761.94/825

The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State

No. 1236

Sir: With the signing on March 23 of the documents of the sale of the Soviet interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway to “Manchukuo”, we have come to the end of a chapter in the relations between Soviet Russia and Japan. Moreover, it has been a critical chapter if one reexamines the reports submitted by this Embassy during the past three years and considers the conviction of the great majority of observers only a few months ago that war was inevitable and comparatively imminent. There has been abundant evidence during those years that Japan, at least certain reactionary and military elements in Japan, desired and expected to attack. That war has been temporarily averted was due to a variety of factors: [Page 107]

1.
The intensive military preparations of Soviet Russia in Siberia.
2.
Recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States.
3.
The entry of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations.
4.
The non-aggression pacts concluded by Soviet Russia with her western neighbors, leaving her greater freedom to defend her eastern frontiers.
5.
The coming of Hirota and his policy of attaining results through peaceful diplomacy and conciliation.
6.
The concentration of Japan on the political and economic consolidation of Manchuria.

While these factors have been of varying importance, their cumulative effect was compelling. Soviet preparedness coupled with Hirota’s policy and influence have predominated. Hirota has accomplished by peaceful means what Japan sought to accomplish by war in 1904–5, and at least part of what the Japanese Army undoubtedly expected to accomplish by war in 1935 or 1936. The Russians have been sent north of the Amur and Japan now has Manchuria exclusively to herself.

We have come, then, to the end of a chapter. The question which now presents itself is: How will Soviet-Japanese relations develop in the new chapter now beginning? Many problems still remain for solution: the delimitation of the “Manchukuo”-Siberian boundaries, the disarmament of the frontiers, the revision of the fisheries agreement of 1928, the revision of the regulations governing the oil fields of North Saghalien, the recurrent controversy over the yen-ruble rate of exchange, and the fundamental issue of supremacy over the Mongol peoples and pastures. In the background, perhaps, but definitely and permanently in the picture is the military conception that Japan can never feel secure from potential Russian attack until she controls Vladivostok, the Maritime Province and Eastern Siberia up to Lake Baikal. There remains also the deep-rooted fear of Communism which influences the ruling classes in Japan.

In appraising the probable trend of the next few years it is obviously of the utmost importance to consider the several developments which have recently taken place in the world arena, directly affecting the Soviet position. With the rapid changes in current political history, certain of the factors mentioned above as having conduced to the avoidance of a Soviet-Japanese conflict have already undergone marked modification. As a result of the failure of the Soviet-American debt negotiations5 and the consequent termination of a potential and important commercial friendship, a moral or psychological asset of Soviet Russia has been lost. Furthermore, the German decision to rearm alters the position of security in Europe which Soviet diplomacy has not unskillfully won. Finally, the continuing deterioration of China [Page 108] is a factor which redounds to the disadvantage of the Soviets in the Far East.

With regard to the termination of the brief Soviet-American honeymoon, the effect is two-fold. The Soviets have lost whatever advantage might have been found in American moral support, a support which was potentially capable of important development. Japan undoubtedly dreaded the development of that Soviet-American bond, far removed as it might be from an actual alliance. The net result has been a weakening of Soviet influence and a consequent strengthening for Japan.

As for the German decision to rearm, it is a blow to the Soviets as a European power. Russian calculations which led to her entry into the League and to an active part in the balancing of forces and counter forces must now be revised. We cannot yet determine in what way the orbits of the powers will readjust themselves, but it is certain that for even so vast a power as the USSR it is impossible to maintain a dominant position on both an Asiatic and a European front. That is the fundamental weakness of Britain, even as a sea power. For the Russians, who are sprawled out over land through a great area as yet poorly articulated by railroads, conciliation either with Europe or Asia is essential. If the USSR should become involved in a war in Europe, Japan would undoubtedly use the opportunity to seize the Maritime Province and more. She has done so before and would do so again.

The effect of Chinese deterioration is less likely to have a clear and simple reaction on the Soviet position. On the one hand it is an encouragement to predatory tendencies of the Soviets long manifest in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang; on the other hand it so delivers China into the hands of Japan that the Soviet position is threatened. It is of course obvious that the Soviets can count on little support from China in case of a conflict with Japan. We are viewing today the expansion of Japan as a continental power and that fact is a portent of danger to the USSR.

With the foregoing in mind it may be seen that, coincident with the close of a chapter in the relations between Soviet Russia and Japan, circumstances have combined to alter the balance of power between these nations in favor of Japan. We may expect Soviet statesmen to seek to deal with this development along two general lines. In the first place the USSR will probably reciprocate and encourage the Hirota policy of conciliation as applied to the specific issues mentioned earlier in this despatch. In the second place the USSR may seek to devise some collective system of security with regard to the Far East. In this connection it may be recalled that so far back as September 13, 1934, the British Ambassador in Tokyo stated his belief that the [Page 109] USSR stood ready at all times to enter into a Far Eastern pact with Great Britain, the United States, Japan and China.* In the recent Eden-Litvinov conversations we have witnessed, perhaps, an exploratory effort in this direction.

There is already evidence that the Soviets are more eager to conciliate Japan. During the Buir Nor incident which involved the sovietized Government of Outer Mongolia there was a marked disposition on the part of the USSR to avoid implication in the matter. At the fishery auction in Vladivostok this year Japanese bids were accepted without question at the rate of 32½ sen per ruble although last year the USSR sought to have the rate revised in her favor. There are of course, to be negotiations on this subject, but the fact remains that the Soviets showed no disposition to become involved in another dispute with Japan at the present time.

