Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, General, Volume I

751.60C/111: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Warsaw, December 8, 1937—1 p.m.
[Received 6:17 p.m.]

143. Delbos visit.

1. Whereas Polish Government previously regarded Delbos’ announced Warsaw visit as little more than perfunctory, subsequently in view of cold-blooded Anglo-German and Anglo-French conversations as well as Neurath’s half-hour Berlin station talk with Delbos while en route to Warsaw, Polish Government attached utmost importance to Delbos visit. Polish Ambassador to France Lukasiewicz who was here during conference informed me that in his opinion conversations proved far more satisfactory than he had expected.

2. Polish Government having maintained close contact with what transpired during aforementioned London and Berlin conversations had meanwhile fully considered topics discussed especially those directly affecting Poland’s own interests.

3. I am confidentially informed both by Foreign Office and by members of Delbos’ official party that Beck–Delbos conversations were characterized by mutual confidence and good feeling. Both extended apparent efforts to strengthen Polish-French friendly relations. In fact, in contrast with former Beck–Barthou conversations Delbos visit had served to strengthen Polish-French relations.

4. Colonel Beck previously aware of France’s insistence on collective security pacts had gained impression France was annoyed over Poland’s advocacy of bilateral agreements during Warsaw Beck-Delbos conversations. However, Delbos revealed that France believed in her friendship with Poland despite Polish bilateral advocacy and Delbos took occasion to assure Beck that latter views did not diminish the value of the Polish-French alliance. This meant a clarification of that hitherto controversial point. Hence Colonel Beck now inclined to feel even France shows signs of chills in former convictions regarding collective doctrine and that under Great Britain’s influence France is gradually coining to understand importance of bilateral pacts.

5. Delbos explicitly assured Beck that if a four-power pact emerged embodying only the mutual relations of the signatory powers, France would not only keep Poland informed thereon but also France would see that the Polish-French alliance would not be allowed to diminish in value through such a pact. Moreover Delbos assured Beck that should the proposed pact embody interests of a broader European nature Delbos would bring Poland in.

6. In touching on Czechoslovakia in general terms Delbos assured Beck that if Poland insisted on settling existing Polish-Czech differences directly and alone France would not insist on mediating and pointed out that he considered good Polish-Czech relations an absolute condition to European peace. Delbos moreover remarked to Soviet Chargé d’Affaires that he dreaded his forthcoming mission to Praha for in representing both France and Great Britain he had to ask Czechoslovak Government to consider granting Sudeten Deutsch autonomous administration providing Germany eventually guaranteed among other things Czech territorial integrity.

7. In view of impression gained here during Anglo-German and Anglo-French conversations of Britain’s and Germany’s disposition to drop the Soviet from considerations working towards a western pact, Minister Beck inquired as to Britain’s attitude regarding the Franco-Soviet pact whereupon Delbos stated Britain not only tolerated but also appreciated the Franco-Soviet pact as a useful element in the pacification of Europe. Delbos added that denunciation of this pact now would only mean an unnecessary Franco-Soviet quarrel.

8. Regarding Austria Delbos remarked to Soviet Chargé that France was seriously concerned over potential outcome of Britain’s indication to Germany that she would consider standing aside under certain conditions in the event Austria elected to turn to Germany culturally and otherwise. France did not like this. Soviet Chargé in reciting foregoing conversation significantly and confidentially remarked that France’s attitude as regards Austrian question made no difference because in final analysis France had to follow Britain’s lead. Delbos moreover told Czech Minister Germany was prepared to recognize integrity of Austria’s boundaries but would not combat Austria’s desire to elect to turn to Germany culturally or otherwise.

9. Following additional disclosures of important relative bearing are: regarding Polish-Soviet relations, Delbos in conversation with Soviet Chargé underlined fact that Beck had told him Poland’s relations with Soviet were normal but that Poland feared machinations of Third Internationale. Moreover Delbos emphatically pointed out that if Third Internationale “laid off” Poland, Poland’s attitude towards Soviet might be expected to improve substantially.

10. I find that both British and French Ambassadors here now share my belief in Beck’s sincerity in denying that Poland intends joining anti-Communist pact.

11. In discussing colonial question Beck emphasized Poland’s interest therein was prompted by Poland’s raw material requirements and her search for a solution of overpopulation stressing its application to the problem in general and not confined to Jewish surplus. Beck added that Poland therefore would want to sit in on any possible future discussions of colonial distribution which might take place in the event of emergence of an international concert. Delbos subsequently stated his opinion that in view of Poland’s overpopulation problem and Poland’s important position in Europe, Poland’s desires in this respect were moderate and justified.

12. Delbos left Warsaw December 6 for Krakow when he departed for Bucharest afternoon December 7. I shall cable any new developments after my conversation with Minister Beck upon his return from Krakow where he accompanied Delbos.

Biddle