817.00/8208
The Minister in Nicaragua (Lane) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 22.]
Sir: Referring to my strictly confidential despatch No. 803 of April 12,54 I have the honor to advise the Department that on April 131 had an extended conversation with President Sacasa in the morning and General Somoza in the afternoon.…
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On April 13 the President spontaneously said to me that he had no objection to General Somoza’s succeeding him in the presidency; that, on the contrary, he would be delighted; but that the election must be [Page 849] constitutional. He said that if a constituent assembly is elected in order to change the constitution (I assume he referred to changes in articles 105 and 141), the Government would, of course, supervise the elections and would make certain that they were fair. I inquired of the President whether there were any other means by which the constitution could be changed other than through a constituent assembly. The President said that the Congress could make only what he termed a “partial” change in the constitution which could not take effect until two years subsequent to the congressional approval of the change. He added, however, that one other method existed, through a coup d’état, by compelling the Congress, through military force, to approve the changes. (This last-named alternative seems inconsistent with the President’s statement that the Congress may make “partial” reforms to the constitution. I felt it unwise, however, to make further inquiries.) In my recent conversations with persons here I have acted principally as a listener, not wishing to indicate through questions which might be misinterpreted or deliberately distorted, that we would favor or disapprove a prospective action (except in that I have, as reported below, counseled against violent action).
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I feel reasonably certain that Somoza intends to be the next president, and has had sufficient success in his recent parries with the Government to encourage him to continue his policy of going boldly ahead, regardless of the President’s wishes. I fear lest each added move on Somoza’s part to put the President in a subordinate role will so much more antagonize the President’s followers against him and make it so much the more difficult for Somoza to carry out his wishes through constitutional means, as to increase the possibility of violent action.
I took the opportunity several times during the course of the conversation to express the hope earnestly to General Somoza that he would not resort to any violence. He promised me that he would take no violent action whatever against President Sacasa, and said “I broke my word to you once (referring to his promise not to take any rash action against Sandino), but I will never break my word to you again”. He said, without any apparent intention of being humorous, that he would not use violence unless it were for the purpose of defending himself. In view of the physical strength of the Guardia as compared to the Presidential Guard, the use of the term “defense” would be laughable were it not illustrative of what may be in the minds of the military element.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