Office of the Historian

724.34119/110: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, August 13, 1935—midnight.
[Received August 14—4:23 a.m.]

174. From Gibson. My 173, August 12, 11 p.m.

1.
Situation has today been further seriously complicated by the Bolivian delegation.
2.
In several discussions with Elío in the course of the day it was made clear to him that the conditions he had put in his formal note could not be met; that we saw no further possibilities of adjustment; that in view of the conclusion of his note there was no scope for further action by the committee; and that the whole subject would have to be reported back to the Conference. In spite of this he stated his desire that the note be maintained.
3.
Elío called on Saavedra Lamas before lunch and handed him a further note in which he stated that he had “special instructions” from his Government to say that Bolivia was not prepared to agree at this time on the constitution of the war responsibilities tribunal [Page 121] which must be put off until the fundamental question had definitely progressed toward solution. Bolivian stand based on proposal of Peruvian delegate reported in paragraph 4 of my 163, August 2, 9 p.m.
4.
As a result of numerous conversations it seems clear that this change of front is due to discord in the Bolivian delegation where there is a complete break between Elío and Saavedra with the result that anything conciliatory Elío does from now on will be under attack in Bolivia. His insistence on having the Conference debate the territorial question now, in spite of his frequently expressed opinion that agreement is impossible, makes it appear that he is looking to his political fortunes rather than the success of the Conference.
5.
As a result of Bolivian obstacles to reaching an agreement on prisoners of war and responsibilities tribunal the Conference is now faced with the territorial question under distinctly unpropitious conditions in that both parties recognize direct agreement by the Conference is highly improbable and agreement on terms of arbitration almost equally difficult. Both parties insist that the Conference remain in session without adjournment. The problem is, therefore, to keep the Conference alive without reaching a deadlock as stated in my 169, August 11, 11 p.m. Already deadlock and failure are to be anticipated if question is dealt with in plenary session, committee, or even informal conversations.
6.
After discussing various ways of meeting the situation this afternoon with Saavedra Lamas and members of our prisoners of war group, I suggested that we might ease the situation and gain time by resorting to the method that was followed in the preliminary soundings and that Nieto del Rio and Podestá Costa might again visit La Paz and Asunción. Their visits could be explained to the press on the ground that the Conference as a matter of courtesy wished to send certain of its members to acquaint the two Presidents with what had transpired up to this time in the hope that this would facilitate discussions we understood were shortly to take place between them. Out of deference to the Presidents the Conference would have a recess until after their meeting.
7.
The real purpose of the visit would be to have a plain talk with both Presidents pointing out that their Governments had signed and ratified a Protocol entrusting a definite mandate to the Conference; that in every question we had approached thus far, even where the delegates had expressed themselves in agreement with us, they had almost invariably produced obstructive instructions from their Presidents or their Governments; that the Conference was daily faced with explanations that this or that proposal could not be accepted because the President or Congress did not agree or the press was aflame or [Page 122] public opinion was rebellious; that the Presidents must realize that this created an impossible situation for the negotiators and that they had been sent under guise of a courtesy visit to make it plain that we must ask for a more helpful attitude on the part of the Bolivian and Paraguayan Governments.
7. [8?]
This suggestion met with acceptance but I suggested that it be given further thought pending another meeting that we are to hold at the Foreign Office tomorrow afternoon. It may be in the nature of administering oxygen to the patient but for the moment I can see no other means of gaining time in the hope that the military commanders who have thus far shown more sense and generosity than the delegations may have a wholesome influence [on?] meeting of the Presidents.

There will be no plenary meeting tomorrow but private consultation with all delegates and a plenary on Friday (without the Bolivian or Paraguayan delegations) to hear a report from the Prisoners of War Committee and Elío’s communication on responsibility. [Gibson.]

Weddell