701.9493/96

The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State

No. 1329

Sir: Although the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told me on May 9 that the publication of the Japanese decision to raise its Legation in China to the status of an Embassy would be delayed for a week or ten days in case the American Government should wish to take similar action simultaneously,* two days later Rengo published a statement to the effect that the Cabinet had definitely decided to take this step, that the decision would be “publicly announced” in a few days, and that informal notification had already been conveyed to the Ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Tokyo. It is difficult to see how the facts, presented to me two days previously in such a confidential manner, could have been obtained and published by Rengo unless the Foreign Office had released them. Furthermore, according to an article in the Japan Advertiser of May 14, the Foreign Office spokesman stated at a press conference the day before that the Nanking Government had been informed of Japan’s decision. In handling the matter in this way, the Japanese Government vitiated any intention that it may have had to let it appear that the United States Government and the other interested Governments, in the event of similar action, had reached their decisions simultaneously with the Japanese. Consequently, when the Governments of Japan, the United States and Great Britain announced [Page 518] on May 17 that they would raise their Missions in China to Embassy status, a widespread impression prevailed that the United States and Great Britain were merely following in the footsteps of Japan through force of circumstance.

Editorial comment on Japan’s elevation of its Legation in China to the status of an Embassy was at first uniformly favorable though for the most part lacking in interest. However, several newspapers made observations that may be of interest in this connection. The Yomiuri stated that the exchange of Ambassadors between Japan and China would be made the occasion for a request by Japan for the recognition of “Manchukuo” by the Nanking Government and that Mr. Ariyoshi would present this request upon his return to China early in June. The Hochi of May 15 congratulated the Foreign Office authorities on their courage and determination in taking the step, added that Japan had more reason to station an Ambassador in China than in any other country in view of the close political, economic, and cultural ties between the two nations, and offered as an explanation for the delay in raising the Japanese Legation to an Embassy the fact that there had been “minor difficulties” between the two countries. The Jiji of May 13 stated that Japan had met China’s desire, since the latter country had requested the elevation of the Japanese Legation many years ago; that in making this move Japan had acted independently of Great Britain, the United States, France, and other countries with extensive interests in China; that Japan’s decision was of much greater significance than had been the sending of Ambassadors to China by the Soviet Union and Italy because of the peculiar geographical and political relationship between Japan and China; and that China would be highly gratified if Great Britain and the United States followed Japan’s example. The Asahi of May 17 remarked that in the past Japan had put more stress on cultivating good relations with Western countries than with China, that this “old-fashioned policy” had been liquidated, that henceforth Japan would pursue an independent policy as distinguished from its former policy of subservience to Western countries, and that therefore there was nothing remarkable about the decision to exchange Ambassadors with China. The Kokumin of May 24 took a less optimistic view of the situation, stating that officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs flattered themselves with the belief that they had succeeded in leading Great Britain and the United States in matters relating to China; that they took this as an indication of possible diplomatic co-operation in the future between this country and the Western powers on Chinese questions; and that, contrary to the opinion held by Foreign Office authorities, Japan could never expect to lead the Powers in diplomatic dealings with China unless this country persuaded China to recognize “Manchukuo”, [Page 519] because the problem of “Manchukuo” would always be a stumbling-block in the solution of other issues pending between Japan and China.

While expressing satisfaction over the Embassy question, many newspapers continued to profess to be doubtful of China’s sincerity, According to press reports, the military not only remained skeptical of Chinese motives but also were displeased over Mr. Hirota’s12 resolution to elevate the Japanese Legation in China to an Embassy. On May 12 nearly all of the leading vernacular newspapers reported that military circles were disgruntled because the Foreign Office’s action had been taken without prior consultation with the Army and because they considered the step premature and dangerous on the ground that China’s alleged change of attitude toward Japan was open to suspicion. Most Army authorities maintained, according to these newspapers, that the Army could not be ignored in the matter of important undertakings affecting China and that if at the present stage the Foreign Office adopted too friendly an attitude toward the Chinese, the latter would all too likely cease their efforts to control the anti-Japanese movement in the belief that what had been done so far had satisfied Japan. The Minister for War13 apparently raised no objection to the Foreign Office proposal when it was discussed at meetings of the Cabinet. However, in denying reports that the Army was opposed to the raising of the Legation to Embassy status, General Hayashi was said by Rengo to have indicated at a Cabinet meeting held on May 14 that some feeling had been aroused in Army circles by the failure of the Foreign Office to consult with the War Office before reaching its decision. According to the same news agency, General Hayashi subsequently stated to press correspondents that he had been given the impression by Mr. Hirota that the Embassy question had been discussed to some extent with the Army authorities; that apparently this had not been the case; that he had pointed out to Mr. Hirota that it would be well to be more careful about such matters; and that they had agreed to co-operate better in the future.

Judging from reports that appeared in yesterday’s newspapers, it would seem that even in certain Foreign Office circles there is a feeling that the elevation of the Legation in China was somewhat premature. Rengo said that it was pointed out by “Foreign Office sources” yesterday that despite Japan’s recent action regarding its Legation and other friendly gestures toward China, the Nanking Government had failed to eradicate certain anti-Japanese activities, such as the refusal by Shanghai newspapers to accept advertisements for Japanese goods, the encouragement of “recalcitrant Koreans” by [Page 520] admitting them into the Military Academy, and the continued anti-Japanese agitation on the part of Chinese diplomats abroad, particularly at Geneva.

Certain recent developments have tended to alter the opinion of the press, which was at first well-disposed toward the raising of the status of the Japanese Legation in China. The Japanese Garrison at Tientsin is reported to have delivered certain demands to the Chinese authorities on May 29 in connection with the alleged provocative attitude taken by Chinese troops stationed in the Sino-“Manchukuo” border district and also in connection with the recent murder in Tientsin of two allegedly pro-Japanese newspaper publishers of Chinese citizenship.14 It is not yet evident whether the Chinese will comply with these demands to the satisfaction of the Japanese military, nor what action the latter will take in any event. There are rumors that the Japanese Army is contemplating a vigorous course of action in North China if their demands are not met to their liking. Thus, as is usually the case, an atmosphere of uncertainty prevails pending possible drastic moves on the part of the military and public opinion as to the wisdom of the decision announced by the Japanese Government on May 17 may be said to be in a state of flux.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
  1. Embassy’s telegram No. 101, May 9, 1935. [Footnote in the original.]
  2. Embassy’s despatch No. 1289, May 10, 1935. [Footnote in the original; despatch printed on p. 163.]
  3. Koki Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
  4. General Senjuro Hayashi.
  5. For further information, see pp. 179, 190 passim.