711.94/1034
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
Reference, Tokyo’s telegram 64, March 27, 6 p.m.,57 paragraph 4.
“… the Younger Japanese naval officers have freely spoken of eventual war with the United States as a foregone conclusion on the ground that Japan has certain definite policies in China which the United States will oppose and that the result will be an inevitable conflict. One of the officers who so expressed himself is aide to Admiral Kenji Kato.”
Comment:
No matter who says it or who fails to say it or who may deny it, it is a fact “that Japan has certain definite policies in China which the United States will oppose and that the result will be an inevitable conflict.” Whether the “inevitable conflict” goes to the extreme of war will depend upon many factors of time and circumstance. Over some of these factors governments may have some measure of control; over other of these factors no government will have any substantial measure of control.
Japan has certain definite policies not only with regard to China but with regard to the whole world. In addition, the Japanese nation is embarked upon lines of activity which are natural and which will be proceeded with regardless of the formulation or the conscious following out of a “policy.” And the same is true of the United States and the American people.
The ideas of the Japanese people and the people of the United States are already at a number of important points in opposition. [Page 856] The economic activities of the two nations are bringing our two peoples more and more into competition. The moral and the political objectives of the two countries are already in conflict.
In regard to China, Japan is already opposing the United States and the United States is already opposing Japan.
Whether and at what point or under what circumstances these differences, this competition, this opposition, this conflict may produce war it is impossible to predict.
The people and Government of the United States want peace. They do not want war. But their desires are not limited to peace or to avoidance of war. They want foreign trade; they want to enjoy various and sundry rights everywhere and at all times; they believe in the making of laws and of contracts and of treaties, and they desire that these, when made, be respected; they have their own concepts of a regulated world in which this and other nations can exist with reasonable degrees of comfort and of security.
The people and Government of Japan are not so solicitous about peace. They are not so intolerant of the thought of war. They too want trade; but they do not believe as firmly as do we in regulation by law and by contract and by treaty; nor are their concepts of laws and contracts and treaties and of respect which should be given them identical with ours. They want control over lands and natural resources which at present belong by law and by right of possession to other peoples; they want enhancement of Japan’s prestige and influence and authority; they want to create and develop a great imperial regime in and among peoples of the Far East the essence of which will be a Japanese hegemony and perhaps an extended Japanese sovereignty. They know what they want and they are willing to press toward their objectives even at the cost, if necessary, of war.
It takes two to keep the peace. No matter how much the people of the United States may desire peace and be willing to do to avoid war, if at any time the Japanese decide that there shall be war there will be war.
War between the United States and Japan is not “inevitable”. Any one of a number of things might happen which would eliminate or at least indefinitely put off the possibility of such a war. For instance: a civil upheaval of sufficient intensity in Japan, a war between Japan and Russia or between Japan and Great Britain in the course of which Japan was severely weakened.
The fundamental concepts of nations do not change rapidly. The concepts and the objectives of the Japanese being what they are today, and their mental and physical vigor being what they are, and their morale being what it is, there is substantial likelihood that, barring unpredictable political accidents or acts of God, the time [Page 857] will come within the next few years when the Japanese people will feel strongly moved to defy the United States and cross swords with us. At such a moment, the only thing which would deter them would be the conviction on the part of those persons who have ultimate authority in Japan that Japan would have no chance of success and would be doomed to decisive defeat if the trial were made.
For that reason, the best chance for peace as between the United States and Japan must lie in the possession by the United States of machinery of military defense strong enough to deter the Japanese from daring to attack.
No conceivable concessions on the part of the Government and people of the United States would have any conclusive effect in regard to this problem. Even if we gave up all thought of overseas commerce, even if American interests and American nationals withdrew or were withdrawn entirely from the Far East, even if the United States endeavored to make itself a hermit nation, it would still remain a fact that the psychology of the Japanese today is a psychology of adolescent imperialism, that Japan is penetrating—with cheap goods—foreign markets everywhere and therefore in this country, and that there are many thousands of Japanese nationals resident in this country whose presence is an irritant in the localities in which they reside and whose rights and persons Japan is bent upon protecting.
It is absolutely essential that we take stock of Japan today as Japan is.
The politik of force—a manifestation and instrument of imperialism rampant—upon which Japan relies and will increasingly rely can be dealt with effectively insofar as the problem of the national security of other nations is concerned only by the imposing of obstacles or the interposition of force. The people of the United States are in possession of intellectual and material resources such that they can create the obstacles or the instruments of force which are, more and more, imperatively called for in this situation. The American Government should see to it that these resources are adequately employed toward those ends.
This country is not going to embark upon any aggression against Japan. There can be no absolute assurance that Japan will not embark upon an aggression against us. But the likelihood of there being aggression and, in consequence, war will be diminished by, and only by, preparedness on our part of such nature and proportions as will tend definitely to discourage adventuring by Japan into acts of aggression against the United States.