711.94/1017
The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 23.]
Sir: With reference to the Department’s strictly confidential instruction No. 671 of January 21, 1935,48 I have the honor to report that Mr. Shigeru Yoshida called on me today on his return from the United States and in the course of our conversation he told me of his talk with you, Mr. Secretary, his account tallying very closely with your memorandum of January 15 recording that conversation. He was clearly impressed by your suggestion that a “holiday” from unnecessary, untimely and impractical talking in our various countries in order to afford an opportunity for some calmer thinking would be the better part of wisdom. Mr. Yoshida told me that he heartily concurred with your views in this respect and that he had recommended them to Mr. Hirota with especial reference to the spokesman of the Foreign Office. He said that the primary function of the spokesman is obviously to speak and that the spokesman is under constant pressure from the press correspondents to fulfil that function, but Mr. Yoshida had pointed out to Mr. Hirota that under present circumstances public statements concerning our international relations should be reduced to a minimum. The seed which you planted therefore seems to have fallen on good ground.
Mr. Yoshida furthermore told me of his talks with Senator Robinson,49 Mr. Castle,50 Colonel House51 and many other people in the United States. He came away with the impression of a general misunderstanding and distrust of Japan and Japanese intentions and he feels that practical measures are necessary to overcome this adverse attitude in the United States. He proposes to see many people in Japan to explain to them the American point of view and to make recommendations along the following lines:
- 1.
- There should be less talk and more constructive action which should be aimed at improving Japan’s international relations in a practical way.
- 2.
- With regard to the question of naval ratios, the Japanese have been consistently basing their demand for parity on the hypothesis of a war with America. Naturally, if such a war should come, Japan [Page 854] would want to win it, but so would America, and if the hypothesis of an eventual war is taken as a basis it is perfectly natural that the United States should not wish to cede parity to Japan. The obvious way out, therefore, is to find some basis for a naval agreement other than the hypothesis of a possible war between Japan and the United States. If the matter is approached along other lines Mr. Yoshida thought that an eventual solution might be found. He did not, however, specify what line of approach he had in mind, if any.
- 3.
- Mr. Yoshida thinks that the primary and most important policy for Japan to follow at present is to develop improved relations with China on a constructive basis with the cooperation of other Powers. Only thus can mistrust of Japan’s intentions be set at rest. He said that he had strongly advocated this policy to Mr. Hirota and had asked that he be allowed to continue his tour of inspection into China so that he might study the situation and make concrete recommendations on his return. He said that Mr. Hirota was considering the matter.
In the course of further conversation Mr. Yoshida said that he had brought to Ambassador Saito in Washington a message from Ambassador Matsudaira in London to the effect that the former talked too much. Mr. Yoshida said that he had delivered this message to Mr. Saito and that Mr. Saito, to his surprise, had entirely agreed with him. It will be interesting to see whether Mr. Matsudaira’s advice likewise falls on good ground.
In this connection there is enclosed a memorandum52 of a recent conversation between Mr. Neville53 and Count Kabayama54 on the subject of Mr. Yoshida’s observations in the United States.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed; it transmitted the Secretary’s memorandum of January 15, p. 840.↩
- Joseph T. Robinson, Senator from Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Majority Conference and member of the American delegation to the London Naval Conference in 1930.↩
- William R. Castle, Jr., formerly Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State.↩
- Col. E. M. House, member of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Edwin L. Neville, Counselor of Embassy in Japan.↩
- Member of the Japanese House of Peers.↩