500.C001/1105
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 4.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that on the occasion of Japan’s effective withdrawal from the League of Nations on March 27 there was a tone of self-assured complacency and of calm superiority in Japanese public opinion, as expressed in the press, that contrasted sharply with the feeling of uncertainty and apprehension which two years ago pervaded the bulk of the editorial comment on Japan’s [Page 114] decision to leave the League.* Furthermore, whereas in the early part of 1933 there was a mass of newspaper and other comment on the pros and cons of Japan’s decision, the arrival of the momentous date of March 27, 1935, was received with relative indifference on the part of the public and of the press, excepting the four mild editorials that will be dealt with in this despatch.
The public mood over Japan’s definitive and successful separation from the League is not unlike the frame of mind of one who looks back upon dangers happily past and fears once felt but now removed. The recent reaction can be explained through an analysis of the apprehensions entertained two years ago in the light of the events that have since taken place and the expected developments that have failed to materialize. In March, 1933, it was thought in many quarters in Japan that the Western nations would impose an economic boycott on Japan or that if such a contingency did not arise Japan’s foreign trade would at any rate suffer disastrously; that there would be a complete moral isolation of Japan in the family of nations; that efforts would be made to force Japan to relinquish its Mandated Islands in the South Seas; that Japan would become involved in a dangerous naval race; and that the United States might possibly take advantage of Japan’s isolated position to develop its trade in the Far East to this country’s disadvantage. Such were the misgivings of a large number of Japanese observers and even the chauvinists admitted the possibility of dangers ahead although they maintained that Japan could successfully withstand any of these eventualities and that any isolation that might follow would be “glorious isolation”.
Nevertheless, not one of the developments anticipated uneasily by the moderates and defiantly by the chauvinists has come about up to the present date. On the contrary, there has been no economic boycott against Japan and Japan’s foreign trade has prospered in the last two years, with an increase in the world demand for Japanese goods.† In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the League Council’s recent resolution against Germany’s unilateral decision to abrogate the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty,12 the application of economic and financial measures against violators of international agreements is specifically limited to European countries. Instead of having become morally isolated in the family of nations in the past two years, Japan now enjoys a stronger and more feared, if not more respected, position than it did before. The League has apparently [Page 115] abandoned any idea it may have entertained of demanding that Japan give up its Mandated Islands and has not even conducted any serious investigation of the report that Japan has been fortifying those islands. No naval race has as yet evolved, Japan has announced its abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty in the face of American and British opposition, and there seems to be little or no prospect of Japan’s weakening in its firm determination for naval parity in principle. Since Japan’s position has not weakened, the United States has been unable to “take advantage” of this position to enhance its economic position with China and Manchuria. On the other hand, Japan is closing the door on American petroleum interests in Manchuria and the Foreign Office spokesman has enunciated a “hands off China” policy the results of which are yet to be seen.
Besides, from the Japanese point of view certain welcome events that were not predicted in the early part of 1933, have definitely occurred, and others are reported to have occurred. The Chinese Eastern Railway issue with Soviet Russia has been peacefully settled. The European political situation has become more disturbed. The League has shown its impotency in dealing with the Bolivian-Paraguayan warfare13 and with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.14 “Manchukuo” has been recognized by one country, at least—El Salvador. A British economic mission has visited “Manchukuo”. Germany has flouted the League of Nations and has followed the lead of Japan in unilaterally violating “unreasonable” international agreements.15 And it is reported that China and Japan have started negotiations looking toward a diplomatic rapprochement.
Four editorials that appeared in the vernacular press on March 27 of this year may be taken to illustrate the changed attitude in this country towards the League of Nations. While formerly there existed some doubt as to the advisability of Japan’s decision to sever its connection with the League, the step is now looked upon as a happy “fait accompli” and the newspapers even go so far as to sit in judgment on the League. The Jiji states that, while two years ago Japan was “utterly isolated”, today its international position is “unexpectedly peaceful”; that El Salvador has formally recognized “Manchukuo” and the Soviet Union has given virtual recognition through the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway; that Lord Barnby’s report16 demonstrated the fallacy of the Lytton report;17 that Japan and China are on the [Page 116] way to renewed friendship; that now no nation is taking exception to Japan’s continued possession of the Mandated Islands, whereas this matter was once the subject of discussion among League Powers; that Germany left the League in 193318 and Paraguay followed suit;19 that the League is unable properly to dispose of the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia; that Germany’s recent abrogation of part of the Versailles Treaty may “shake the foundations of the League”; and that Japan need not fear the League, although Japan would have been placed at a disadvantage by withdrawal if the League had been a “really strong medium for peace making”. The Kokumin states that the League Covenant has many defects; that the League itself is a product of the Great War and is limited to European nations; that the nations of Europe fought in that war not for the sake of justice but each in a contest for superiority; that the Great War was different from Japan’s wars against China and Russia and from the fighting in Manchuria; and that it is impossible for such an organization as the League to show any effective ability for peace making without at least a strong military force. The Nichi Nichi states that events subsequent to the Manchurian “incident” have proved that the League attached more importance to the upholding of an unreasonable formula than to a settlement based on actualities; that the League put obstacles in the way of the development of “Manchukuo”, yet today that country is a “force in the Far East” which nobody can ignore; that the new state has been strengthened by the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway; that there is an increasing tendency in China to cultivate friendship with Japan; that there are indications that with the advent of the Roosevelt Administration the United States departed from its policy of supporting the League against Japan; that the United States is coming to a realization of the motive which actuated Japan when it decided to “stake its national existence” in a fight for the independence of Manchuria; and that the prevailing situation of peace in the Far East, partly a result of Japan’s withdrawal from the League, is a “curious commentary” on the League of Nations, “which is now unable to do anything about the situation arising from the German rejection of the Versailles Treaty and also from the dispute in Abyssinia.” The Yomiuri states that there was a time when Japan was threatened with international isolation and that this threat was enhanced by an increase in the number of advocates of the “Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of Manchukuo”; that fortunately the threat came to an end as the Powers came to know the “real intentions of this country in the Far East”; that Japan is now enjoying a “boom in trade, the like of which was never known before”; [Page 117] that “Manchukuo” is making steady progress as an independent State; that El Salvador’s recognition of “Manchukuo” shows that the principle of non-recognition has ceased to have a hold on “the League Powers”; and that it will not be long before Soviet Russia and Great Britain enter into formal relations with the new State.
Although the military authorities have made no pronouncement anent Japan’s final separation from the League, it is doubtful whether they could be entirely pleased with the quiet manner in which the event has come to pass, inasmuch as this very separation from the League has been one of the principal bases of the military’s contention that 1935 and 1936 would be “crisis years” for Japan.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s despatch No. 312 of March 7, 1933. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s Despatch No. 1206 of March 20, 1935. [Footnote in the original; for text, see p. 949.]↩
- Treaty of peace with Germany, signed June 28, 1919, Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. iii, pp. 3329, 3399.↩
- See vol. iv, pp. 7 ff.↩
- See vol. i, pp. 594 ff.↩
- See vol. ii, pp. 294 ff.↩
- Report on British trade prospects in Manchuria made by Lord Barnby, chairman of the Federation of British Industries mission to Japan and Manchuria, reported in the press on December 22, 1934, following the mission’s return from the Far East.↩
- For text, see League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (Geneva, October 1, 1932).↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. i, pp. 265 ff.↩
- See telegram No. 14, February 23, 1935, 6 p.m., vol. iv, p. 11.↩