The President has been away at his home in the interior and I have not
been able to see him. I, however, saw the Secretary for Foreign Affairs
today and informally discussed the proposed treaty at some length. A
memorandum of the conversation is transmitted herewith.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Chargé in Panama (Burdett)
Panama, January 23, 1935.
With reference to the proposed treaty, Dr. Arosemena said today that
the negotiators were in substantial accord on every point except
that referring to further acquisition of private Panamanian property
by the United States for the use of the Canal. He said the
Panamanians would not sign any treaty which left Panama under the
threat of the grant expressed in the 1903 Treaty permitting seizure
by the United States whenever it felt that further lands or waters
were needed for the construction, maintenance, operation,
sanitation, or protection of the Canal. He was quite emphatic in
saying that in its present form this part of the draft was not
acceptable to Panama. He referred again to the reported opinion of
Don Luis Anderson to the effect that Costa Rica could not negotiate
a boundary treaty with Panama as long as all Panamanian territory is
subject to seizure for Canal purposes.
I said that the Canal might conceivably be enlarged to a point where
more water was needed, and the Bayano River seemed to be
[Page 892]
the only practical
solution to this problem. I asked if anything had been suggested on
either side as to describing a definitely limited portion of
Panamanian territory which should alone remain subject to the
acquisition expressed in the 1903 Treaty. Dr. Arosemena said the
Bayano River was mentioned by Governor Schley in a conference with
the treaty commissioners at Washington but that other than this
River, Colonel Schley was unable to suggest what might be needed as
a further grant. The Secretary then had me read the minutes of the
conference between Governor Schley and the commissioners at
Washington. These minutes were written in Spanish by Dr. Alfaro6 and couched in a somewhat aggressive
and uncompromising phraseology.
It appeared from these minutes that Colonel Schley was quite unable
to mention any Panamanian lands which might be needed hereafter for
the Canal, or any rivers other than the Bayano. The waters of this
River, he thought, could only be brought into Alhajuela Lake by many
miles of canal and several tunnels through the mountains, which
would probably make it practically impossible from an engineering
standpoint.
Dr. Alfaro further endeavored to refute Governor Schley by quoting
former Governor Burgess as to the impracticability of utilizing
further Panamanian lands or waters. I gathered that Alfaro is
distinctly inimical to the American contention on this point.
Incidentally, I have not yet seen Governor Schley since his return
from Washington on January 20, and I have consequently not discussed
any of these matters with him.
Referring to the trans-Isthmian highway, Dr. Arosemena repeated the
already reported view that inasmuch as the United States wished to
construct certain fortifications commanding the right-of-way, Panama
would not consent, and in consequence would not build the road. He
felt that the United States itself would build the road within a few
years as the United States needed it more than Panama. He said that
probably Panama would go ahead with certain work on the road by
making a dirt road between villages, which work could later on be
used in the trans-Isthmian highway.
Regarding radio, Dr. Arosemena said that there was no reason to
mention radio in the proposed treaty inasmuch as Panama was already
going ahead with radio development in accordance with its existing
rights.
Regarding the proposed abrogation of American guarantee of Panamanian
independence, Dr. Arosemena remarked that this was inserted to save
the national honor, that while it meant little as far
[Page 893]
as the United States was
concerned, it would establish Panamanian independence.
The Secretary was rather vague concerning any proposed provisions for
regulating the commissaries. Apparently, he has not personally given
deep study to these matters and was obviously ill informed on some
of the details of the commissary, sales to ships, and residence in
Zone controversies. He felt that the commissaries should not sell to
ships at all and that their sales to ships of such articles as fuel
and ships’ stores was through a voluntary concession on the part of
Panama and that this should be understood. I said that the United
States was providing many articles to ships because Panamanian
merchants could not supply them or would not do so at reasonable
prices, that the United States was obligated to see that the ships
transiting the Canal are provided at a reasonable price with the
supplies essential to their operation, and that it could not
willingly see the ships forced to pay extortionate prices. The
Secretary said that this was not at all the case, that it was
impossible for the Panamanians to sell to the ships because they
were not given the chance, that they would compete with the
commissaries on every article used by ships if they had an equal
opportunity.
Referring to restrictions on residence in the Zone, I said that if
Panama was going in for free trade they might like to see the number
of residents of the Canal Zone largely increased, inasmuch as it
would add that many more potential customers of the expanded
Panamanian merchandising setup.
The Secretary said that, in his judgment, there should be a
requirement that the manifests of all ships carrying goods destined
for Panama should be legalized with a visa from Panamanian consuls.
I did not discuss this point further. He seemed to have this matter
confused with the provision that goods arriving at Zone ports and
consigned to Panama shall be accompanied by Panamanian consular
invoices.
The Secretary then spoke for some time about the wrongful prevention
of Panamanians convicted of crimes in the Canal Zone from transiting
across the Zone, and cited the hypothetical case of a Panamanian
living to the west of the Canal who suddenly needed hospital
treatment in Panama City and could not pass through the Zone if he
had been convicted of crime there. The Secretary has spent most of
his life as a criminal lawyer and judge and this matter is
apparently his pet hobby. I said that such people might be provided
with passes to be used in cases of emergency, but the Secretary said
that passes could not be granted in an emergency; furthermore, no
Panamanian should be prevented from crossing through his own country
in case of need. The Secretary went into this digression at
[Page 894]
great length and
apparently feels very keenly about it. Incidentally, President Arias
also once spoke to me somewhat feelingly about this matter.
The Secretary said that proposed references to sanitation
administration are acceptable and that abrogation of Paragraph 3 of
Article VII was an excellent thing inasmuch as United States
intervention in Panama was generally uncalled for. He cited the
Chiriquí occupation as especially unfortunate.
He said that reference to the payments under Article XIV of the 1903
Treaty7 should not be included in the proposed
treaty and that corrective measures should be otherwise
arranged.
He said that a reference to a corridor to Colon was inserted at the
instance of President Roosevelt. He made no complaint about a
proposed change in the future jurisdiction of the Madden Dam road
although in previous conversations he has been obdurate on this
point.
The Secretary said that the treaty as a whole was satisfactory except
for the portion having to do with future grants, and that if that
portion could be arranged in a manner agreeable to Panama, he
thought the treaty would be signed. That President Arias would not
bring a treaty to Panama which he was not certain could be
ratified.…
He said … the President was sure he would be able to have the treaty
ratified if it is one which he can conscientiously sign. He said
further that the President would call an extra session of Congress
as soon as, and if, the treaty is signed.
He thought that the Panamanian Commissioners could return to Panama
some time in February unless Mr. Welles expected to take a vacation,
in which case the Panamanian Commissioners would have no objection
to staying over a month longer in Washington.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
