724.34119/224: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:32 p.m.]
234. From Gibson. Department’s 136, October 7, 3 p.m. All mediatory delegates have expressed their belief that plan offers best present chance of success.
We are agreed in the light of our experience that we must abandon all thought of direct agreement save on the basis of a definite detailed proposal put forward and pressed by the mediators. We do not see any strong chance of adoption but if the proposal is rejected, it at least brings to an end, in a dignified way, the attempt to promote direct agreement.
I have not sought to win support for the plan but have submitted the facts and let each delegate decide for himself. The present position is unanimously in support of the plan as drafted in tentative form although there may be modifications when the mediatory Governments are heard from.
Department’s understanding of Elío’s position as expressed in last paragraph is entirely accurate. In third paragraph of my 232, October 5, 7 p.m. it was not intended to indicate that reciprocal concessions had been so complete as to meet on a definite line. Rather in the words of that paragraph “this line cuts between the minimum positions which they have outlined”. The quintessence of the Bolivian stand on the territorial question has been that they must have a port on the river, the territory ceded by Brazil in the Treaty of Petropolis being useless for this purpose. Paraguay has insisted on the other hand on the retention of “The Bahia Negra” including the town of that name and the drowned lands into which the Rio Negro or Otuquis empties. We have sought to cut this Gordian knot by leaving the [Page 158] town of Bahia Negra to Paraguay while giving Bolivia a few kilometres north of the town along the Paraguay River which were in Paraguayan possession even before the war including a port at Puerto Caballo as useful (or more accurately of equally little use) as Bahia Negra.
The line drawn to the upper Pilcomayo seems a fair and reasonable partition of territory practically uninhabited by either party. If you have before you a map showing (1) the line held by the Paraguayans on the outbreak of hostilities, (2) the line now held by them, and (3) the suggested line, it will be clear that the latter roughly splits the difference between the first two.
Both parties are entirely unreasonable but there is a bare chance that this solution may be accepted and if it is not this will show that the chance would be even less good of continuing negotiations on separate problems. If the plan is accepted we are out of the woods. A refusal by either or both parties would enable us to tackle the next phase which is the elaboration of an arbitral agreement.
I am convinced, however, that if it is decided to press this plan we should interpret our role of mediator broadly and exercise a friendly but definite pressure upon both parties to end this conflict on the ground that it is not only senseless as between themselves but a public nuisance for the other countries of America. I believe that such definite and concerted pressure is essential as both Governments are quite prepared to [play?] fast and loose with the problem for their own political ends. [Gibson.]