741.51/253: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State93
[Received 9:37 p.m.]
1685. Delbos and Chautemps returned from London late last night. I talked with Delbos this afternoon and found him for the first time in the past year extremely satisfied with himself and full of confidence.
[Page 181]He said that agreement between Chamberlain, Eden, Chautemps and himself had been absolute on every point discussed and that this was saying a great deal since they had discussed almost all the problems of the world. There had been no fundamental rearrangements of opinion whatever, and merely minor details had required elucidation. He was enormously pleased that Chamberlain had said to him that he could speak for Great Britain as well as France on his trip which begins tomorrow to Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.
I asked Delbos if he intended to stop in Berlin on this trip and he said that his train would be at the station in Berlin for 20 minutes and he had had an intimation from the German Government that some official would meet him at the station in Berlin and have a talk with him.
Delbos said that Halifax had brought back little of a concrete nature from Germany. The Germans had talked to him vaguely and had stressed their right to colonies and their need for colonies. They had offered no concessions of any sort in order to obtain the return of their colonies. They had made it clear to Halifax, however, that they did not care whether they should receive again the colonies which had been taken from them by the Treaty of Versailles or whether France and England should arrange to give them Portuguese, Belgian, or other colonies of equal value. They had been extremely vague in any remarks about Austria and Czechoslovakia and had acted as if they felt the British should have small interest in Central Europe. They had not said categorically to Halifax that Great Britain had no business in Central Europe.
In London it had been agreed that the British and French Governments should say to the Germans that they were ready to examine the question of colonies but that it was an extremely complicated question which would require prolonged study and that it could be settled only within the framework of a general agreement which might make it possible to preserve peace in Europe. “In other words,” said Delbos, “we agreed that we should both be ready to make concessions to produce peace but that we should make no concessions whatsoever of any nature which would strengthen Germany for another war. We agreed to remain for the moment completely in our present positions, making no concessions whatsoever but informing the Germans we were ready to discuss constructive proposals for the maintenance of peace.”
I asked Delbos if this meant that either the French Government or the British Government or both jointly would in the near future make any specific proposals to Germany. He said that on the contrary the French and British Governments would make no proposals and that proposals would have to come if they were to come in the [Page 182] immediate future from the German side. I remarked that inasmuch as the position of the Germans was that they would be glad to hear proposals but that they would have to come from the side of the French and British it seemed to me that the two parties might continue to scowl at each other for some time without speaking. He replied that this was what he anticipated although it was not excluded that the French and British Ambassadors in Berlin might be able to prepare the way for more important conversations. Events were moving so fast that there would soon be incidents of one sort or another which would necessitate conversations.
I asked Delbos if the British had promised him to support France completely in Central Europe. He said that neither France nor England would announce in advance that they would go to war in case Germany should act against Austria. On the other hand neither would announce that they would not go to war and only the event could prove what would happen. The case of Czechoslovakia was different. France was guaranteed by her treaty obligations to support Czechoslovakia at once in case of German attack. The British had declared that they were not disinterested but had made no promises.
I asked Delbos if there had been any discussion of a four power pact. He replied that there had been none whatsoever. Entirely aside from Germany there was Italy to be considered, and at the present time the Italians were behaving like lunatics. They were furious that the Germans had had talks with the British and that the British had had talks with the French. The French and the British had decided at London that they should tell Mussolini that he could get nowhere by his daily nastiness and that while they would be very glad to develop friendly relations with Italy there could be no question of having any conversations until Mussolini should stop his present daily press attacks and radio attacks against France and England.
I asked Delbos if there had been any discussion of the situation in the Far East. He replied that there had been a great deal of discussion but that the British had said that while they were quite ready to cooperate in any general movement to stop Japan they could not act individually. The French Government had taken the same position. There must be a general world action to stop Japan or Great Britain and France could not act.
Delbos said that the Spanish situation also had been discussed. The situation there was still somewhat obscure. He had excellent reasons to believe that Franco was having conversations with the Catalan Government though not with the National Government in Spain. He did not believe these conversations had progressed very [Page 183] far. He thought that the reason Franco had not yet attacked was the simple one that he did not have sufficient forces at his disposal to carry through an offensive.
There was such an unwonted note of confidence in Delbos’ declarations that I asked him if he had been successful in obtaining a promise from the British to accelerate the speed of their rearmament. He replied that it had been unnecessary to make this request. He and Chautemps had been astounded when they had been shown by Chamberlain and Inskip94 the actual figures with regard to British rearmament. It was proceeding much faster than anyone realized. I said that my most recent reports indicated that the British were turning out 200 first quality planes per month. He replied that the number was considerably above 200 per month. He said that the figures on British rearmament were intensely satisfying and reassuring. This fact, coupled with the fact that every party in Great Britain from the Conservatives to the Labor Party was in complete agreement with the attitude of the British Government and was at the moment most friendly to France, enormously strengthened the French position.
In conclusion Delbos said that he had received before going to London the report that there was real disagreement between Chamberlain and Eden. He was now certain that there was no disagreement whatsoever between them. He had been told that Chamberlain desired to give Germany a free hand in Central Europe in return for a promise by Germany not to ask for colonies now in possession of the British. He had found, on the contrary, that Chamberlain was in full agreement with him and Chautemps, and Chamberlain had asked him to represent the British as well as the French on his trip through Central Europe. His repetition of this statement indicated very clearly how deeply it had pleased him and he will leave Paris tomorrow very confident, and more under British influence than ever.