893.515/716
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips)
I called this morning upon Secretary Morgenthau and told him that a good many of us in the Department were becoming very much concerned over recent developments in the Far Eastern situation and that I would like a few minutes talk with him on the subject. Mr. Morgenthau at once sent for Mr. Coolidge.25
It had become apparent, I said, that important trends were developing in the Far East which might directly affect American interests in that part of the world; in the past our policy had always been close cooperation with the British Government in the Far East, a policy which we in the Department felt would protect American interests in the Far East better than if we were trying to go it alone; the policy of Japan was, of course, directly opposite; they would be glad to drive a wedge between the British and American Governments in the Far East; therefore, it was all the more important for us to do nothing which would tend to give the impression abroad that there was any radical divergence of views between London and Washington in connection with the Far East; as a result of an interview given by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross just before he left London, it was evident that he was disappointed, to put it mildly, by the fact that he had not been urged to come to Washington en route to the Far East, that, regardless of the rights or wrongs of the matter, it seemed to me unfortunate that a man of his quality and standing should go to the Far East with the feeling that he had been slighted in any way by this Government; moreover, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross’ interview had undoubtedly been spread all over the press of China and Japan and might easily have created already an impression that there was a divergence of views between the British and American Governments; [Page 615] in the circumstances, I wondered, and I had already made the suggestion myself to Secretary Hull this morning, whether it might be advisable for me to go to Toronto to meet Sir Frederick at his cousin’s house, where he will be staying, that if I went I could explain the reasons why we had not felt it possible to extend an invitation to him to come to Washington; that we naturally assumed he would like to consult us with regard to our silver policy, that, for various reasons, including the presence of Congress, we could not discuss such matters at this time and that we felt, therefore, we had better refrain from causing him (Sir Frederick) any disappointment in this respect; I could continue by saying that I had come up to Toronto to assure him that our historic policy in the Far East with respect to the British Government remains unchanged; that we desired close cooperation and good team work.
I might have added (though I did not say this to Secretary Morgenthau) that our representatives in the Far East would be glad to talk over with him at any time any matters which he might care to bring to their attention and receive from him any messages which he might care to send to us.
Secretary Morgenthau very evidently did not welcome my suggestion. He expressed surprise that the Under Secretary of State would think of going to Toronto to contact with a British official, who was only fourth or fifth in order of rank. I replied that I did not know about his numerals, but Sir Frederick was, in fact, the principal financial and economic adviser of the Foreign Office, of the Treasury and the entire British Government and could only be accepted as one of their most important officials.
Secretary Morgenthau referred to the comment which the British Ambassador had made to me during my last interview with him26 on the subject of Sir Frederick’s proposed visit to the effect that there was no real cooperation between the two governments, although on the other hand, there were good relations between the two. Mr. Morgenthau attached so much importance to this casual remark of Sir Ronald that he sent for his secretary, with instructions to find the memorandum of the conversation in question. When it arrived he re-read it and was more than ever satisfied that it was a slap at us. I said that I could not agree with this interpretation and felt convinced that there was nothing in the Ambassador’s mind to that effect when he made the remark.
At the end of a somewhat lengthy conversation, in which I brought out Secretary Hull’s concern about the entire Far Eastern situation, including the naval memorandum just received from the British [Page 616] Government,27 Mr. Morgenthau said that, while he was certain of the President’s attitude, he (Morgenthau) would not say anything to the President in disparagement until after I had talked to the President, if I decided to do so; he, however, reserved his right to express himself freely to the President, in the event that the President might be persuaded to accept my viewpoint; he was certain, however, that he knew the President’s mind in this respect and that he had a fundamental belief that it was better to make no overtures to the British, but rather to bide our time until they should come to us.
- Thomas J. Coolidge, Under Secretary of the Treasury.↩
- On July 16, p. 606.↩
- See telegram No. 359, August 9, 7 p.m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, vol. i, p. 87.↩