Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, The American Republics, Volume IV

724.34119/273: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, November 7, 1935—9 p.m.
[Received 11:59 p.m.]

271. From Gibson. My 270, Nov. 6, 7 p.m.

1. We are now definitely faced with the situation forecast by my telegram 267 of Oct. 30, 9 p.m.

2. Bolivian and Paraguayan replies are of such nature as to render direct agreement on the boundary impossible at this time. Our line is midway between the lines each desires and yet it was rejected by one as unjustifiable and by the other as inequitable. I cannot see how there is any present prospect of drawing any line which will satisfy both parties.

3. The situation as to arbitration has been defined by the Paraguayan reply and offers even less possibility of success than before. On the other hand, the Paraguayans have now stated clearly that they will insist on retaining the territory up to their present line of occupation and will arbitrate only the territory between that line and their undefined extreme claims. On the other hand, Bolivia has held invariably from the first that if a direct agreement cannot be reached the question of sovereignty over the entire Chaco must be submitted to arbitration.

4. Both replies take substantially the same positions on the territorial question as those presented by the Bolivian and Paraguayan delegations when the question was first taken up at the July 31 meeting of the Conference (see my telegram No. 161 of July 31, midnight).

5. The progress made during the negotiations of late August in getting the two parties to recede from their extreme positions has been entirely lost, and the Paraguayans, in particular, have repudiated all of the concessions which Zubizarreta then stated clearly that his Government would either be willing to grant or consider (Dawson’s telegram No. 194 Sept. 2, 9 p.m.)

6. There have been similar changes within the past few days in the Paraguayan attitude in regard to the prisoners of war and the policing of the line of separation.

7. Negotiations on the prisoners had reached a point where all that remained in order to secure Paraguayan acquiescence to a formula for the return of prisoners was the fixing of a sum to cover the costs of maintaining them. At this stage the Paraguayans repudiated the whole scheme, blandly denying ever having given their assent to any of the matters discussed, and stated that they could not consider the release of the prisoners unless a large indemnity were given by Bolivia, and the latter guaranteed to respect the present line of separation as though it were a definite boundary pending a final settlement.

8. After agreeing expressly to the policing of the zone of separation by a neutral body, the Paraguayans have abruptly taken the stand that they will occupy the zone up to the intermediate line of separation, policing this territory with their own troops. Instead of neutral police, they are only willing to have one or two observers resident in the region who would receive complaints and endeavor to adjust disagreements. These officers would have no authority and would be confined to keeping the Peace Conference informed as to the situation. The Uruguayan delegates have stated that their Government will be unwilling to undertake the duty under the circumstances.

9. The unfortunate situation in which we find ourselves is the direct product of the internal political situation in both countries. As you are aware, elections in Paraguay are scheduled in March and in Bolivia in May. Until these are over and the political situation in both countries has clarified, there is no possibility of progress. The chief Bolivian and Paraguayan delegates are both candidates for the Presidency, Ayala and Tejada¹⁰ seem to have aspirations to succeed themselves, and there are numerous other potential candidates in both countries. Any retreat by either Government from the extreme position now taken would be immediately seized upon by the opposition for political reasons. In Bolivia, the situation is complicated by the fact that the present Government is a minority one with little popular or political support.

10. We are continuing our efforts for a solution of the prisoners question, despite the grave difficulties presented. The mediators continue to feel that if this problem can be solved, we shall have exhausted the present possibilities of achievement. The unanimous feeling is that we should then adjourn subject to recall by the chairman rather than fix any specific date for reconvening. This would permit reassembling the Conference at any time conditions become more favorable. We do not however foresee any probability of such a development until after the elections and the assumption of office by the newly elected Presidents in both countries.

11. We can see no useful service which we could perform by remaining in session in the full knowledge that there is nothing we can accomplish for months to come. On the contrary, there would be grave dangers in such a course. The relations of the Bolivian and Paraguayan delegates have become steadily worse in recent weeks, and they are not now in a state of mind to carry on negotiations. We should also be subject to the caprice of our chairman whose opportunities for mischief-making are greater if the Conference is in session.

12. If you are still opposed to adjournment under the conditions I have outlined, I should appreciate an early expression of your views as to the nature of the activities which the Conference could undertake so that I may have some guidance in meeting the general desire.

Weddell

10. L. Tejada Sorzano, Vice President of Bolivia.