Office of the Historian

793.94/7423: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, November 23, 1935—noon.
[Received November 23—9:45 a.m.]

172. Without knowing what has taken place during the past few days at Nanking it would seem that Chiang Kai-shek has four courses to choose from:

(1)
A compromise over the North China situation based upon [by the] creation by the National Government of an anticommunist commission of North China whose members would be appointed by Nanking which would include the leaders of North China and which would not have an autonomous character in both economic and financial aspects which the commission would have had if Doihara’s recent activities had been completely successful;
(2)
Capitulation by Chiang to Japanese desire for an autonomous North China;
(3)
Refusal by Chiang to compromise, coupled with intention to resist with force if aggression should extend to Central China; and
(4)
Resistance to Japanese aggression, this resistance to include North China in the sphere of resistance.

2.
The first course might be a compromise sufficient to save the face of the Japanese military and the North China leaders and the Japanese would perhaps agree to it as they would presumably regard it a makeshift arrangement preliminary to a real autonomy. A serious question appears to be whether this course (or the second) would not so seriously affect the prestige of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang that their continued existence in power would be threatened by disaffected elements within China united by such a course. The questions raised by the third and fourth courses are how long and how effective could Chinese resistance be maintained and whether a resistance that did not include North China would not perilously injure Chiang’s prestige.
3.
Rumors from Nanking that some sort of a military agreement has been made between Chinese and Japanese authorities (rumors which are credited but not confirmed by local Chinese observers) would indicate if true that conciliation is to continue. On the other hand Chiang’s sudden and temporarily effective interference in Doihara’s activities and Chiang’s alleged military preparations are indications that resistance in some form is being considered.
4.
The attitude of Tokyo and the compliance of the Kwantung Army to Tokyo direction are of major importance. If [It] is impossible to judge here whether the Japanese military will agree to any course which will not be humiliating to Chiang if he accepts it. An abortive attempt to demonstrate in favor of an autonomous movement allegedly occurred at Tientsin on November 21. There are reports that some Japanese military may make use of plain-clothes men in Tientsin or of such discontented elements as those led by Liu Kwei-tang and Shih Yu-shan to create a situation leading to autonomy.

Repeated to Nanking and Shanghai, by mail to Tokyo.

Lockhart