More important than the above somewhat tenuous evidence has been the marked change in the public pronouncements of Soviet officials with regard to Japan. It is only a year since Molotov,6 Bluecher,7 and others thundered against Japan; it is scarcely six months since the Chinese Eastern Railway negotiations degenerated for a time into a contest of vituperation seldom resorted to by nations not at war. At the present time, however, we find Mr. Litvinov hailing the success of the railway negotiations in a friendly tone, looking forward to negotiations on other questions, and hinting that an agreement might be reached for the disarmament of the Amur border. On the conclusion of the railway negotiations Mr. Litvinov telegraphed to Mr. Hirota:

“I feel sure that we will continue our further fruitful cooperation for elimination of any cause for conflicts and misunderstandings between our countries and for the strengthening of really friendly relations between them in the interests of our nations and of general peace.”

The Izvestia and the Soviet press in general welcomed the news of the transfer of the railway in a tone of marked cordiality to Japan, if we may believe the reports which reached Tokyo. And last of all various members of the Soviet Embassy in conversation with members of my staff have expressed abundant optimism that the settlement of other problems will now be facilitated, To be sure their optimism may be studied, but it is none the less indicative of the Soviet’s determination to solve pending problems by diplomatic means.

With regard to the other Soviet approach to securing her Far Eastern interests, we have not yet been able to confirm the report that [Page 110] Great Britain and the USSR have been exploring the possibility of some collective system of security in the Far East. Nevertheless such a step would be a logical one for the defense of the Far Eastern interests of England and the USSR.

We have seen then that the balance of power has altered in favor of Japan and we have mentioned the two general directions in which Soviet diplomacy may be expected to work. Here in Japan, however, we are concerned primarily with the Japanese reaction to these new developments. What will be Japan’s attitude towards conciliation with Soviet Russia? What will be her attitude towards collective efforts to secure “the peace of East Asia” which she has come to consider her unique responsibility?

With respect to the first question Mr. Hirota in the last two weeks has repeatedly reaffirmed his policy of settling one by one through diplomatic negotiations the various outstanding issues. He did so in cordial terms in answering a telegram from Mr. Litvinov; he has done so at various dinners and ceremonies which followed in the wake of the railway transfer; and he has reported to the Diet in this sense. Mr. Hirota’s prestige has been enhanced by his successful mediation in the Chinese Eastern Railway question and he should therefore be in a better position than before to carry out his policy of conciliation. Accordingly there seems good promise that the next chapter in Soviet-Japanese relations will witness the solution through diplomatic means of many of the problems enumerated above. At the same time it should be mentioned that the rearmament of Germany has aroused the expectation in Japan that the USSR may have to transfer at least a portion of the Far Eastern Red Army to Europe. This in turn might influence the chauvinist elements in Japan to oppose conciliation with Soviet Russia.

With regard to the rumors of a Far Eastern security pact, the statements of the Foreign Office spokesman on April 1 are significant. After denying that the Soviets had made fresh proposals for a pact of non-aggression or that official negotiations for the disarming of the Amur frontier had commenced, he went on of his own volition to mention the effect of the European situation on the Far East. He advanced the theory that the vital interests of Japan are confined to East Asia and that those of the Western powers are not vital in East Asia. He even expressed doubts as to the vital nature of Soviet interests in the Far East. He declared that there was a growing tendency for each region of the world to maintain peace in its own region, the peace of Europe to be maintained by Europe, of America by America, of Asia by Asia. In view of the thesis enunciated by Mr. Amau himself and others that “Japan is responsible for the peace of East Asia”, his statement amounts to a thinly veiled declaration [Page 111] that Japan would not look with favor on any negotiations for a collective system of security in the Far East. In fact, although Mr. Amau’s statements sometimes reflect the opinions of the chauvinist elements in the Government rather than those of Mr. Hirota, there is little reason to doubt that the Japanese nation as a whole is determined in so far as possible to control East Asia by and for itself, and consequently will be inclined to disapprove of any attempts to impose restrictions, in the nature of a security pact, on Japan’s activities.

In conclusion it may be said that in the broadest sense events in Asia once more largely wait upon the crystallization of the present fluid state of European politics. With uncertainty prevailing in Europe the Far Eastern policies of the USSR and the other Western powers must remain uncrystallized. This is patent to the Japanese. Meanwhile, as for Soviet Russia, it may be said that a policy of conciliation looms once more as a policy of necessity. It is fortunate for the Soviets that the question of major political importance, the liquidation of Russia’s Manchurian interests, has been settled. It is even more fortunate that Japan’s most vital interests lie in Manchuria and in China and not in Soviet territory.

With these considerations in mind it may be concluded that the next chapter in Soviet-Japanese relations will be less critical, because less vital to Japan, than the chapter which ended with the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

While the foregoing opinions are submitted after a careful study of the situation, I believe that in Japan it is always wise to recall that time and again the military has taken independent, drastic action. Accordingly there always remains a possibility, at present seemingly remote, that an inflammatory incident along the Manchurian border might lead to serious complications.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
  1. See Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 166 ff.
  2. Enclosure No. 1 to Embassy’s Despatch No. 979, September 18, 1934. [Footnote in the original; despatch printed in Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. iii, p. 281.]
  3. V. M. Molotov, President of the Soviet Council of Commissars (Premier).
  4. Soviet Far Eastern Army commander.
  5. Enclosure No. 2 to Embassy’s Despatch No. 1235, April 5, 1935. [Footnote in the original; despatch printed supra.]