793.94/6892
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck)
Lord Lytton52 called and we had a conversation of about a half hour.
In the course of his address at the Town Hall last evening, Lord Lytton had said among other things that he felt that the Occident had failed to make clear to the Japanese its reasoning with regard to events in Manchuria and Japan’s procedure in disregard of treaty obligations and in impairment of the peace machinery and the collective system; he felt that it had not even made the effort to do this; he felt that the League as such and the British and the American Governments as governments ought to make approaches to Japan on the subject and the British and American Governments ought to initiate conversations with the Japanese looking toward a common understanding of and a common attitude toward the Far Eastern problem.
With this in mind, the most important part of the conversation now under reference was in consequence of a question which I asked: Had Lord Lytton envisaged steps which might be taken in practice toward doing this thing which he had said had not been done and which he felt should be done. Lord Lytton replied that he had: he felt that there should first be conversations between the British and the American Governments in which there should be developed a line of common or joint approach to the Japanese; these two Governments should work out a practical solution upon which they could agree and should ask the Japanese Government to give it consideration (Note: Lord Lytton did not say definitely what the solution should be but he intimated clearly that it should be along the lines of the recommendations in the Lytton Report. At one point he said that those recommendations should be considered and that perhaps it would be found desirable and essential to make some changes in them). I said that even in so seemingly simple a matter as the holding of conversations between two governments there sometimes arise difficulties: there is first the question of initiative; and, in relation to the holding of conversations between the British and the American Governments with regard to Far Eastern matters, there sometimes arises the difficulty that, as soon as the Japanese learn that such conversations are going on they become suspicious that something is being plotted against them. [Page 57] Lord Lytton said that he realized that there exist both of these difficulties. In reply to an indirect question on my part, he said that he felt that in regard to this matter the initiative should come from the British Government, as that Government was a member of the League and was in something of a half-way position between the League and the United States. He said that, however, the British Government would hesitate to take such an initiative unless it knew in advance that its initiative would be well received. He said that the ground might be prepared by most informal approaches. Thus, if it were intimated by us that we would welcome such an initiative on the part of the British Government, the British Government would then be in position to move. At that point I suggested that informal approaches might just as easily take the form of an inquiry from the British side asking whether we would be agreeably disposed toward such an approach. Lord Lytton indicated assent.
At two points in the conversation, Lord Lytton pointed out that he was expressing purely his own opinions and was not endeavoring in any sense to interpret, to indicate or to imply the mind and thought of the British Government. He stated, however, at one point that he had expressed to Sir John Simon53 substantially the same views that he was expressing to me.