893.515/536
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 19.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 147 [148], March 28, 7 p.m.,82 outlining a conversation with Sir Warren Fisher on the suggestion of the British Government for joint consultation between various governments in the matter of the financial situation in China. Fisher has stated very frankly that before the final suggestion was evolved he discussed many angles of it with the Japanese Ambassador on several occasions, so that eventually the idea had Ambassador Matsudaira’s full support, and he felt was likely of acceptance by his Government. However, the British suggestion was not formally placed before the Japanese Government until approximately the same time as my telegram referred to above. To date, however, no reply has been received from the Japanese Government and this obviously has caused some concern to Fisher. Ambassador Matsudaira is away, but Fisher stated yesterday that he intended to talk this morning with the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Kato, formerly Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington. This morning Fisher saw Kato and had prepared for him a memorandum, according to Fisher, “in terms of baby language”. This memorandum, Fisher explained carefully to the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires, was a personal production of his own, which he gave to Kato in the hope that if there did exist any ambiguity in the mind of the Japanese Government on this British suggestion this document would by full and detailed explanation alleviate it. Subsequently, having seen Kato, Fisher saw Atherton this afternoon and gave him a signed copy of the memorandum hereto attached.83
[Page 571]. . . . Consequently, while Fisher explained that the British Government was under no illusions as to the probable trend of Japanese thought, British policy was to negotiate for a peaceful solution in the Orient which would leave as undisturbed as possible the development of English trade in China and Asia generally; assure security of British possession in the Far East; affirm the general maintenance of the status quo in so far as possible and decrease the possibilities of a rapprochement between the Governments of Japan and Germany which might cause considerable embarrassment, not only to England, but to the United States as well. Fisher felt that all this was in line generally with American policy, and that the United States was not prepared any more than England to force initiative in the Far East, and that therefore in the present circumstances the United States Government likewise was seeking a solution in the Far East which maintained the open door as far as possible and did not add another area of conflict to create fresh difficulties in a world where a rebirth of confidence was of primary importance.
The impression left was that Great Britain was quite conscious that some day she would have to meet Japanese policy if it remained unchanged, but she was not ready to face such an issue now. This recent suggestion for joint consultation might thus be considered as one of many palliatives England might propose from time to time, not only for the purpose of temporizing in the Far Eastern situation, but equally in an attempt through an inconspicuous approach to introduce cooperation between the Occident and the Orient, and more especially common consultation between England, the United States, China and Japan. It was thought that this English proposition, if accepted by China and Japan and the United States, might lead gradually from purely technical discussions on Chinese finance to cooperation in larger fields; especially if these preliminary dealings carried on through diplomatic channels were not given great prominence and the results of them tended to a just equilibrium, Japanese opinion might gradually come to be less apprehensive of Western cooperation.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy