500.A15A5/440
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that recent intimations have been conveyed to me which, if correctly interpreted, may be of considerable importance in revealing the real attitude of the Japanese naval authorities toward and beyond the next Naval Disarmament Conference. Contrary to the views as expressed in the press to the effect that the navy desires an early conference and maintains its policy of last year entirely unchanged, there is reason to believe that these views may already be undergoing modification.
On June 24, three days ago, the Naval Attaché had a talk with Admiral Seizo Kobayashi, a member of the Supreme War Council, and often mentioned as the leading candidate to succeed the present Minister of the Navy, Admiral Osumi. In speaking of the next naval conference Admiral Kobayashi said that he was of the opinion that it would be held about November of this year, but that there appeared to be no chance of concluding a new naval treaty at that time. He said that while the conference had to be called it would be better in his opinion to postpone the real efforts toward a new treaty for at least a year, perhaps two. He gave as his reason the disturbed conditions prevailing not only in Europe but throughout the world. He said that Japan could not possibly compete in a naval building race with the United States and did not wish to do so. Admiral Nomura also expressed the opinion that this would be a very bad year for Japan in a naval conference because Japan is being criticized so much abroad for her policy in China and on account of serious internal questions at home. To the suggestion that the conference might meet and then agree to a postponement, Admiral Nomura replied that the postponement could be arranged through diplomatic channels.
The idea of waiting a year or two before making the next real effort toward concluding a new naval treaty has been hinted at several times recently by Japanese naval officers of high rank, including Admiral Hasegawa, Vice Minister of the Navy, and some retired officers. Although officers on active duty have in general avoided reference to this subject the reason for this, in the opinion of the Naval Attaché, is that the more conservative and more broad-minded group of higher ranking officers, which includes Nomura, Nakamura, Nagano and now Kobayashi, hope that as time goes on they will be able in some way to modify the demands of the younger officer group now supported by Admirals Kanji Kato, Suyetsugu, Takahashi, Yamamoto and others, who wish to free themselves of all treaty restraint and [Page 863] build a navy to suit their own wishes if they cannot achieve their object of parity and the abolition of the ratio system. There is some reason to believe that Admiral Osumi, Minister of the Navy, may have appeared to support the latter group more for tactical reasons and to preserve peace and order in the fleet than because of a thorough conviction that it is in the best interests of Japan to do so.
This growing consideration of the idea of postponement appears to be supported by both the conservative and the younger chauvinist groups within the Japanese navy, but for different reasons. The older heads hope that delay will furnish an opportunity for the younger element to realize more clearly the dangers of a non-treaty status for Japan and the hopelessness of engaging in a naval construction race with the United States. On the other hand the chauvinist element may well desire postponement and delay in the hope that Japan’s position may be improved through a lessening or modification of our own building program brought about by the pressure of what they believe to be a large pacifist sentiment in the United States or through failure to obtain the necessary appropriations in the Congress.
With this in mind it is clear that this postponement and delay can be turned to our advantage only if we continue to build up to our full treaty strength and also if we make it obvious that we intend to preserve the present ratio with Japan regardless of cost or other considerations, even after December 31, 1936, provided no further treaty has been signed by that time. I wish to re-emphasize the opinions expressed in my despatch* of last December discussing the importance of American naval preparedness, with special reference to the comments on page 13 thereof. By pursuing such a policy we would also be giving support to the Nomura–Nagano–Nakamura–Kobayashi group in demonstrating to the younger element the hopelessness of the situation so far as parity with the United States is concerned. Once won over to this realization there has been ample evidence in the past to show that public opinion, which has been assiduously groomed to demand parity and the abolition of the ratios, might then be remoulded to accept the new situation.
Respectfully yours,