724.34119/243: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:35 p.m.]
249. From Gibson. Department’s 144, October 17, 4 p.m. The Department’s view of the duty of the Conference as outlined in paragraph 3 is shared by the mediators.
However, a new situation has arisen which calls for consideration.
As regards direct agreement the Paraguayans have repudiated their recent statements as to what they would be prepared to accept and have reverted to their earlier claim that they won the war and are consequently entitled to all the territory they now hold (my 248, October 18, 10 p.m.).
As regards arbitration they have all along stated that failing direct agreement they would refuse to submit to arbitration any part of the Chaco now held by them.
Due to the faulty drafting of the Protocol of June 12th, the matter can go to arbitration only on the basis of agreement between the parties. Therefore, there is no hope of progress so long as the Paraguayans maintain their present attitude.
The reason for their stand is a matter for conjecture. In the light of all the facts there may be ground for the belief that they have never intended to reach agreement but signed the Protocol in order to get the Conference to take over the maintenance of their maximum occupation [Page 167] and demobilize the Bolivian Army (see my letter of August 6 to Welles,5 pages 8 to 12).
Since writing the above I have read an interview with Ayala6 published in this morning’s Nación stating that “if under the auspices of the Conference Paraguay and Bolivia solemnly bind themselves to undertake to respect the present lines of occupation as if they were definite frontiers pending the conclusion of a boundary treaty there will no longer be any objection to the complete return of the prisoners”.
It would appear that Paraguay is counting upon the prisoners of war as a club to force acceptance of their territorial aspirations and upon the Conference to keep the Neutral Military Commission functioning in the Chaco in supervision of the various security measures, thus effectively guaranteeing their possession up to the present lines of separation.
The Conference will, therefore, probably find itself in the near future upon the horns of this dilemma, either (1) maintaining the Neutral Military Commission, thus perpetuating the present situation as against Bolivia and encouraging Paraguay in its unyielding attitude, or (2) withdrawing the Commission in the knowledge that armed clashes will eventually result. Some of the mediators tentatively favor extending the functions of the Commission for a limited period of 2 or 3 months, but this would appear to have most of the disadvantages of both the above courses.
One fundamental difficulty is that Zubizarreta aspires to the Presidency as a rival to the official candidate who will probably be Riart. For their own point of view at first they must establish a clear record of having defended Paraguayan aspirations. There would, therefore, appear to be little hope of a more moderate attitude until the Presidential situation has become more clarified. Even then there is some question as to whether this will modify their stand as Paraguay already holds practically all of the Chaco and sees no reason for concession particularly if the mediating powers can be induced to continue to supervise the security measures and thus hold the territory for Paraguay.
The most discouraging feature of the situation is that the chairman of the Conference is vacillating and will not confront difficulties. Yesterday, for instance, when the Paraguayans commented offensively on the Conference proposal, instead of adopting a firm attitude he besought them not to attack the proposal but to remember that it is only a suggestion and that if they do not like it we will try to evolve another one. This, of course, merely encourages them to remain intransigeant.
[Page 168]There are now two immediate problems: (1) how to deal with Paraguayan intransigeance and, (2) how to keep the Conference alive awaiting possible developments more favorable to agreement.
We are to meet Monday to begin discussion as to how the situation can be met. It would be very helpful if I might have your views as soon as possible. [Gibson.]