many of the small Member States as possible and with renewed and greater activity toward rearmament. Such a policy of drift would probably mean that France and Great Britain would do everything possible to prevent any League discussion of questions which would arouse the resentment of Italy and Germany and thus embarrass smaller Member States, and a definite “playing down” of League activity in political matters generally. This attitude, it is felt, would lead in the end to only one result—war—and that probably within a relatively short time.
Of these alternatives, the first would seem to have the best chance of success, but pessimists in Geneva feel that with the present British Government in power, with France in her present attitude of indecision, and with Russia torn with internal dissension, the last alternative will be the one adopted, unless Hitler can somehow be persuaded to adopt a more conciliatory point of view.
Respectfully yours,