793.94/7434: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in China (Peck) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:40 a.m.]
108. 1. It is understood that discussions of Sino-Japanese issues are proceeding between Tang Yu-jen and Suma. Both Foreign Office and Japanese Embassy officials are reticent concerning these discussions and the general impression is that they are an attempt on the part of the Japanese to bring the Chinese to a definite commitment, the Chiang-Ariyoshi conversation of November 20 having been unsatisfactory. Developments in Hopei seem so far to have been officially ignored and there is no indication that the Chinese Government has decided what action if any should be taken. According to one well-informed Chinese source, neither the Chinese nor the Japanese are yet certain of the intentions of Sung Che-yuan and difficulty is anticipated with Hsiao Chen-ying, Chairman of Chahar, who is considered the chief Chinese conspirator for autonomy in the North.
2. A plausible explanation of the autonomy movement’s temporary collapse on November 19–20 given confidentially by a well-informed Chinese official is as follows: Reports to Chiang by his intelligence service of indecision within the Japanese Cabinet which happened to coincide with a movement by Sung’s subordinate officers to defeat Hsiao’s efforts to persuade Sung to fall in with Doihara’s schemes, influenced Chiang Kai-shek to hazard “calling Doihara’s bluff” by ordering Sung to discontinue negotiations with the Japanese officer. Doihara’s threat of military invasion was thereupon repudiated by the Japanese Government because it realized that he was failing to persuade the North China leaders to go forward with his scheme. The Government’s reasons for its about-face, the informant conjectured, was (1) a desire to disassociate itself from the conspiracy because of possible action by the League similar to the application of sanctions against Italy and (2) probable adverse effects at the forthcoming Naval Conference51 at which Japan desires to press successfully its demand for parity. According to the official quoted in my 94, November 20, 6 p.m., orders to the Japanese troops not to proceed beyond Shanhaikwan were limited in time until after the Naval Conference and included also a restriction against military action (except defense action) in the Shanghai area.
3. Paraphrase by air mail to Peiping, ordinary mail to Tokyo.
- For correspondence concerning the London Naval Conference, see vol. i, pp. 64 ff.↩