724.34119/214: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 5—3:10 a.m.]
230. From Gibson. The Conference is now faced with the necessity for declaring the war at an end in conformity with the provisions of article 3 of the Protocol. No date is fixed for this but the intentions of the Protocol are clear and the Bolivians are pressing for an early declaration. Elío makes no secret that as soon as the declaration is made he will start a vigorous campaign for the immediate return of prisoners of war. If this controversial question is precipitated the whole situation will be considerably aggravated and ultimate agreement rendered practically impossible.
I can see only one way to avert this which is through the presentation by the Conference of a definite proposal for the solution of the whole Chaco question. I think we shall have to abandon any thought of plan (such as that outlined in my 203, August 27, 12 p.m. from Rio de Janeiro) entrusting the territorial question to a mixed commission as it would inevitably be rejected by Paraguay.
A comprehensive plan for a treaty between the parties was prepared in my office this morning with Rodrigues Alves and Podestá Costa, and this afternoon we went over it with Saavedra Lamas. The plan may be briefly sketched as follows.
- 1.
- Peace reestablished.
- 2.
- Territorial question settled by drawing a line due west from the Paraguay River 20 degrees 14 minutes south to 58 degrees 16 minutes west longitude. From this last point a straight line west southwest to point where parallel 22 south latitude crosses the Pilcomayo.
- 3.
- Paraguay to concede a free zone at Puerto Casada and certain stipulated transit facilities on the railway and roads between that point and the frontier. Similar concessions in Bolivia granted the Paraguayans in order to give an air of reciprocity.
- 4.
- Return of prisoners of war on signature of treaty of peace except those who make written application to remain.
- 5.
- General amnesty for prisoners of war as well as the inhabitants of occupied territory.
- 6.
- Expense of returning prisoners to be regulated in conformity with Geneva Convention of 1929.
- 7.
- Reestablishment of diplomatic relations.
The plan would in effect establish a line approximately that which Zubizarreta a month ago indicated that Paraguay would be in a position to accept plus a few miles of the bank of the Paraguay River south of the mouth of the Rio Negro and north of the town of Bahia Negra in order that Bolivia may have the satisfaction of getting some territory on the Paraguay River in addition to that ceded to her by Brazil in the Treaty of Petropolis. Points 3 and 4 would of course be Paraguayan concessions to Bolivia to make it easier for the latter to give up some of its territorial claims.
We have also contemplated the possible addition of a point providing the giving up of the War Responsibility Tribunal and all claims for indemnities and reparations but are holding this back as a possible additional inducement and because of the fact that an immediate suggestion by the mediators that this be abandoned a few days after a protocol providing for it has been signed might have a bad effect.
The Paraguayan chief delegate has in conversations indicated that Paraguay would be prepared to accept all of the points included in plan, including abandonment of the War Responsibility Tribunal, the reparations, if presented by the mediators in a general scheme of settlement.
In my opinion the real difficulty is not [now?] believed likely to come from Bolivia inasmuch as Elío has made it clear that he is unwilling to take any steps which might affect his popularity for the next elections, that he prefers to reject any plans for settlement and try to maneuver Paraguay into refusing concessions, then going to the World Court, by unilateral action if necessary. However, if we put forth some such general proposal before the Conference declares the war is at an end we may preclude Elío from demanding the immediate return of the prisoners of war as an opening gun of a campaign to justify withdrawal from the Conference.
In our conversation with Saavedra Lamas this afternoon he expressed himself as agreeing in principle but suggested delay at least until we had seen the Neutral Military Commission which is due in Buenos Aires on Monday. He may or may not overcome his natural procrastination enough to take the matter up vigorously but Podestá Costa, his principal collaborator, is completely in accord with our ideas and is drafting a formal document embodying them. The plan will be discussed with the other mediators tomorrow.
We are under practical compulsion to act without delay as from one day to another we must declare the war at an end and unless this declaration is accompanied or preceded by a proposal for a general solution there is no way to avoid a serious clash between the two parties; as we see it we have no choice but to make some general proposal [Page 154] at this time. No purpose can be served by putting off the evil hour. We know as much now as we shall ever know as to the intentions of the parties and what they can accept and a continuation of dilatory proceedings would merely serve to cause the disappearance of all chance of an agreement.
If this plan is rejected the Department will realize that we shall have exhausted the possibilities of bringing about direct agreement and that the next step will be an attempt to draw up an arbitral agreement.
I am reporting this fully in order that you may have the matter under consideration and give me the benefit of any suggestions that may occur to you. [Gibson.]